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It is the purpose of this study to analyse in Roman education 
the considerable number of elements which are attributable to Stoic 
influences. The field of Roman education to be considered is that 
encompassed by the teaching of the grammaticus (or secondary school­
master) , by the teaching of the rhetor and in the curriculum of the 
liberal arts or eyMdKXtos uauöeLa, which comprised grammar (literature), 
rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy. It is 
the range of education which might cover the ages eleven to eighteen;* 
and it was the general education undertaken by students in Rome 
following possibly four years of elementary schooling. Because
elementary education was concerned with the development of fundamental
2literacy and numerical skills, it includes no relevant aspects to
consider from the point of view of Stoicism; so elementary schooling is
not discussed. Also, as it is proposed to study Stoic influences in the
standard programme of Roman education as experienced by secondary
3 4 5students, training for such fields as medicine, architecture and law 
is not discussed.
It is difficult to indicate precisely when stages of pupils’ 
education in antiquity began and ended. Possibly the age of seven 
was regarded as a suitable age to begin elementary schooling (Quint. 
i.1.15; H.-I. Marrou, Histoire de l1 *34education dans I'antiquite,
p.202; M.L. Clarke, Higher Education in the Ancient World, pp.1,2). 
When pupils were considered ready, they proceeded to the school of 
the grammaticus', eleven or twelve seemed to be an appropriate age to 
begin secondary schooling (Suet. Her. 7; V. Pers.). It would appear 
that rhetorical education began about the age of fifteen and perhaps 
was completed at eighteen (Quint, i.1.12-14).
 ^ Quint. i.4.1.
3 Desirably, medical training was undertaken following the completion 
of a general secondary education (Galen xix.59).
4 As for medicine, the student architect was to have gained a knowledge 
of the subjects of the general curriculum, as well as of such 
subjects as drawing and law (Vitruvius i.1.12).
 ^ It is argued by a number of scholars that the framing of Roman law 
incorporated Stoic influences (cf. E.V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism, 
pp.384,385,402; J.E. Renan, Marc Aurele et la fin du monde antique, 
pp.22.23; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa I, p.203, Die Stoa II, p .135). 
However, an analysis of Stoic elements in technical Roman law is 
considered not relevant to this thesis.
VThe period of Rome's social development considered as 
appropriate to this study begins in the mid-second century B.C., when 
Hellenistic influences began to appear and then to transform and 
consolidate the principles of Rome's educational patterns; it is 
appropriate to place Quintilian, or the end of the first century A.D., 
as the later limit of this period. Throughout this time there was in 
Rome considerable educational development and activity which took place 
within a set educational pattern that was Hellenistic in form. And 
there are a number of very fine studies which provide comprehensive 
information on Roman education of this period.*
With respect to Stoic philosophy, much has been written.
Information on the Stoic systems is detailed, full and coherent, both
because of extant literature of the late Stoics in particular and
through the many studies of modern writers. So it is possible to gain
quite a clear idea of Stoic philosophy, and also of Roman education.
Yet, to my knowledge there has been no comprehensive treatment of
2Stoicism and its interaction with Roman education. And this 
interaction is the proposed theme of this thesis.
Stoicism was the dominant philosophy in the Greco-Roman world 
from the third century B.C. until the third century A.D. and the 
appearance of Neo-Platonism. However, in keeping with the terms of this 
study the Stoic system will be considered only up to the end of the
5 o < >1 e c ffirst century A.D. Stoicism, like Christianity and.-great community 
religions, had a theoretical rationale but was concerned in a pragmatic 
way with virtually all aspects of society. The Stoics had insight into 
and contributed in a practical way to the values of Hellenistic and 
Roman civilisation. H.-I. Marrou, commenting as an authority on 
education in antiquity rather than on philosophy, maintains that 
Stoicism was 'the interpreter of a whole civilisation' and that through 
a consideration of Stoic philosophy the historian can be accordingly 
aided in defining the atmosphere of thought or ethos of this period.
See Bibliography.
The work by G. Pire, Sto'icisme et Pedagogie, sets out clearly and 
definitively the educational views of a series of leading Stoics, 
especially from the point of view of Stoic ethics. It is a useful 
text on Stoic thought and moral education rather than an analysis of 
Stoic elements in the education actually experienced by Roman pupils.
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Such a r6le on the part of Stoicism is clearly exemplified in 
its contribution to Roman education. It appears in the teaching 
methods of the grccmmatious who in his methods of literary exegesis was 
indebted to techniques furthered by the Stoics and in particular by the 
Stoic Crates of Mallos; in the teaching of grammar, that was regarded 
as so important in antiquity, there was a marked Stoic content; in 
Latin authors read in schools there were firm Stoic values and elements; 
many gvammatici were either Stoic, or influenced by Stoicism; there was 
a Stoic rhetoric that was used by a number of orators and which can be 
identified with the 'plain* style, regarded as appropriate for certain 
occasions; the Stoics had views on the value of the curriculum of the 
liberal arts, or c y m u mAlos uotLÖcucx, especially as propaedeumata for 
advanced and specialist education; and contributions were made by them 
to the development of each subject of the c y h u mAlos Tiau6eua, except 
music and arithmetic; the Stoics were the experts on dialectic; 
knowledge of astronomy was gained by pupils for the most part through 
the established school study of Aratus' Stoic poem, the Phaenomena; the 
Stoics Posidonius and Geminus made firm contributions to geometry. 
Throughout this study it is proposed to analyse and elaborate upon these 
and other Stoic aspects in Roman education as elements that are most 
important and substantial.
It may be now useful to comment briefly on the arrangement of 
chapters in this study. In tracing the development of Stoicism from its 
foundation to the end of the first century A.D., the initial chapter, in 
comparison to the following chapters, is very much introductory and 
straightforward. However, it is important to be aware of such develop­
ment from the point of view of a coherent understanding of the Stoic 
system, of the way in which Stoicism adapted positively and effectively 
to changing social circumstances, and of its marked appropriateness and 
comprehensive acceptability to Rome's traditional ethos. Awareness of 
the Stoic framework, then, as set out in the first chapter is an 
essential background for considering the arguments presented throughout 
this study.
The chapters following the first chapter may be broadly 
categorised into three divisions. The grammatico-literary curriculum is 
covered in Chapters II to V; it is considered that a number of chapters
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is essential to do justice to the many strong and diversified Stoic 
influences that were incorporated in what was taught as really the basic 
programme of secondary education.
Then rhetorical education with its Stoic elements is covered 
in Chapter VI. It is convenient to divide this chapter into two parts: 
the first part treats the Stoic style of rhetoric and the second part 
analyses particular Stoic elements in oratorical technique.
The final chapter is devoted to Stoicism and the teaching of 
the liberal arts, with particular reference to dialectic and the 
mathematical sciences. Grammar (literature) and rhetoric, the all- 
important subjects of the liberal arts programme for Roman education, 
have at this stage, of course, already been discussed in previous 
chapters. The final chapter covers, then, a number of particular 
subjects; it is felt that the varied content of this chapter is 
justified because the subjects discussed were really specialist 
disciplines that were studied much less substantially by secondary 
students than the grammatico-literary and rhetorical programmes of 
education.
CHAPTER I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF STOICISM 
FROM ITS FOUNDATION 
TO THE END OF THE FIRST CENTURY A .D .
Stoicism1 as a school of philosophy was founded in Athens in 
294 B.C. by Zeno of Citium. As a dogmatic system of practical 
philosophy it was intended to give guidance to the individual in 
depressing political and social circumstances. Although the fourth 
century B.C. had been a very troubled period and the city-state, as a 
political and social organisation, had become obsolete, there had still 
prevailed a degree of freedom and therefore a degree of hope. 
Consequently there was an idealism in the speculative philosophy of 
Plato and Aristotle, who had developed systems of thought that were 
optimistically designed to strengthen the city-state. Their methods 
involved the investigation and careful questioning of ideas with a view 
to acceptance, or non-acceptance; in contrast to post-Aristotelian 
philosophy their systems were not dogmatic.
On the other hand, Hellenistic philosopies such as Stoicism, 
Epicureanism and Scepticism concentrated on developing principles which 
might be wholeheartedly accepted by the individual as practical guides 
to life and which might lead to self-sufficiency. The establishment of 
such dogmatic systems followed political and social circumstances where 
the resources of Greece had been consumed in struggles between Achaeans,
The principal sources that have provided general information on Stoic 
philosophy are: Diogenes Laertius; Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (ed.
H. von Arnim); Cicero's philosophical works; Seneca; E.V. Arnold, 
Roman Stoicism; P. Barth, Die Stoa; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa; C.J. de 
Vogel, Greek Philosophy, Vol. Ill: The Hellenistic-Roman Period',
E. Zeller, The StoicsEpicureans and Sceptics. Further reference 
texts are included in the Bibliography.
2Aetolians and Spartans; where the independence of Greece had been 
crushed by the Macedonian ascendancy; where the city-state had been 
subsumed within world empire; where corruption and low morale meant 
that people were ready to accept firm principles and guidance to help 
them endure frustrating conditions.^ In such a climate Zeno developed 
his system of doctrinal rationalism; in so doing he drew substantially 
on earlier Greek speculative philosophy and at the same time was 
sensitive to universal values in a world community, as appropriate to 
the situation in the Hellenistic empires.
Although it is possible to set out fairly coherently the 
teachings of the early Stoics and in particular of Zeno, Cleanthes and 
Chrysippus, there is virtually no contemporary evidence that can be 
referred to. We must wait until the first century A.D. for the first 
comprehensive accounts as given by Seneca and Epictetus; and of course 
the information supplied by Diogenes Laertius is of inestimable value. 
And the very great importance of Cicero must be acknowledged, for his 
eclectic approach to philosophy enables us to gain considerable 
information about many aspects of Stoicism. The fact that a wealth of 
Stoic information is increasingly available well after the time of Zeno 
testifies to its growing force and firm establishment in the ancient 
world. Apart from the literature that is directly and didactically 
Stoic there are Stoic elements in a vast range of authors: it was a
philosophical system that was itself eclectically drawn upon. The ways 
in which Stoicism later modified its own principles and was used 
variously by different authors reflect its successful adaptation to
changing conditions. The firm dogmatism of the early Stoics was later
2to be relaxed, enabling the school to remain active for five centuries 
from the time of its foundation.
Cf. Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p.229. The 
Hellenistic age as the period of Macedonian domination is described 
as a period of subjection and disorder, while that of the city-states 
is described as a period of freedom and disorder.
The Stoics’ effective modification and adaptation of their principles 
will be discussed, where appropriate, throughout this study.
3ZENO, AND THE ETHICS OF EARLY STOICISM
Zeno, on coming to Athens from Citium in Phoenicia, first 
joined the Cynic school and was taught by Crates.1 Reacting against the 
Cynic manner of life and somewhat insubstantial teaching he became a 
pupil of Stilpo who was concerned both with Cynic principles and 
Megarian logic. According to Cicero he was a student of Polemo and 3
later was to adopt the teachings of the Academy on primary impulses.
For ten years he was a student of Xenocrates, so clearly with him the 
influence of the Academy was strong. He was taught logic by Diodorus
4and Philo, showing a readiness both to study and to practise the 
principles of dialectic. It is clear that Zeno for a long time studied 
a range of philosophical teaching prior to framing his Stoic system.
And in establishing the principles of the school Zeno's function was not 
so much to originate but to draw from and combine elements from 
previously formulated systems of thought. Zeno's procedure in so doing 
naturally meant that he was to be accused of plagiarism.^ Although Zeno 
may have been indebted to previous thinkers there was a certain 
originality and thoroughness in the way that the principles of the 
school were structured into a comprehensive and coherent system. Also, 
it is important to note that the Stoics made original contributions to 
and furthered the development of human study and activity; for instance 
dialectic, anomalist grammar, aspects of 'plain' rhetoric, ethical 
theory were developed substantially by the Stoics.^ In so doing their
Diogenes Laertius, vii.2.
2 Ibid.
 ^ de Fin. iv.16.45; cf. Acad, i.2.35.
 ^ D.L. vii.16.
 ^ Cic. de Fin. iii.2.5. ... Zenoque eorum princeps non tarnen rerion
inventor fuit quam verborum novorurn. Cic. de Fin. v.8.22. Restant 
Stoici3 qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent> 
nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt.
Cf. D.L. vii.25; Cic. de Fin. v.25.74, iv.2.3; v.8.22; Acad.
ii.v.15; de Leg. i.13.38.
 ^ Stoic contributions to such developments will be brought out in the 
appropriate chapters on respective aspects of Stoicism and Roman 
education, and in the discussion on the modifications made to Stoic 
ethics.
4thoroughgoing methods of analysis, of proof, of division and subdivision 
gave firm strength to their arguments.
Zeno stressed the tripartite division of philosophy into
ethics, physics and dialectic.^ His ethical scheme laid down that
virtue was all-important and could be taught. Virtue comes by training
2and once acquired is sufficient for happiness. Virtue may take on a
number of particular virtues, namely wisdom, justice, courage and 
3moderation. Zeno therefore adopted Plato’s category of four cardinal 
virtues, but in so doing Co«s>V/i?sec/ the quality which
embraced the other three virtues.
Also, virtue was achieved by living a life in accord with 
nature.4 To live in accord with nature (Kara <J>uaiv) meant that the 
individual, like creatures of the animal world, would have a primary 
impulse towards self-preservation.^  Life in conformity with nature 
meant life in accordance with reason, for the cosmos is controlled by 
rational law or Aoyog. As man was a rational being, reason would 
control his impulses.
As <(>uais also referred to the world at large, it was 
appropriate that the individual as well as being responsible and 
rational about his own welfare should be conscious of his duty to man­
kind and to the universe.6 The Stoics regarded «frucns as being 
synonymous with irveOya; the soul was by its nature corporeal. Just as 
^oyos pervaded both the universe and the individual, so then the human









D.L. vii.27; cf. Cic. de Fin. 27, 79.
D.L. vii.91 foil'.
D.L. vii.87.
D.L. vii.85; cf. Sen. Ep. 10.
Cic. de Fin. iii.63.
Sen. Ep. 41.2; 66, 12. Ratio autem nihil aliud est quarn in corpus 
humanum pars divini spiritus mevsa. Cf. Epictetus, Discourses, 
i.14,16.
5Just as virtue and happiness were (den//"/ect, the good and the 
useful were h'nkee/ with duty and reason. What was useful could not 
be distinguished from duty nor from virtue. The Stoics, therefore, in 
these attitudes were showing their absolutism and uncompromising 
dogmatism. Goodness could not be modified; there were no degrees of 
goodness, nor could it really vary in form.^ While emphasising the two 
clear-cut categories of ’goodness’ and 'badness' the Stoics also 
provided for a category of 'indifferent' things or a6ia<J)opa. Included
in ct6ia4>opa were honour, disgrace, wealth, richness, health, poverty and
2even death; aflioKfiopa were apart from morality and were not of 
fundamental concern to the individual.
However, an 'indifferent' may be of varying degrees of value;
some 'indifferent' things may be in accord with nature, others the
reverse. Within aöia<f>opa could be included things of moderate value and
3some things that are more preferred. Zeno was prepared to 
differentiate within the category of 'indifferent' things; he described 
as TTponyuEva such matters as health, freedom from pain, wealth, 
unimpaired senses, fame, and aTTonponYpeva indicated pain, disease,
4poverty, disgrace, loss of senses, etc.
Zeno stipulated that there were appropriate actions or 
Ka0r)Kovxa (officia), where such duties might include friendship, family 
duty, public responsibilities. He was the first to apply the use of the 
term tcaQnKOV to such concepts. KadnxovTa were at the same time 
K a x o p 0 w y a x a .  ^ It was appropriate then that in accordance with Stoic 
absolutism the only really perfect duty would be expressed as a virtuous 
life.^ Yet, later, Stoic theories of Ka0r iKovxa could be adapted in a 
practical, effective manner to traditional Roman values through
* Cf. E. Zeller, The Stoics3 Epicureans and Sceptics, p.232; Sen. de 
Ben. vii.2.1.
2 Zeller, op. cit. , p.232.
^ Cic. de Fin. iii.16.53.
 ^ Cic. de Fin. iii.15, 51 foil.
 ^ D.L. vii.108, Kaxtovopaodau 6 outws otto ttpwxou Zpv'wvos xo Ka0hKOV.
6 D.L. vii.115; Stob, ii.182; Cic. Tusc. iv.6,11.
6Panaetius. Stoic duty in regard to honouring one's parents, family and 
country and Stoic responsibility as a member of a world society were 
strongly acceptable values for Romans of the second century B.C.
Strong emotions or passions were considered from a moral view­
point rather than from the psychological. Emotions were regarded as 
contrary to reason. Zeno defined ticxOos as disorder, which was an 
agitation of the soul alien to right reason and contrary to nature."^ An 
emotional condition represented an imbalance of the soul, which ideally 
should be rational and emotionless. Zeno thought that an impulse
impinging upon judgment was a passion or an emotion; emotion was a
2strong impulse that was contrary to reason. ’Aitddeoa was for the
3Stoics the ideal condition; the wise man or sage should be without 
emotion. Virtue was synonymous with otTtd^ GLa.^
The early Stoic concept of the sage was an ideal to which it 
was essential to aspire, but impossible to attain.* 235 6 The sage was 
absolutely free of vices and faults. His judgment was unerring. He 
alone had real cppovnobs. He alone was rich and happy, for he enjoyed 
self-sufficiency and had no material desires.^ The sage was never 
defeated; he was resolute and invincible. He alone enjoyed freedom,7 8
because of his inner harmony and independence. For him such negative 
aspects as pain (Xunn) , fear (cpdßos) , desire (cTtu^ uubot) and pleasure 
(nöovrj) had no significance. However, such an unreal and unattainable 
ideal as originally set down by Zeno was later to be modified. The 
practical application of such an ideal for everyday life was impossible;
D.L. vii.110, ... aXoyog xau Ttapa cpuatv (Jjuyhs xuvncbc; n opyp
7t AeovcxCouaa.
2 Sen. de Ira, i.9,2; Ep. 88, 10.
3 D.L. vii.117.
 ^ Ps. Plut. V. Horn. 134.
See D.L. vii.117-120 for description of qualities of the wise man.
6 Cic. Farad. 6; Sen. de Ben. vii.3; 2; 6,3; 8,1.
7 D.L. vii.122.
8 D.L. vii.110.
accordingly provision was to be later made for the sage-in-progress 
(npoMonn), where the individual could be virtuous in proceeding stead­
fastly towards the ideal.
7
In his uoAltclcx, which contained Platonic influence and
elements, Zeno maintained that only the good were true citizens,^" and
that the sage was the only one fit to rule or govern as a king,
2magistrate, judge or to be an orator. As a corollary the wise man
should not live in solitude for he was in character equipped to
3contribute actively to society. Involvement in public life was
completely consistent with Stoic principles; for there was a rational
affinity between the individual and the universe. It was appropriate
that, as the universe was equivalent to a world community, the individual
4should have some active responsibility in its social welfare. Such a 
view was clearly relevant to the ethics of the ruling Roman nobilitas of 
the second century B.C., when Stoicism was taken up so wholeheartedly.
Although the Stoics upheld the principle of self-preservation, 
which could be substantiated from the point of view of living in accord 
with nature, from the first they allowed the individual the right of 
suicide. Later, a significant number of Roman Stoics were to exercise 
this 'right', the first being Cato and then quite a few under the Empire. 
Suicide was justifiable if it was impossible to live satisfactorily waxa 
(pucruv; and if natural disadvantages completely outweighed natural 
advantages.1 23 *6 For instance, intolerable pain, mutilation or incurable 
disease could provide a valid reason.^* Or, in keeping with the 
individual's concern for social welfare#suicide could be justified for




 ^ Cic. de Fin. iii.20,67; M. Aurel, iv.4; ii.16.





The Stoics’ system of ethics was based on their scheme of
physics. Where the Epicureans based their theory of matter on the
’atom', the Stoics maintained that body was the element or component
that moved and spread through the universe.* Body moved through and
2combined with body. Associated with body was 'tone' (tovoz/intentio).
Tone was virtually synonymous with dynamic force which might vary in
intensity by exerting itself strongly or by quietly functioning in a 3
relaxed way. The Aoyos OTtEpuaxuxds was the creative aspect of body, 
that could be regarded as the fiery force of body acting in association 
with tone or tension. A divine power or God activated the movement of 
matter. God was all-pervading and created the four elements — fire,
4water, air and earth. The four elements were incorporated or mixed
within 'body', normally represented by heat, cold, dry and wet. These
elements were derived from ethereal or primitive fire. Tension or xovos
pervaded the universe, just as it was present in the individual.8 The
idea of a universal conflagration was upheld whereby at the close of the
great year or cycle of years all was re-absorbed into primitive fire.* 2346
However, the theory of world conflagration was not to hold throughout
7the history of Stoicism, although Zeno originally propounded the
O
destructibi 1 ity of the world in his treatise Tiepu oAou.
The Stoics supported a geocentric concept of the universe, 
which was a perfect sphere; the direction of all things was to the
* Sen. Dial, vii.4,2.
2 Hipp. Phil. 21 (H. v. Arnim, Stoicorum veternm fragmenta, ii.469).
3 "7 8See discussion^E.V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism, p.160 foil.
4 D.L. vii.136.
E. Brehier, The History of Philosophy: The Hellenistic and Roman
Age, p .47.
D.L. vii.141; Cic. N.D. ii.46,118; Sen. Dial, vi.26,6. The concept 
of the great year was taken from the Pythagoreans.
7 For instance, it was a belief shared by Cleanthes, Cnrysippus, 
Antipater and Posidonius, but not by Panaetius. Cf. D.L. vii.142.
8 D.L. vii.131.
9middle of the sphere.* The universe comprised two parts: in the middle
was the earth surrounded by water and air, and moving about it was the 
2aether.
Implicit in the Stoic view of the universe was the idea of
cause and effect, based on universal law and rational force. Fate or
3destiny was determined by this universal law. Similar arguments 
supported Stoic thinking on divination, which enabled man to predict 
events in accordance with the rational order of the universe. Nothing 
could occur without a basic cause and indeed particular, precise
4circumstances would produce the same result.
The anomaly that was raised in regard to fate was to reconcile 
free will (to ecp’ n y u v )  with destiny. And there was no clear answer to 
this. The Stoics believed that the individual had some degree of 
choice.* 23 It was argued that if the individual adopted appropriate 
ethical values his will was being expressed in accordance with the will 
of the universe. A particular choice, as an expression of will, was 
related to a certain cause (to a v a o T u o v ); for the wise man there was an 
appropriate cause which closely associated destiny and will. Such 
destiny and will, of course, should be in accord with nature and virtue.^ 
Conversely, with the person lacking in virtue actions would be taken 
that were not in accord with appropriate cause, will and destiny. So 
cause, and desirably appropriate cause, was the basis of free will, for
7no action by the individual was independent of cause.
von Arnim, op. cit., ii.547.
2 Ar. Did. fr.31 quoting from Chrysippus.
3 D.L. vii.149; Stob, ii.178.
 ^ Plut. de Fato, 11.
3 Cic. Acad. ii.12,39; de Fato 17,39.
Cf. Arnold, op. cit., p.214.
Plut. Sto. rep. 23, 2 and 3.7
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LOGIC
Logic, or dialectic, was the system of study which suggested 
methods for determining what was true or false. It represented a theory 
of knowledge. Knowledge was based on representation or image (cpavxotaua) 
of an object, accurate perception of which led to apprehension 
(xaxctAryKs) • The accuracy of the image could be equated with 
'apprehensive representation’ (cpavxaaLcx xaxaAnitTUxn) • * The 'apprehend­
ing representation' indicated certainty, or a degree of certainty. This 
certainty was not always in the perception by those less than a sage.
For perception by the sage was sure and rational; perceptions by the 
sage fitted into a completely rational and coherent pattern. There were 
also primary conceptions that could be the basis of other truths. For
the early Stoics it would appear that sensation and primary conceptions
2(xpoAn^eug) were standards of truth.
To proceed beyond these basic considerations and to determine 
truths not directly and unequivocally apparent, there was a need to 
apply scientific processes of proof. Zeno in breaking away from the 
Cynics, who regarded certain truths as obvious, insisted on precise, 
scientific proofs in establishing similar truths. Stoic dialectic 
schematically set out these scientific methods. The fundamental state­
ment or utterance for the process was the Aexxov, which in itself was 
not material but expressed the substance of thought. ’A^uwyaxa were the 
simplest statements that could be true or false. Statements comprised a 
noun or pronoun together with a verb. The xaxnydpriya was the predicate 
and an incomplete expression. A judgment was that which was true or
false, but also a thing complete in itself (auxoxeAeg), e.g. 'It is
3day', 'Dion is walking'. Although Zeno was very much concerned with 
dialectic and drew substantially on Megarian logic, it was the third 
leader of the school, Chrysippus, who as the great master of Stoic 
dialectic, built up the strong edifice of Stoic logic. Dialectic and 
its great importance for the development of grammar and Stoic anomalist
* D.L. vii.54. Cf. Cic. Acad. i.11,41.
 ^ Cf. Zeller, op. cit. , p.90; D.L. vii.54.
3 See D.L. vii.63 foil.
theory will be especially discussed in Chapter III. Dialectic and its 
importance for Stoic rhetoric and as a subject of the liberal arts 
curriculum will be considered in Chapters VI and VII respectively.
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CLEANTHES
Cleanthes of Assos succeeded to the leadership of the school
in 260 B.C. on the death of Zeno. He was apparently lacking in
originality,^ yet to him is attributed quite a number of works which
2cover a wide range of Stoic topics. Cleanthes continued very much in 
Zeno's tradition. With his concern for Stoic theology he emphasised the 
significance of destiny in the life of the individual. In his hymn to
3Zeus is expressed the Stoic religious feeling of the omnipresent divine 
power. The hymn became famous and was well known throughout the history 
of the school.
Cleanthes, and for that matter also later Stoics, tried to 
establish natural principles (Adyoc (puatxou) for popular mythology; he 
was concerned with allegory, writing works Ttepu §ewv and rcepu too
4
kolptoO (that is, on Homer). Zeno had also similarly treated all the 
works of Homer and Hesiod.^ He wrote on the struggle of the gods 
(öeoyaxca).^  Greek mythology was interpreted allegorically from the 
point of view of the Stoic concept of the universe. For instance, 
Cleanthes proposed that the name Dionysus was from öuavuaau, based on 
the daily completion of the sun's course around the world.^ Cleanthes 
emphasised that the sun was the governing force in the world, and that
D.L. vii.168.
2 D.L. vii.174-175.
3 See von Arnim, op. cit., i.537 foil.
4 D.L. vii.175.
 ^ See Zeller, op. cit., p.356.
Ps. Plut. de Ftuv. v.3; D.L. vii.175 (i.e. rcepu yLydvxujv) .
7 Macrob. Sat. i.18.
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it would be the origin of the world’s end by conflagration. The 
theological and allegorical views of Cleanthes influenced Chrysippus and 
Crates of Mallos in their allegorical exegesis.
CHRYSIPPUS
Chrysippus of Soli succeeded Cleanthes by becoming the leader
of the school in 232 B.C. He systematised and elaborated upon what had
been established by Zeno and Cleanthes. He is regarded as the 'second'
founder of Stoicism. He brought an intellectualism to the system, while
at the same time he maintained its original aims. To him has been
2attributed the lasting success of Stoicism throughout antiquity.
Where Cleanthes believed that virtue could be taught from 
moral premises, Chrysippus' view was that the individual could be
3
educated to virtue through the intellect. Through his capacity for 
systematic analysis and because of his concern for precise definition 
Chrysippus carefully identified qualities of virtues in Stoic ethics.
For instance, intelligence included the ability to distinguish between 
good and bad, and what was 'indifferent'.4 Bravery was the knowledge 
how to endure vicissitudes or was the necessary condition of the soul 
during suffering and hardship; the soul should be brave and without 
fear in acquiescing to the universal law.5 Correspondingly vices could 
be related to the individual's lack of knowledge.^
Chrysippus upheld that events took place in accordance with 
fate; however, he determined that there were various antecedent causes. 






Plut. Com. Not. 31, 10.
D.L. vii.183.
v. Arnim, op. cit. , iii; Chrysippus, 229a; cf. G. 
et Pedagogie, pp.37,38.





and approximate causes.^ But there were also antecedent causes that
after occurring still provided the opportunity for the individual to
2
influence the outcome. It was possible that assent or an expression of
3
will might be given to antecedent causes.
He had an allegorical view of mythology, which was to be so 
strongly furthered by Crates of Mallos. He equated the Fates (youpau)
4
with just, inexorable destiny and the Graces (xapuies) with benevolence 
and gratitude.'’ Chrysippus also supported divination; he wrote two 
books on this subject, one of which was on oracles and the other on 
dreams.^ Support of divination by the Stoics generally, except 
Panaetius, represented another factor in the acceptability of its scheme 
to the Roman ethos.
With Chrysippus there was some moderation of the dogmatic 
principles laid down by Zeno: good health, wealth, freedom from pain
and honour were now not necessarily ’indifferent1 2*4 things for an7individual's happiness and welfare. The flexibility and eclecticism 
that began with Chrysippus and were characteristic of the Middle Stoics 
were the basis for the survival and developing success of the school, 
where adaptation was essential. It is not certain from whom originated 
the concept of the npoxoiin or sage-in-progress, as a modification of the 
absolute principle that only the sage was virtuous and that no-oneg
reached this ideal. According to Zeller, Chrysippus was probably 
responsible for categorising 'those in progress' into three classes, as
Cic. de Fato. xvii.41. The terms suggested are adiuvantes and
proximae.
2 Cic. de Fato. xix.45.
 ^ Cic. de Fato. xviii.42.
4 Stob, i.180.
 ^ Sen. de Ben. i.3,8; i.4,4.
^ Cic. de Div. i.3,6.
Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 2.
Op. cit. , p .294.8
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discussed by Seneca. The particular steps leading to virtue, as 
suggested by Zeno, were to become a realistic compromise as 
incorporated in the concept of the Tipoxonn.
Chrysippus anticipated, also, the significance of human
psychology for Stoicism, as emphasised by the Middle Stoics. Cleanthes
had not considered the particular nature of the individual, but
Chrysippus stressed that individual natures were parts of the nature of
the whole universe. Therefore the xeXos of life was defined as life in
3accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe. 
Human development is provided for in his argument that to live 
virtuously was to live in accordance with experience of the actual 
course of nature.^
Chrysippus, more than any other Stoic, was a champion of 
dialectic. And he built up a system of logic that was to prevail 
throughout following centuries. Of the three divisions of philosophy he 
regarded dialectic as the most important.* 3 On the other hand, Zeno and 
Cleanthes regarded dialectic as a subordinate study, although they did 
write on the subject. Chrysippus wrote 311 volumes on logic, and his 
influence in this discipline went far beyond the Stoic school. He broke 
away from Aristotelian logic, but did not much contest its views; 
rather, he continued in the tradition established in Megarian logic, 
which had concentrated on problems of possibility and necessity. 
Aristotle had been very much concerned with universals, where the basic 
syllogism may be 'If all A is B, and all B is C, then all A is C ,  or as 
an example 'If all human beings are animals, and all animals are mortal, 
then all human beings are mortal'. The Stoics, however, were concerned 
about statements on individual things. The Stoic syllogism would there­
fore be 'If A,B. But A, therefore B'. For instance, 'If the sun is
Ep. 75.8.
? See M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa I, p.154.
3 D.L. vii.86.
 ^ D.L. vii.87.
5 Cf. P. Barth, Die Stoa, p.49.
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shining, it is day. But the sun is shining, therefore it is day.’
Accordingly, Chrysippus established five basic forms of the syllogism,
and his methods of dialectic were to make a substantial contribution to
2proving and disproving arguments in rhetoric.
Some of the very important aspects of logic developed by
3Chrysippus included the matter of simple and composite judgments, 
inferences^ and Stoic theory on categories.^ His development of Stoic 
grammar, that was basically a systematising of language for dialectic, 
and his work on literary exegesis were to be of fundamental importance 
when Hellenistic education was so enthusiastically taken up in Rome in 
the second century B.C.
MIDDLE STOICISM
From the time of Chrysippus until that of the great figures of 
Middle Stoicism, Panaetius and then Posidonius, there were a number of 
Stoic thinkers, who although important have not been included in the 
brief survey which constitutes this introductory chapter. Aratus and 
Crates of Mallos will be discussed in later chapters, but there will be 
no discussion on Aristo, Persaios, Herillos, Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of 
Babylon,^ Antigous, Archedemos, Antipater of Tarsus and Boethus of Sidon. 
But with Panaetius we have a Stoic who was of the utmost importance for 
Stoicism in Rome and who was the founder of Middle Stoicism.
See D.L. vii.55 foil, for discussion on Stoic dialectic.
2 See Chapter VI, especially.
3 See Zeller, op. oit., p.110.
 ^ Sext. Math, viii, 233.
 ^ See Zeller, op. cit. , p.97 foil.




Panaetius at one time a student of Crates of Mallos,  ^ Diogenes
2of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus was also taught by the Peripatetic 
and Academic schools. A Greek, he was born about 184 B.C. and in the 
middle of the second century B.C. became a very close acquaintance of
3Scipio and leading Romans of the time. Panaetius' Stoic principles 
provided a theoretical basis or rationale for the role of the nobilitas 
in Roman society. He provided a philosophical or intellectual basis for 
the Roman aristocratic ideal of rule. For Panaetius the Roman
4constitution represented a desirable form of government. Such a 
concept was based on the idea that the statesman particularly should 
embody certain Stoic qualities in his character.^ Personal inclinations 
should be subordinated to the welfare of all.^ The statesman should 
have the Stoic concept of justice which also incorporated a strong sense 
of social responsibility; and the Stoic idea of npercov (decorum) was 
especially important for a leader. During his long association with 
Scipio and contemporary leading Romans, Panaetius was instrumental in 
adapting the Hellenising spirit and Stoic dogma to Roman values. It is 
no exaggeration to maintain that but for Panaetius there would have been 
no such firm acceptance of Stoicism in Rome.
Panaetius' approach to philosophy and Stoicism was eclectic, 
in contrast to the dogmatic principles laid down by Zeno and Cleanthes. 
For instance, he drew upon the Platonic and Aristotelian idea that 
certain ones should lead and that others should serve; he substantiated
7such thinking from Stoic teaching of natural law. The modifications 
made to the system by Chrysippus were for the most part continued with
Strab. xiv.676.
Cic. de Div. i.6.
Cic. pro Mur. 66; de Off. i.90.
Cic. de Leg. iii.14; de Rep. i.34.
Cf. M. Pohlenz, op. oit. , p.436.
Lucilius, 1337.









Panaetius, who discarded some basic Stoic principles while broadening 
and 'humanising' Stoic teaching into a wider pattern.
He placed primary importance on physics.^ He upheld the
theory of universal law and life in accord with nature. However, he
played down the theology of the school and the significance of fate. He
2rejected the concept of the universal conflagration, and virtually
3alone of Stoics did not support divination or astrology. Consequently
4he regarded the universe as indestructible. It is clear that his views 
on nature and physics provided for human development and individual 
psychology; and this emphasis is evident in a number of ways:
(i) He distinguished human nature from that of animals by
asserting that man's sense organs gave him the capacity to 
appreciate beauty of form and tone, and led him to a 
capacity for artistic enjoyment.'’ The arts then were the 
result of human effort; and for Panaetius human effort and 
expression were of great importance.
(ii) He broke with the Stoic tradition that all were equal.
There were degrees of quality in mankind and in society.^ 
Such a view was no doubt acceptable to the nobiles of 
Scipio's time.
(iii) While Panaetius acknowledged the qualities of courage,
7justice and moderation, which were practical virtues, he 
also emphasised theoretical virtue (cppovnous) which enabled 
the individual through theoretical knowledge and intellectg
to decide what was morally appropriate.
1 D. L. vii.141.
2 Cic. N.D. ii. 118 •
3 Cic. de Div. i. 6,12; D.L. vii . 149
4 Cic. N.D. ii. 73 foil.
5 Cic. N.D. ii. 140 foil;; i. 14.
6 Cic. Tusc ii .65; de Div. ii. 96.
7 D.L. vii. 92.
8 Cic. de Off. i.6,19.
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(iv) Panaetius considered that aöudcpopa were to be elevated to 
become significant, for virtue was not necessarily self- 
sufficing; health and material needs were important.^
(v) He set down a human application of logos that enabled the
individual to use ’reason' in regard to his own inclinations.
Panaetius, in the tradition of Crates of Mallos, was strongly
interested in philological and literary exegesis. However, his sense of
human psychology and his realistic outlook did not allow him to believe
in the strongly allegorical and extreme idea that the poet should be a
2sage, with which Homer might accordingly be identified. Yet he was
strongly interested in literature, as indicated by his concern about
establishing the authorship of certain works; and he wrote a favourable
3commentary on a poem by Appius Claudius.
It is evident that Panaetius' standing both in Athens and Rome 
was extremely high. When he returned to Athens from Rome, the school 
flourished under his leadership. And at that time the Stoic school 
became the leading philosophical school there. In Rome his high 
standing with the Scipionic circle was unique in Roman history, for no 
other philosopher was to enjoy such a privileged position with the Roman 
establishment.
Cicero expresses great respect for Panaetius^ and of course 
was especially indebted to his Tcepu too MaSnxovxos in writing his De 
Officiis. In keeping with Cicero's own attitude towards philosophy, he 
commends Panaetius for his less dogmatic approach to Stoicism and his 
readiness to draw from other philosophers.^
Panaetius' most important students were Posidonius of Apamea 
and Hecato of Rhodes. For the present survey, of these two Stoics it is
1 D.L. vii.128; Cic. de Fin. iv.23.
2 Pohlenz, op. cit. , p.421.
 ^ Cic. Tusc. iv.2,4.
Cic. de Leg. iii.14.
5 Cic. de Fin. iv.79.
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important to comment upon Posidonius, the great encyclopaedic intellect 
of Middle Stoicism. However, while Panaetius was very much concerned 
with a humanist approach to Stoicism and had a deep interest in social 
responsibility, Posidonius was the pure scientist, whose research and 
knowledge are of the utmost significance; but he was less concerned 
with the implications of Stoicism in the practical sense and for Roman 
society.
POSIDONIUS
Where Panaetius was able to find practical expression for his
Stoicism within an ordered Roman society, Posidonius appeared to be a
strongly interested but more detached observer. On the other hand, it
might be noted that the unsettled circumstances of the republic that
prevailed during Posidonius' lifetime made it impossible for him to
associate with the governing class as Panaetius had done, and to a
lesser extent Polybius, with the Scipionic circle; Rome’s welfare was
being determined too strongly by the changing power of individuals for
such a situation to exist. Yet Posidonius' influence was strong with a
number of leading Romans, as well as with scholars. Pompey was his
friend, and at times visited him at Rhodes.^ Also, Cicero was his
2student and friend. But perhaps more importantly his influence was 
strong with such outstanding scholars as Galen, Asclepiodotus of Nicaea, 
Proclus and Cleomedes the mathematicians and Strabo the geographer. 
Although Posidonius was of impressive intellect, was a philosopher of 
far reaching influence, and wrote a great deal, nothing of his jictual 
work has survived. Yet from other sources it is still possible to 
present a fairly coherent comment on his philosophic views.
In accordance with basic Stoic dogma Posidonius emphasised the
articulated unity or monism, which meant that all things in the universe
3were connected throughout a divine order. Such a basic Stoic dogma
Cic. Tusc. ii.26,61; Pliny N.D. vii.30; Plutarch, Life of Pompey, 
42.
2 Cic. N.D. i.123.
3 D.L. vii.138.
20
taught that all elements existed in all things;1 and a vis vitalis or 
öuvayts cwTbxn pervaded all, a vital life-giving force that was 
universal. Posidonius gave special emphasis to this idea of a force 
that was strongly dynamic and active. He gave more attention to this 
aspect of Stoic physics than to the 'rational' aspect, to which 
according to the early Stoics everything was subordinate. For
Posidonius warmth was the prime physical agent; there was a warm breath
ft 3(Tiveuya evdepyov) in the nature of all things; this nveuya was the
soul which moved and 'animated' plants, animals, human beings, etc.
Posidonius believed that providence was related to warmth as the prime
physical agent, while the early Stoics thought that providence was based
4on reason. Therefore throughout the whole universe there was nveuya 
which could be identified with a divine intellectual spirit that 
extended through substance.^
It was appropriate that in arguing that a divine, active nous 
permeated the world Posidonius upheld divination as a valid method of 
prediction; of all Stoics Posidonius was the strongest champion of 
divination. Therefore his thoughts on divination were important for 
Roman theology and religious practice. In Cicero’s De Divinatione are 
comprehensively set out the arguments of Posidonius who considered 
divination in a tripartite manner;^ he maintained that Zeus could issue 
his prophecies through an inspired prophet, that fate could be predicted 
through astrology and that future events could be presaged through 
various natural phenomena.
Posidonius' views on ethics were in keeping with the more 
reasoned and modified thinking of the Middle Stoics, who as mentioned
Cic. N.D. ii.84; Sen. N.Q. ii.4,6;
Cic. N.D. ii.24; Sen. N.Q. v.6.
D. L. vii.157.
Cic. N.D. ii.11-16.
See L. Edelstein, 'The Philosophical System of Posidonius', American 
Journal of Philology, Vol. 57, 1936, p.291.
6 Cic. de Div. i.125.
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were prepared to give consideration to human psychology. Like early
Stoics he believed that virtue could be taught, but stressed the concept
of the sage-in-progress.* Like Panaetius he believed that certain
2aöudcpopa could contribute to man’s happiness; he maintained that
3health and wealth could be considered 'good things'. However, he
warned that such advantages as were included in aöudcpopa could be also
4the causes of evil. Posidonius did not unequivocally uphold the idea 
of aTtdSeua. He considered that there were gradations of emotions or 
passions, just as there were gradations leading to wisdom.*’ Emotions 
should not necessarily be suppressed but should be subordinated to man's 
own reason or logos; in this way inner peace and harmony of soul could 
be acquired. Posidonius related these theories to the traditional 
Stoic principle of 'life in accord with nature'. His reasoned approach
7stressed that virtues be based on the right understanding of emotions. 
Arguing against traditional Stoic psychology he adopted Plato's viewg
that in the psyche there were both rational and irrational elements. 
Posidonius provided for the process of human development where the child 
in its natural inclination to pleasure and power, and in its natural 
aversion to pain, matured in such a way that 'irrational' elements less
9dominated its behaviour. Such a theory, of course, was consistent with 
the idea that virtue could be acquired or taught.*9
While Posidonius had clear ideas on principles of Stoic 




 ^ Sen. Ep. 87.13.
3 Cf. Brehier, op. cit. , p.138.
9 Cf. Pohlenz, op. cit., vol. I, p.237.
Galen, de Placitis, 654,36; cf. Edelstein, op. cit., p.312.
O
F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics, p.135.
9 Ibid. , pp.135,136.
10 D.L. vii.91.
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taken up by his followers, Posidonius’ contribution is more marked in 
the various disciplines and subjects he researched and wrote about. His 
influence was very much through the great body of knowledge he built up 
by scientific and mathematical methods, whereas Panaetius' influence had 
been for the most part through his ideas on Stoic ethics and humanistic 
values.
Posidonius’ research was based on a thoroughgoing scheme of
causation, where the early Stoics had one simple concept of caused He
considered that cause was inherent in matter, in the principle of
activity or reason governing the universe and in the soul itself which
was a source of motion. His approach to philosophy was consistent with
the importance he gave to causation, and consequently to mathematical
processes. Galen believed that his philosophical principles and the
ways in which his views differed from Stoic dogma were based
2fundamentally on his mathematics. And mathematics was dominant in his 
intellectual activity.
Posidonius was renowned as a geometer. He broke away from 
the traditional Stoic idea that mathematical figures existed only in 
thought, and convincingly based his mathematics on the principle that 
mathematical form was corporeal and that mathematical figures actually
4existed. As an astronomer Posidonius developed a coherent scheme based 
on his mathematical methods and on his firm views regarding world 
physics. He upheld a geocentric view of the universe, at the same time 
attributing to the sun a very strong force that was divine and possessed 
soul.' He suggested precise calculations for the sizes of heavenly 
bodies and for distances between them. As a geographer he presented 
arguments based on travel and empirical observation, anthropological 
description and mathematical calculation. For instance, he had clear
Cf. Areios Didymos fr.18 Doxographi Gvaeci, p.457,4 foil.
2 de Placitis, 362,5; 653,14.
3 Comment on Posidonius' contribution to geometry is included in 
Chapter VII, 'Stoicism and the Teaching of the Liberal Arts'.
4 Cf. discussion by Edelstein, op. cit., p.303.
D.L. vii.139 foil.; cf. Pohlenz, op. cit., Vol. I, p.223 foil.
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theories on tidal phenomena, and wrote on the ocean and regions in his 
uept wxeavoO moil xwv Max’ auxov, providing precise measurements on these; 
and he presented views about environmental and geographic influences on 
mankind.*
Posidonius’ scholarship was imposing, covering many fields in
great depth. He was receptive to the ideas of other philosophical
schools, and was particularly influenced by Plato and Aristotle. It is
2 3agreed that his prose style was excellent, and it has been suggested 
that his writings represented the high point of Hellenistic prose style. 
Although Posidonius gave original aspects to many principles of Stoicism, 
his principal contributions were to particular disciplines and to 
scientific research and development; his influence was not to be very 
strong in Stoic ethics or in other philosophical developments.
STOICISM AND THE ROMAN ETHOS
Of the complex and varied Hellenistic influences that appeared 
in Rome in the second century B.C., Stoicism in particular was accept­
able to the Roman ethos; Stoic principles and traditional Roman values 
could be quite compatible. The concept of Stoic divine rationalism 
ruling the world could be readily equated with Roman pantheism and 
theology. The Stoic idea of the virtuous being active in politics and 
of the individual having a responsibility to his fellow man provided 
philosophic support to the political activity of Scipio and his fellow 
nobiles.
Roman pietas which stipulated duty to family, gods and state 
could be regarded as consistent with Stoic duty or MaShxov; also in 
other ways Stoic McxdrjHov, as mentioned, could be equated with Roman 
officium, which required suitable, responsible conduct in accordance 
with a particular situation. The Roman state religion could also be 
related to and substantiated by Stoic theology. Q. Mucius Scaevola,
Pohlenz, op. cit. , Vol. I, p.221 foil.; Barth, op. cit., p.136 foil.
2 Cf. evidence cited by Pohlenz, op. cit., Vol. II, p.104.
3 Ibid., Vol. I, p .211.
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pontifex maximus, took over Panaetius' tvipevtita theologia, that set 
out three 'theologies’: poetic theology which is futile, for gods are
considered less than outstanding men; the theology of philosophers 
which may not really help the existence of the community; and the 
theology of statesmen which upholds the traditional religion of the 
community.
It is interesting that a number of jurists who were 
responsible for framing Roman law in the late second century B.C. and 
early first century B.C. were Stoic, or had Stoic sympathies. Stoic 
dialectic was applied to the development of Roman law by Servius
Sulpicius, student of the Stoics, Lucilius Balbus and Gaius Aquilius
2 3Gallus. Q. Tubero had also applied dialectic to Roman law. It is
4generally contended that when the Romans framed from their own tus 
civile the ius gentium which was required for the legal administration 
of their growing empire, Stoic theories regarding the general community 
of mankind and the world logos provided a philosophical rationale for 
their legislation.
The Roman ethos from the middle second century B.C. was to be 
permanently changed and its elements enriched by Hellenistic influences. 
The synthesis so formed embodied substantial Stoic content. While it is 
appropriate to mention briefly these developments as appropriate to the 
brief survey which constitutes this introductory chapter, the analysis 
and explanation of such developments in regard to Roman education are 
really the theme of this thesis; they are to be discussed in detail 
throughout the following chapters. Roman education was taken over by 
the Hellenistic pattern which was grammatico-literary for the most part. 
Stoic anomalist grammar made a substantial contribution to the teaching 
of Latin grammar by the grccmmaticus. And the Stoic, Crates of Mallos, 
introduced to Rome methods of literary exegesis which were so strongly
* See Brehier, op. cit., p.131; Pohlenz, op. cit. , Vol. I, p .198; Cf. 
Augustine, Civ. Dei, iv.27.
2 Cic. Brut. 152; 154.
 ^ A. Gellius, Noctes Atticae, i.22,7.
 ^ Cf. Pohlenz, op. cit., Vol. I, p.263; Vol. II, p.135.
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influenced by Stoic philosophy. Rhetoric, too, had as one of its styles 
a plain form which could be associated with the Stoic style. Stoic 
dialectic made a contribution to methods of rhetorical proofs. The 
purpose will be to show that the Stoic elements in education and in 
intellectual activity were substantial and lasting. However, for the 
present it is first important to comment upon Late Stoicism and to 
complete this introductory outline.
LATE STOICISM
It is convenient to mark the end of Middle Stoicism with the
death of Posidonius in 51 B.C. and the appearance of Late Stoicism with
the work of Seneca and Musonius about the middle of the first century
A.D. Yet, it should be noted that Cicero, who was a professed follower
of the New Academy and had a strong but eclectic interest in philosophy,
presented for Roman readers a great deal of Stoic thought in his
prolific writings. In being the first Roman to treat philosophy in
Latin, he exposed many Romans to Greek philosophy in general, and
naturally to Stoicism in particular.^ Marcus Porcius Cato, who suicided
in 46 B.C., represented the prototype of the Roman hero and practising
2Stoic. The repeated extolling of Cato throughout Latin literature
indicates that he was regarded as the epitome of both Roman and Stoic
ethics. Aelius Stilo, teacher of Cicero and Varro, was the outstanding
3Roman philologist of the first century B.C.; he championed Stoic 
anomalist grammar in Rome. And even though the analogist system was 
ultimately to prevail, especially through the efforts of Remmius 
Palaemon in the first century A.D., Aelius Stilo's influence was 
considerable and, later, he was often referred to by Quintilian.
Stoicism under the empire was of a very much different 
character from that of Panaetius and Posidonius. The late Stoics 
emphasised ethics with little concern for physics and dialectic. Their 
ethical and moral interest represented virtually a spiritual or
 ^ See pp. 106 foil, for a comment on Stoicism in Cicero's works.
2 See Chapter IV, pp.94 foil.
See Chapters III and V.3
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religious support for the individual, while the Stoicism of Panaetius 
and Posidonius was a creative movement which provided vigorous and 
dynamic impetus to Rome's social and intellectual development. The 
positive and formative circumstances of the second century B.C. offered 
exciting opportunities for Rome's social progress. And there was felt a 
close Stoic identification with the state's institutions. Under the 
empire, however, autocratic and oppressive rule by the emperors meant 
that freedom of speech and action was curtailed.^ Career progress 
through the cursus honorum now depended on imperial recognition and 
favour rather than through the popular vote. There existed an inhibit­
ing situation where people frustrated in their wish for freedom and in 
their opportunities for self-expression had recourse often to philosophy 
or to rhetoric, which for many became a hobby rather than a medium for 
political persuasion.
The independent stand taken by philosophers and Stoics was not
acceptable to emperors, and especially to Nero and Domitian, who
2expected conformity and support. Such independence, as also shown by 
the early Christians, could not readily be tolerated by emperors who 
relied on emperor-worship to maintain a position of power. Stoic 
opposition, of course, was not organised; it was simply an assertion of 
free thinking. Although the Stoics were not condoned by the emperors, 
and the study of philosophy was questioned by many, there was a wide 
diffusion of Stoicism, of which there were many adherents.
The literature of late Stoicism is substantial, and is 
comprehensively available to us, in contrast to the fragmentary writings 
from early and middle Stoics. In keeping with its ethical emphasis this 
literature is very much hortatory and didactic. Seneca wrote his essays 
and letters in such a vein. Musonius set out rules for human conduct. 
Epictetus gave appropriate advice to youth,4 with whose moral
Cf. Dio Cassius, lxi.15.
Cf. Helvidius Priscus who as praetor was accused because he did not 
pay homage to the emperor. And under Domitian, Herennius Senecio was 
executed because he wrote a biography of Priscus. Dio Cass. 66.12-19, 
67-73.
Cic. Tuso. iii.l; Tac. Agricola 4,3.
Cf. Brehier, op. cit. , p.152.4
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development he was concerned. Later, Marcus Aurelius in his xct eus
eotuxdv upheld an introspective approach which involved self-examination.
Also, Stoics might serve as mentors or counsellors, such as Musonius and
Coeranus did for Rubellius Plautus.^ As well as the specialist
scholastic teaching by Stoics within the sect public lectures were given
by outstanding Stoics or by itinerant preachers who were often satirised 
2or scoffed at. The favourite form of teaching followed within the
school was probably diatribes, where keen questioning and lively
3discussion followed a lecture.
As there were quite a few Stoic writers under the empire, it 
is appropriate for the present survey to comment upon the most 
influential Stoics of the period who were probably Seneca, Musonius and 
Epictetus; and the following comment will be concerned with these three 
late Stoics. This does not discount the importance of the Stoic poets 
Lucan and Persius, the latter being taught by the well regarded Cornutus, 
nor the importance of Hierocles who wrote his ’H^uxn aioLxeuocjLs and 
IlepL K a ^ n x o v x w v . Marcus Aurelius, the last great Stoic figure, is not 
discussed because he wrote at a time later than the period considered in 
this study.
SENECA
Seneca, as a Stoic, is somewhat enigmatic. He wrote earnestly 
and sincerely on Stoic values, but his own life reflected perhaps some 
conflict with such values. For he was ambitious, needing at times to 
comply with Nero's wishes, wealthy through service to the imperial cause, 
and an outstanding orator in his use of a style that was pointed and had 
impact. On the other hand, he was ascetic, religious in a strongly 
Stoic sense, and a champion of Stoic ethics both in his own attitude to 
life and in the manner in which he wrote. However, in comparing aspects 
of this apparent conflict in Seneca's life, authorities generally make 
an assessment in his favour; his Stoic qualities are generally regarded
 ^ Tac. Ann. xiv.57.
2 Cf. attitudes of Horace and Epictetus.
3 A. Gellius, i.26.
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as strong and are to be appreciated, although at times he may have 
followed an expedient line of action.
Seneca himself did not profess to be a sage, and did not write
for sages.^ Yet he believed that the idea of the sage-in-progress was a
2practical principle. Seneca in a letter to Lucilius urged daily self- 
3improvement. He maintained that moral progress and personal education 
were related to living ’in accord with nature', as set down by 
traditional Stoicism; for Seneca this also meant living simply, which
4was in keeping with his basic asceticism. Like other Stoics of the 
period Seneca upheld a reflective attitude to one's life and the value 
of self-examination; in strongly recommending evaluation of each day, 
he maintained that it effected self-improvement and before sleep a 
tranquillity of mind.'’ It was important for the individual to be self- 
aware, and recognition of one's own vices was the beginning of 
salvation.^
He stressed the will as the fundamental factor in moral 
7progress. And he regarded the will as more important than knowledge.
He related wisdom closely to will when he offered a definition: Quid
est sapientia? Semper idem velle atque idem nolle. Where the early
Stoics had divided man into sage or non-sage, Seneca's division was of
9the will, that was either good or bad. The will was to be exerted so 















Ep. xxviii.9; cf. Ep. liii.8.
Ep. lxxx.4.
Ep. xx.5.
Cf. Pohlenz, op. cit., Vol. I, p.320.
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Stoic might feel sensation but with the proper direction of the will, 
sensation should be overcome.^
For Seneca conscious effort was most important. His maxim was 
2
viveve militave est: the individual had to work steadily and earnestly
to acquire Stoic qualities of virtue and to withstand the strong
pressures that might draw him away from moral progress. Praemeditatio
3was necessary to ensure self-preservation.' And effort and struggle 
were embodied in his idea that the itpoxonn had to aspire to three
4significant stages of progress.
Seneca emphasised the religious teaching of Stoicism, and he
was concerned with Stoic theology more than any other Stoic since
Cleanthes. He presents established Stoic thought, but with special
emphasis on the al1-pervading nature and universal influence of God.
Seneca goes so far as to assert that God hardens those He loves.^ For
Seneca, God is omnipotent and can be caring in the Christian sense.^
7God has manifold functions. God and divine reason are nature. He is
g
Fate. He is Jupiter. Seneca considered that Roman polytheism was sub­
sumed in a Stoic monotheistic concept, where Hercules, Mercury etc. were
9 . 1 0identifiable as the one divine force. In short, everything was God.
It is natural that, according to Seneca, the soul within the 






4 Ep. lxxv.8-14. 
 ^ de Prov. i i . 5.
 ^ de Ben. iv.passim.
7
de Ben. iv.17.
 ^ de Ben. iv.7,2.
 ^ de Ben. iv.8,1-2.
 ^ Eat. Quaest. i.Frei.13 Quid est deus? Mens universi. Quid est deus? 
Quod vides totum et quod non vides totum.
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should possess a divine quality.^ The divine soul residing within us is
our guardian and takes note of our good and bad deeds. If we cooperate
2with this spirit, we can become good and rise superior to fortune.
Seneca allows for the possibility that the soul may be immortal, a
3belief that he upholds more strongly than most Stoics.
Seneca wishes to remove the fear of death. He advocates self- 
preservation but on many occasions he maintains that the individual
4should be resigned to the possibility of dying at any time. He who has 
removed the fear of death has cast off the bonds of slavery.^ Suicide 
could be an acceptable way out, if a situation is intolerable and 
insoluble. It seems that Seneca himself had mentally prepared himself 
to commit such an act^ for he repeatedly discusses the prospect of death 
and the education of oneself in this regard.
The influence of Seneca’s writings was considerable, both from 
his philosophical thought and from his eight tragedies. His plays, 
which contain Stoic elements, strongly influenced writers as late as the 
sixteenth century, and then French classical dramatists. And much of 
his thought was in keeping with early Christian beliefs.
MUSONIUS
C. Musonius Rufus was a contemporary of Seneca and strongly
representative of the spirit of late Stoicism. He was concerned with
practical ethics, and like fellow Stoics of the period had limited
interest in physics and dialectic. However, he advocated the study of
7dialectic so that his students learned to use logical processes.
Ep. xxxi.11.
 ^ Ep. x1i.2.
3
Ep. lxv.24; Ep. xxxvi.8.
4 E.g. Ep. xxiv.15.
5 Ep. xxvi.10.
6 Ep. lxi.4.
Pohlenz, op. cit. , Vol. I, pp.294,301; Barth, op. cit. , p.188.7
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Musonius was a preacher of Stoicism, and not a writer. Yet his 
influence was considerable, for among his pupils were Epictetus, Aulus 
Gellius and C. Minucius Fundanus; the latter was to become consul. 
Musonius' method of teaching was Socratic discussion, and a student 
Pollio recorded his maxims in his collection arcoyvrnjoveuviaTa Mouawvuou, 
many of which are included in Stobaeus' Florilegium.
Musonius was uncompromising in a Stoic manner in his involve­
ment in public causes. His participation was strongly individual; his 
activity was very much different from that of Seneca who fitted into the 
Roman institutional pattern. He prosecuted Egnatius Celer for giving 
false evidence against Barea Soranus, ^although in so doing he was
pitting himself against the renowned cynic, Demetrios.^ Following the2Piso conspiracy he was banished from Rome. He returned to Rome in 69 
on Nero's death; during the trouble between Vespasian and Vitellius he 
preached to the soldiers involved on peace and censured them for bearing
3arms. For this he was given a violent reception and was manhandled.
Following Chrysippus he believed in the inherent goodness of 
4man; virtue was based on knowledge and could be attained through daily 
habit. Vice was really the result of ignorance.^ The body could be 
conditioned to withstand enticement to vice. Musonius stressed the 
practical value of philosophy for showing us how to lead a virtuous 
life.^ Naturally such a practical view meant that, like other late 
Stoics, he did not urge the concept of the sage and associated absolute 
virtue. Musonius' sincerity was undoubted; his influence in his own 
lifetime was positive and healthy; and because of his integrity and
7character he has been described as the 'Cato of his generation'.
* Tac. Ann. xvi.30-33; Hist. iv.10.40; Dio Cass, lxii.26.
2 Tac. Ann. xv.7.1.
 ^ Tac. Hist, iii.81.
 ^ Pohlenz, op. cit. , Vol. I, p.300 foil.
Barth, op. cit., p.190.
Barth, op. cit., p.187.
Arnold, op. cit., p.117.7
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EPICTETUS
Epictetus (ca. 50-130) was originally a slave, a background 
which meant he was to stress that for the individual the study of 
philosophy could lead to independence of thought and to an egalitarian 
concept. When philosophers were expelled from the city by Domitian in 
90, he went to live and teach in Nicopolis. Like Musonius, his teacher, 
Epictetus did not write on philosophy; his teachings have been recorded 
by his student and disciple, Arrian.
He thought that the student of philosophy and of practical
ethics needed to recognise his own weaknesses and shortcomings.* Man
2had a natural inclination to truth and goodness. But there was a 
contradiction in man that did not always enable him to follow this
3natural inclination. It was the function of philosophy to teach the 
individual to recognise and learn what was the truth, which would in
4turn lead him to happiness. Logic was important for establishing what 
was true or false,^ but Epictetus considered dialectic as completely 
subordinate to ethics and did not of course elevate it to the importance 
given it by Chrysippus. He did not have any significant interest in 
physics, although he maintained that one should have some educated 
awareness of physics and nature as appropriate to the Stoic principle of 
living 'in accord with nature'.^
Self-education was fundamental; it was a process whereby the
individual could learn and be conditioned to what was appropriate and
what was basically alien. Training was important to distinguish between 
7good and evil. Examination of conscience was important, a principle
* Discourses, ii.11,1.




5 Ibid, i.7,1 foil., 21 foil.; ii.17,7 foil.; iii.1.19 foil.
 ^ Ench. 49; Discourses, ii.14,27.
Discourses, i.26,2; iii.10.18; iv.5.4.7
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stressed especially by the late Stoics. Socrates' maxim 'know thyself' 
was particularly significant for Epictetus' teaching.^
2Epictetus emphasised the idea of the 'sage-in-progress',
where the will was so essential to progress successfully. And the will
3
was the proper use of innate propensity. He upheld a theory of
4(paviaoLat or 'representations'; the soul was to make the correct use 
of such impressions in relation to what was good or virtuous. Epictetus 
argued that the individual had and should have absolute freedom of will, 
and consequently he reduced the traditional Stoic significance of fate. 
To him is attributed a theory of prohairesis1 23 4*67 (or moral purpose), which 
meant that the individual had the freedom to choose attitudes and his 
own values.
Epictetus championed Stoic theology. He associated the divine 
logos which controlled the world with the divine element in man which 
empowered him to govern the world.^ Also the divine logos, an element
7of which was also in man, should be observed and, in turn, there would 
be engendered in the individual a deep inner peace; such a principle is 
akin to Christian worship. God was omnipresent and omniscient; He was
g
synonymous with soul, intelligence, knowledge and right reason. Just
9as Cleanthes had taught, we should thank and praise God.
1 Discourses, i.26,18.
2 Ibid. , i.4,3; ii.19,25.
3 Ibid., ii.19,32.
4 Ibid. , i.3,4; iii.3,4.
3 Ibid., i.30.4 upoacTieacs oca 6el nac xPnous (pavxaauwv; cf. 
iii.22,103.
6 Ibid. , i.4,3; ii.19.25.
7 Ibid., iii.13,112.
Ibid, ii.8,1 foil; iv.1,61.
Ibid., i.6,16 foil.; ii.14,10 foil.; iv.10,14 foil.9
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Epictetus taught much that was in accord with Stoic orthodoxy. 
For instance, he regarded external matters, dßcdcpopa, very much in the 
same way as did the early Stoics; he upheld the Stoic view of social 
responsibility and the principle of family duty. And his firm sincerity 
is substantiated by his own way of life and humility. Epictetus’ 
influence was strong. He was the friend of Hadrian; and his teachings 
have been long esteemed throughout the history of Christianity and 
Western civilisation.
From a review of Stoicism, that treats its development from 
its foundation until the end of the first century A.D., is gained a firm 
impression of a philosophical school that set out an extremely thorough­
going and comprehensive system. Just as important as its completeness 
was the adaptability of Stoicism to various ages; and accordingly it 
made positive contributions to mankind in meeting social, spiritual and 
intellectual circumstances. In ethics there was an evolution from the 
time of Zeno to a less dogmatic, benevolent position. Its physics and 
natural science were of interest to researchers and philosophers, and at 
times were incorporated in literary works. Its dialectic was used by 
scientists and was taught in rhetoric, as providing sound methods of 
proof. Now, following this introductory chapter,the purpose is to look 
at this contribution as it is embodied in Roman education.
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CHAPTER II
INTRODUCTION IN ROME OF THE 
TEACHING OF THE GRAMMATICUS, WITH 
REFERENCE TO ITS STOIC ELEMENTS
Secondary education as taught by the ypayyaiuKos in 
Hellenistic schools was introduced and became established in Rome in the 
second century B.C. Authorities^ are generally unanimous in stating 
that the pattern of education to be taught by the grammaticus for 
succeeding centuries in Rome was the same as that taught by his 
Hellenistic counterpart. But in adopting the pattern followed in the 
Hellenistic grammar school Stoic trends that had begun to appear in the 
third and late second centuries B.C. became clearly established 
elements in the teaching of grammar schools in Rome. These were 
principally in the methodology taught by the Stoic Crates of Mallos, the 
Stoic system of Homeric exegesis, the Stoic slant on astronomy and 
geography (especially as evidenced in the popularity and standing of the
Stoic Aratus' Phaenomena) and the teaching of the Stoics’ anomalist
2theory of philology. But before elaborating upon these elements it is
J. Bowen, A History of Western Education, p.152. (Reference is also 
made to the long lasting nature of Hellenistic education, cf. Pap.
Oxy. i . 124; iii.469; Antinoopolis Papyrus, ii.68.)
D.L. Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education, p.59.
H.-I. Marrou, Histoire de l'education dans I'antiquite, p.359.
A.S. Wilkins, Roman Education, p.3.
Marrou identifies Roman and Hellenistic educational patterns so 
closely that he states that his chapters on Roman education are some­
what superfluous: ... 1'adaptation au milieu linguistique latin
n'entraina pas de modifications profondes dans la pedagogie: le
lecteur s 'etonnera certainement du caractbre litteral de cette trans­
position, un transfert pur et simple beaucoup plus qu’une imitation.
The anomalists' theory of philology and their conflict with the 
analogists will be discussed in Chapter III.
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important first to understand clearly the method of teaching followed by 
the Hellenistic and Roman grarmaticus.
The function and aims of the grarmaticus were to teach the art
of speaking correctly and to interpret authors.1 2* In the established
2 . 3method of the grarmaticus the first step was öudp^waus or emendatio, a
correction of text where errors in reproduction by copyists had to be
eliminated; it was important that every pupil read the same version of 
4the text.
The second step was the dvdyvwaus8 or praelectio ^  where the
text was read by the teacher with appropriate expression and some basic,
but not yet elaborated explanation indicating why it was read in a
certain way. The absence of punctuation in texts demanded some care and
7preparation for interpretative reading. This was followed by recitatio 
by the pupils who were required to learn the passage by heart.
The third step was c^dynaus or enarratio, and this was the 
most important part of the grarmaticus' teaching. The enarratio was 
divided into two aspects: the methodice or verborum interpretatio and
v 8the historice, or historiarum cognitio. The verborum interpretatio
involved the careful analysis of words in regard to grammatical form, 
construction and etymology, and the explanation of difficult words or
Ars grarmatica praecipue consistit in intellectu poetarum et in recte 
scribendi loquendive ratione: Sergius, 'Explanatio in artem Donati',
H. Keil, iv, p.486;
... recte loquendi et poetarum enarrationem, Quint, i.4,2.
in grarmaticis, poetarum pertractatio3 historarium cognitio3 verborum 
interpretation pronuntiandi quidam sonus, Cic. de Or. i.187.
2 Dion Thrax. 1.
8 Quint. i . 4,3.
 ^ Marrou, op. cit., p.230; Wilkins, op. cit. , p.70.
8 Dion. Thrax. 2.
 ^ Quint, i.8,1.
 ^ Quint. i . 1,36.
8 Cic. de Or. i . 187; Quint, i.4,2.
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glossemata. This part of the grammaticus’ work was subsumed in the vast 
amount of philological research and grammatical study that had been 
carried out throughout the third and second centuries B.C. by the 
schools at Alexandria, Pergamum and Rhodes.
The second aspect of the enarratio (or exegesis) was the 
lotopcxov,^  which involved a comprehensive treatment of what the poet 
intended to say — his presentation of character, events, places. Such a 
treatment covered mythology and allegorical interpretation, geographical 
references and explanation, and aspects of astronomy — in short, every­
thing in the text that the grammaticus thought should be explained, 
whatever the subject field.
2The final step of the grammaticus’ treatment was the mplols
* 3or judgment, almost a comment on the otpcrn, or the work’s expression of 
a moral ideal. This ’judgment’ has been firmly attributed to the 
Stoics, especially in regard to Homeric exegesis.^ The grammaticus’ 
treatment could be regarded as comprising the ’inferior hermeneutic’ and 
'superior hermeneutic’.^  The former consisted in the grammatical, 
stylistic and historical interpretation of texts, the latter being 
virtually the xpuoLS and covering the moral, and possibly aesthetic 
judgment of the work.
It is not difficult to explain the general pattern of the 
grammaticus’ teaching in Hellenistic and Roman education. It was the 
education generally experienced by pupils at the secondary level, but 
this basically literary and grammatical education with its excursions 
into various subject fields such as astronomy and geography was actually
Dion. Thrax. 10,9.
Dion. Thrax. 1.
Marrou, op. cit., p.234.
Marrou, op. cit., p.234. Les Sto’iciens ont joue ici un role 
preponderant: entre leurs mains3 Hombre est devenu ”le plus sage des
poetes"3 un sage de type romantique3 dissimulant a dessein3 sous le 
voile du mythe3 toute une doctrine precise dont l’exegese allegorique 
permettra.it de retrouver les lecons. Ulysse3 Symbole du sage3 nous 
enseigne par example .. .
G. Pire, op. cit., p.48.
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part of a broader ideal programme of education: the eyMuxAyos TtauSeua,
which came to be termed the liberates artes in Roman education.^ This 
2general culture comprised grammar (literature), rhetoric, dialectic as
well as the four mathematical disciplines: geometry, arithmetic,
3astronomy and music (theory). Generally, however, a pupil’s 
acquaintance with the liberal arts depended upon the grammatieus r 
preparedness to move into these fields in the process of his textual 
explication.
INFLUENCE OF CRATES OF MALLOS
The key figure in the introduction of the ypayyaTuxos’
4methodology to Rome was the Stoic Crates of Mallos. His standing in 
the Hellenistic world was high, being upheld vigorously by his followers, 
KpotTniELOL,^ but strongly contested by other scholars and especially by 
Aristarchus and his supporters at the uouoelo v at Alexandria. But it 
was Crates' system that was introduced to Rome in the second century 
B.C. and successfully prevailed at that time. Although Suetonius was 
writing very much later, his acknowledgment of Crates’ influence in the 
strongly Stoic spirit of the second century B.C. is justifiable when he 
claimed that assidueque disseruit ac nostris exemplo fuit ad imitandwri. 
Crates introduced to Roman education the grammatieus ' methodology as 
outlined above,^ literary exegesis from a Stoic viewpoint and Stoic 
anomalist philology.
Cic. de Or. i .8-12; i.187; iii.127.
Cf. Marrou, ... culture generale, op. cit., p.244.
Cf. the later division of the Trivium and Quadrivium.
Crates of Mallos (born circa 200 B.C.) was the Stoic head of the 
Library at Pergamum. He came to Rome in 169 as the ambassador of 
Attalus II (Suet, de grccmm. 2). He had been a pupil of the Stoic 
Diogenes of Seleucia.
Cf. Ptolemy of Ascalon’s Ttepc ins Kpainxebou aCpeaewg.
Suet, de gramm. 2.
G. Pire, op. cit., p.50.
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Crates wrote commentaries on Homer, Hesiod, Euripides and
Aristophanes and of special importance was his AcopSwous ’ IAudöos xau
’Oöuoaeuas ev BlBAu ols. Homer had generally been looked to by the
philosophical schools as literature to be interpreted and rationalised
in support of their principles. The effective presentation of argument
based on Homer helped substantiate the outlook of a certain philosophy.
The cliche 'Bible of the Greeks'* indicates the exalted standing and
authority of Homeric literature. The Stoics had been very much
interested in Homer from the time of Zeno, who wrote generally on poetry
and produced five books on 'Homeric problems', giving allegorical
interpretations; there were attempts to discover moral values based on
natural principles (Aoyou cpuauxoL, or physicae rationes) in the poetic
3 tand popular representation of the gods. Cleanthes in his Ticpu toü 
TtocnTou interpreted Homer from the point of view of both allegory and 
etymology; with him appeared the earliest known use of the word 
otAAnyopLMwsAnd Chrysippus continued this tradition.
The introduction of Crates' Stoic interpretation, editing and 
exegesis of Homer fitted into a parallel bilingual system of education, 
where the Roman pupil received his education from both a Greek and Latin 
grammaticus.^  This tradition strongly prevailed until the first century 
A.D. There is clear evidence of educated Romans knowing and studying
Cf. E. Zeller, op. cit., p.356.
P. Grimal, Le Si^cle des Scipions: Rome et I'Hellenisme au temps des
guerres puniques, p.29 n,L'Iliade's on le sait3 avait ete la Bible du 
peuple Hellene."
G. Pire, op. cit., p.49, Les poemes homeriques jouaient chez les 
Grecs un role presque semblable a celui de la Bible chez les Hebreux.
Dio Chrysost., Or. 53,4; D.L. vii.4.
Cic. N.D. iii.24,63, Alia quoque ex ratione et quidem physica fluxit 
multitudo Deorum; qui induti specie Humana fabulas poetis 
suppeditaverunt hominum autem vitam superstitione orrmi referserunt. 
Atque hie locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo 
puribus verbis explicatus est ... physica ratio non inelegans inclusa 
est in irrrpias fabulas.
J.E. Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, Vol. I, p.49.
Marrou, op. cit., p.355, ...l’ecolier suivait parallelement les 
cours du grammaticus Graecus et ceux de son confrere latin.
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Homer from the second century B.C. Scipio Aemilianus quoted verses from
Homer when he expressed concern about the future welfare of Rome, as he
contemplated the ruins of Carthage,* and when he learned of the death of
2his brother-in-law, Tiberius Gracchus. Cicero also attributes Homeric 
3knowledge to him. The philhellenism of the Scipionic circle was tinged 
with marked Stoic feeling, nurtured, as mentioned, through the strongly 
influential Panaetius and Polybius. Panaetius was interested in Homeric 
exegesis in Crates’ tradition;** his concern with literary criticism^
influenced both authors and g r a m m a t i c i Panaetius was a faithful
7 8disciple of Crates and both exerted an influence in Roman pedagogy.
In introducing his method of Homeric exegesis to Roman 
pedagogy Crates used his editions of the Iliad and Odyssey, which 
incorporated extensive and detailed alterations in accordance with his 
method of öbop^wots, or textual correction, to suit Stoic principles.
His exegesis was based on interpretation of Homer's work, as well as 
textual modification, where the opportunity arose and when he thought it 
necessary. Crates' study and exposition of Homer was in opposition to 
the interpretation of his great rival Aristarchus, who had developed
App. Pun. 132; Horn. II. vi.448 quoted: eaaexau fipap ox’ av h o t’
oAwAq ’IAlos tpn.
Plut. Ti. Gr. 21; Horn. Od. ii.47: xouoÖeaaLV ßaauAeue, Tiaxnp 6’ u>s
nuLos nev.
Cic. de Rep. i.56, ... qui nutu, ut ait Homerus, totum Olyrrrpum
converteret ...
Pire, op. cit. , p.53 refers to A. Schmeckei, Philosophie dev 
mittleren Stoa in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhänge dargestellt.
Plut. Aristides i.5,7; Cimon iv.9; Demosthenes xiii.4.
M. Pohlenz, Pauly-Wissowa, Vol. xviii.3, p.426: Bei Lucilius spüren
wir ... ganz den Geist des Panaetios. Aber auch die anderen Römers 
die uns in dieser Zeit als Stoiker genannt werden, wie Sp. Murmius 
(Brut. 94) oder der Grammatiker Aelius Stilo (Brut. 106^ haben gewiss 
seinen Einfluss erfahren.
Pire, op. cit., p.54, Nous continuerons de voir en Panetius un fidele 
disciple de Crates de Mallos.
Marrou, op. cit., p.229, Crates de Mallos et Panaitios meritent3 plus 
qu'Aristarque de figurer dans la galerie des grands pedagogues 
classiques.
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definite rules to correct and restore much of Homer, ostensibly to its 
original verse. The approach of the Alexandrians was strict, and did 
not tolerate solecism or barbarism in the text which was in keeping with 
their established system of grammatical analogy. But as well as 
following the anomalist approach, Crates directed his attention
to cosmic and allegorical interpretation, with the appropriate Stoic 
judgment or mplqls TtoLnpdiwv. ^
Crates and the Stoics regarded Homer himself as being in the
2tradition of the Stoic sage, who wrote with a didactic purpose. Also 
Crates regarded Homeric heroes in the same light; this was especially 
so in regard to the Odyssey. Ulysses was the prototype of the Stoic 
sage. His supremacy over obstacles symbolically epitomised the Stoic 
aspiration to ride over and become detached from life's difficulties and 
frustrations, as well as becoming liberated from human passions. This 
was exemplified in his resistance to the temptations of the Lotophagi, 
Circe and the Sirens, and in not succumbing to the frenzied rage of the 
Cyclopes. Hercules could be similarly regarded,^ as independent in the 
Stoic tradition.
The Stoic interpretation of Homeric character can be compared 
to Virgil's portrayal of Aeneas who is often regarded as possessing 
Stoic qualities.'’
Crates attributed to Homer the Stoic concept of the global 
earth,^ around which flow the oceans in a continuous expanse of sea;
Pi re, op. cit. , p .49.
Ibid. , Crates et les Sto’iciens font d ’Homere un aede n rayant de gout 
que pour la vertu proscrivant le plaisir et ne s'ecartant jamais de 
l'honnete. Its le peignent done a l fimage du sage stoieien.
Zeller, op. cit., p.369.
Zeller, op. cit., p.368.
See Chapter IV, where the Stoic content of authors taught by the
grammaticus is discussed.
Heraclitus, All eg. 36. The following discussion on Crates' Stoic 
interpretation and modification of Homer is generally based on the 
arguments of W. Kroll, pp.1634-1641, Pauly-Wissowa, xi.2.
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the sun ends its course over the equatorial zone. The phenomenon of
2tide is caused by the confluence of ocean currents from east and west.
The sun is the highest heavenly body, and is above the moon, planets and
*7
stars. Crates’ forced Homeric interpretations meant that in Odyssey,
xii.l, he identified xoxayouo £>dov ’ftxeavoco as a part of the great
global ocean.^ He associated the two doves on Nestor's goblet* 3 *8taking
ambrosia to Zeus, with the Pleiades and identified the whole imagery as
nourishment of the sun through ocean vapours. He altered Od. i.24, nyev
6uaoyevou 'Yucpdovos n 6’ avcdvxos, by having the Ethiopians live to the
north and south of the equatorial ocean.^ In Odyssey iv.84 Crates
included ’Epeyvous instead of ’EpeyBous to fit the idea of Menelaus
proceeding to the outer area of the ocean and to India. He also located
the voyages of Ulysses in this outer ocean, which was a controversial
issue between himself and Aristarchus.^ In Odyssey xi.14 he changed
Ktyyepujov to KepBeptwv and located their country in the Arctic. He 
« 8interpreted eAlxwucs as watchers of the Bear star, attributing to 
people of Homer's time a knowledge of astronomy consistent with Stoic 
thought. He substituted evfiyotp for evvhyap in Iliad xii, considering 
that the traditionally accepted form absurdly signified that the gods 
required nine days to destroy a wall constructed by men in one day.
Crates' cosmic interpretation of the shields of Achilles and
Agamemnon meant identifying xuxAou of one and Ttxuxes of the other as
9Stoic heavenly cycles; the apyupeos xeAayujv' was considered the axis of
Cf. Cleanthes, Stoic frg. i . 112 ; frg. 501.
 ^ Macrob. Sorrn. ii.9,3.
3 Heracl. 23.
 ^ Strab. i.5.
3 Horn. It. xi.634; Kroll, op. oit., p.1637.
 ^ Kroll, op. cit., p.1638.
 ^ Gell, xiv.6,3.
8 Horn. II. i.389.
9 Horn. II. xviii.480.
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the universe. He offered a similar interpretation of Aeneas' shield.^
Such allegorical and cosmic exposition was widely respected and was the
2accepted basis for concepts presented in later literature. Crates'
cosmic interpretations were upheld by Posidonius, who in turn influenced
3Strabo, Plutarch and Geminus.
PANAETIUS' PUPILS
Whereas Crates introduced a pedagogical method to be used by 
the grammaticus, Panaetius is regarded as the consolidatory force in the 
founding of Roman Stoicism. As mentioned, his interest in moral and 
political philosophy^ together with a reasoned eclectic and conciliatory 
outlook in Stoicism especially found favour with and influenced nobiles 
active in Roman politics and society in the second half of the second 
century B.C. There is repeated evidence of this influence throughout 
Cicero who names as Panaetius’ pupils Q. Tubero (Lucullus 44,135; de 
Fin. iv.9,23; Tusc. iv.2,4); C. Fannius, C. Laelius, Q. Scaevola 
{Brut. 26,101); Laelius {de Fin. iv.9,23); P. Rutilius Rufus {Brut.
30, de Off. iii.2,10); M. Vigellius {de Or. iii.21,78); L. Furius {de 
Or. ii.54, de Rep. iii.5). However, the only grammatici to be known as 
Panaetius' pupils were Apollodorus5 and Aelius Stilo.6 Posidonius, as 
his pupil, adopted Panaetius' teachings which were disseminated through 
Posidonius' influence. It is difficult to determine with any degree of
Horn. It. xx.269.
Kroll, op. cit., p.1638, Diese allegorisch-kosmische Auslegung hat 
den stärksten Eindruck gemacht und ist in die spätere verwandte 
Literatur ubergegangen.
Kroll, op. cit., p.1633.
P. Boyance, Association Guillaume Bude_, Actes du congress 196Z, 
p.222, Ce que Panetius a donne au sto'icisme romain se situe dans la 
morale et dans la politique ... Peut-etre aussi a-t-il influe sur la 
theologie.
Suidas, Lexicon A3407. Apollodorus was a famous Athenian ypayyaiLKos 
who was both a disciple of the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and 
Aristarchus (see B. Tatakis, Panetius de Rhodes, p.36).
See Chapters III and IV.
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precision Panaetius' contribution to the grarmaticus ' pedagogy; and it 
is unfortunate that Marrou has not given a further lead in describing 
Panaetius as one of the 'grands pedagogues classiques'}
ARATUS’ PHAENOMENA
In discussing the introduction of the gvammaticus ' teaching in
Rome due consideration must be given to the Stoic poem, the Phaenomena 
2of Aratus. The popularity of this poem became firmly established; an
3Aratean tradition was established that lasted till the Renaissance.
And there is firm evidence to suggest that the Phaenomena was read as a
4school text. Quintilian in discussing Greek literature to be taught in 
schools lists two categories. In the first category he refers to some 
half dozen Greek authors, headed naturally by Homer and including 
Aratus. He acknowledges Aratus’ instructional value, but has 
reservations about his literary worth.^ An indication of the 
Phaenomena's standing is clearly given in Quintilian's introductory 
statement before he outlines his curriculum of Greek authors. He quotes*
Op. cit., p .229.
2 Aratus of Soli in Cilicia (c.315-263) had in his youth been a student 
of the Peripatetic Praxiphanes of Mytilene and then Zeno of Citium 
(see Pauly-Wissowa II, p.392). Although not a strong disciple of the 
school he was commissioned about 276 B.C. by the Stoic king Antigonos 
Gonatas of Macedonia to write the Phaenomena, which appeared in 
274 B.C. The Phaenomena also includes the Diosemeia, which is 
concerned with meteorology. The Phaenomena proper of 730 lines was 
based on the prose work, the Phaenomena, by Eudoxus of Cnidus; the 
Diosemeia of 422 lines was largely derived from the Kept anpeu^v of 
Theophrastus. Aratus also wrote an edition of the Odyssey, composed 
hymns and had a knowledge of medicine. He was regarded as versatile 
and talented by such a person as Callimachus who was also his friend 
(ncxvu iTtotuvwv auxov tbs iioAupadh *au aptoxov TiounT^v) — Pauly-Wissowa 
II, p.394.
3 G. Sarton, Hellenistic Science and Culture in the Last Three 
Centuries B.C. f pp.64 foil.
4 x.1,46.
 ^ Arati materia mo tu caret3 ut in qua nulla varietas3 nullus adfectus, 
nulla persona, nulla cuiusquam sit oratio; sufficit tarnen operi3 cui 
se parem credidit.
 ^ Phaen. l.
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Aratus in justification of his reason for beginning with Homer: Igitur,
ut Aratus ab love incipiendum putat, ita nos rite coepturi ab Homero 
videmur. Even though Aratus’ theme was ostensibly scientific, it was 
mostly grarnmatici who explained the poem.^ Because of its simple,
direct style it was eminently suitable as an instructional work for
2 3young pupils. Crates had a good knowledge of the Phaenomena. He had
particular opinions on the hymn to Zeus, which constitutes the proemium
of the poem. It is significant that Crates in the process of his
Homeric exegesis made references to the poem.
From the time of its appearance and throughout the period with 
which we are concerned, from the second century B.C. to the first 
century A.D., the Phaenomena was widely read. And the Aratean tradition 
was ultimately stronger in Latin literature than in Greek. The 
Phaenomena was a didactic^ poem that explained the constellations and 
meteorology from a Stoic viewpoint; in the Hellenistic world it was 
read as didactic poetry for popular education and was studied earnestly.^ 
It was commented on by the Stoics Boethus of Sidon, Diodorus of 
Alexandria and Zenodotus of Mallos. Hipparchos, the great mathematician 
and astronomer of the second century B.C., in referring to certain 
errors made by Aratus, at the same time has commendation for the poem; 
his concluding statement testifies to the wide spread acceptance of 
Aratus' explanations: ... and almost all who expound this particular
Marrou, op. cit. , p.255, ... c ’etait en fait, le plus souvent, des
grarmairiens qui expliquaient ce poeme.
W. Ludwig, 'Die Phainomena Arats als hellenistische Dichtung',
Hermes, Vol. 91, 1963, p.426, Und doch ist Arat in der Antike ... als 
Schulbuchautor berühmt gewesen.
2 The outstanding Aratean scholar, G. Kaibel, compared the expression 
to a father's explaining to a child, Hermes, Vol. 29, 1894, p.91, Es
ist wie wenn der Vater dem Kinde den Sternenhimmel beschreibt, bald 
auf die Schönheit eines besonders hellen Sterns aufmerksam machend 
bald eine Geschichte erzählend, bald erklärend, bald betrachtend.
3 J. Martin, Histoire du texte des Phenombnes d'Aratos, p.13.
Phaen. 17,18, ... eyou ye yev daxcpas cltigüv rj öeyus euyoyev^ 
TEMynpaie maav aoLÖpv.
 ^ G. Sarton, op. cit., p.64.
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poet associate themselves with his statements. It is significant that
the only surviving fragment of Hipparchus’ work is his comment (of a
couple of hundred words) on Aratus, which could indicate the standing of
the Phaenomena in antiquity. Attalos of Rhodes, a renowned
mathematician and a contemporary of Hipparchus, also wrote a careful
2exposition of the poem, as well as several other writers. Later
i , , 3Posidonius wrote nepL oeyMpuaews ’Apcxiou xat 'Optfpou."
In Latin literature Aratus’ popularity is evidenced by the
fact that Roman writers wrote translations of the Phaenomena. Cicero in
4his youth wrote a translation, 475 lines of which are still extant. 
Germanicus Caesar, nephew of Tiberius, also wrote a translation, 857 
lines of which still survive. In the fourth century Rufus Festus 
Avienus wrote a paraphrase of the poem in 1878 lines, which we possess. 
Some part at least of Aratus was translated by P. Terentius Varro Atax 
in the first century B.C.
Also, Aratus’ influence was strong among Roman writers. 
Lucretius^ drew on him. Ovid^ possibly under the influence of 
Callimachus points to the powerful position of Aratus. Manilius’ 
Astronomica incorporated much of the Phaenomena. Virgil's Georgies 
comprises many elements of Aratus' Diosemeia. Much of the Stoic content 
of the Phaenomena would have been presented by the Roman grammaticus 
through his teaching of Virgilian literature. About 25 B.C. Virgil and
g
other 'modern' poets were introduced in secondary education through Q. 
Caecilius Epirota, who was instrumental in raising the educational
English version by T.L. Heath^Greek Astronomy, quoted in Sarton,p.65.
2 Hipparchus, loc. czt.
 ^ Pauly-Wissowa II, p.398.
 ^ admodwn adulescentulus, N.D. ii.41.
 ^ G.R. Mair, introd. to translation of Aratus, Loeb, p.371.
 ^ Cum sole et luna semper Aratus erit, Amor, i.15.6.
 ^ G.R. Mair, op. cit. , p.372.
g
Suet, de grarnm. 2.
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Standing of Latin literature. In the first century A.D. Homer and 
Virgil were studied alongside each other.*
Many Stoics produced commentaries on the Phaenomena; perhaps
2the most influential was Boethus of Sidon, who about 150 B.C. wrote 
3four books" on Aratus, which were probably the basis of four later Vitae. 
.. 4Cicero had read Boethus and duly acknowledges him. It was probably 
through the Stoic Boethus and his commentaries that Roman authors 
produced their versions of the Phaenomena.^
It is clear that the Phaenomena was read and studied at all 
levels — by philosophers, authors of literature, scientists, grammatici. 
Such a diversity of people, many being of considerable standing, 
confirms its strong position in antiquity. Yet its theme, astronomy, 
although one of the studies of the eymumXlos itaLÖeua or liberates artes, 
was taught through literature. It was a clear instance of the literary 
technique of the grammaticus moving into the province of the scientific 
disciplines; and the position of astronomy in secondary education 
devolved mainly upon the literary explication7 of Aratus’ Stoic and 
didactic Phaenomena. From their Hellenistic colleagues the Romans 
learned to relate the study of astronomy to the textual analysis of 
Aratus, and in mythological interpretation rather than from mathematical 
explanation.
Juv. vi.436; xi.180.
He was the pupil of Diogenes of Babylon (Philodemus, Ttcpu xwv 
Etcolmwv) .
Geminus, Isag. 14, o§ ev  x a u  Bongos 6 cpcXoaocpos ev  xt£ TCTctp i^  
xhs ’Apaxou E^ nyiloEids xxX.
de Div. i.8.13.
Pauly-Wissowa, Vol. II, 1895, p.396, Bestätigend hinzu treten die 
Nachahmungen der Römer denen die Kenntnis des Dichters durch den 
Stoiker Boethos vermittett zu sein scheint.
Marrou, op. cit., p.254.
Marrou, op. cit., p.255, si l'astrononrie figure en bonne place dans 
le programme des ecoles secondaires3 c'est ä Aratos qu'elle le doit3 
et c'est sous la forme d'une explication de texte3 d'une explication 
essentiellement litteraire3 qu'elle etait representee.
Marrou, op. cit., p.378.
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The importance of Aratus in antiquity has possibly been under­
estimated,* at least by British and American scholars. Authorities on 
Aratus are predominantly German. The leading scholars appear to be G. 
Kaibel, M. Erren (see Bibliography) and E. Maas. The French scholar, J. 
Martin, has written a highly authoritative text and G.R. Mair's Loeb 
translation, together with a very useful introduction is often referred 
to.
It is informative to consider briefly the Stoic content of the 
2poem. The very first lines expound the omnipresent and divine power of
Zeus, which is in accordance with Stoic theology. This homage to Zeus
3
has often been compared to the famous hymn to Zeus by Cleanthes.
Aratus praises Zeus who is ever present and cares for all mankind. This 
concern for man is embodied in the cosmic system where stars are placed 
in heaven as signs, by which seasons are indicated for farmers, weather 
changes are forecast and sailors are guided. The poem then is an 
exposition of Stoic astronomy and meteorological theory, rather than of 
Stoic morality.
A marked exception is the charming digression in the 
4description of Justice, which is personified and at the same time given 
a strong Stoic quality. Aratus presents the version whereby uap§£vog 
(or the Maiden), after mingling with mankind as Justice>was placed in 
the firmament as a star close to Bootes. She is portrayed as naturally
It appears that a knowledge of Aratus was often assumed. Saint Paul 
quoted Aratus in his address from the Areopagus (see Pauly-Wissowa, 
II, p .395).
In Cicero, de Rep. i.56, Scipio, as would be appropriate for his 
strong Stoic interest, indicates a general familiarity with Aratus,
Imitemur ergo Aratums quz magnis de rebus dioere exordiens a love 
incipienduw putat.
Also cf. Quintilian x.1.55.
2 Phaen. 1. ’E m Auog dpxwyeoda tov ouöe'nox ’ avöpeg ewyev 
appnxov yeaxac 6c Atog xaaau yev ayuuau, 
Ttüüau 6 ’ dvdpGOTtwv ayopae, yeoxfi 6e §aAaoaa.
2. 11.3-6. (Zeö) ae yap Ttavxeaau -ödyug $vnioCou Tipocauöäv 
in aou yap ydvog e l o’ nyou yuynya Aaxovxeg 
yoüaoL, oaa xe xai epiteu $ v d x ’ enu yauav
xco ae Maöuyvnou) Mae aov Mpdxog auev aeiaw.
4 1.105 ff.
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beneficent,1 and ministering to mankind's every need.2 3*6 Her approach to
mortal people was basically gentle and it was only man's intolerable
evil that aroused Justice's severity. The Stoics' concept of justice
was based on the cooperative ideal among men, where beneficence,
charity and gentleness were the fundamental virtues to be upheld.
Aratus' metaphorical description is consistent with Panaetius' concept
3of justice, as outlined by Cicero. This spirit of justice is also 
reflected in the teaching of the later Stoics: Seneca, Epictetus,
Musonius and Marcus Aurelius; and it is especially exemplified in 
Seneca's treatises, namely De Beneficiis, De Clementia, De Ira. It is 
pointed out that the wise man from a sense of justice will allow for 
human weakness and particular circumstances when imposing punishment.^
The Stoic cosmic system presented is based on the concept of a
heavenly sphere that revolves each day about heaven's axis, that is
fixed.^ The heavenly sphere is divided by the xuxXos canyepLvds (or
celestial equator) and the two zones, between which extends the Zodiac
6 7with its twelve figures. The five planets (i.e. Saturn or Cronus, 
Jupiter or Zeus, Mars or Ares, Venus or Aphrodite, Mercury or Hermes — 
but unnamed in the poem), the sun and moon move within the Zodiac about 
the earth; the moon is closest to the earth, then the sun and at a 
further distance the five planets. Meteorological signs are given by
Ibid. , xad e Auxriv xaX^eaxov aycupoyevn 6c ydpovxas, 
nc non clv ayopri n eupuyopc^ ev dyutri. 
önyoicpas yeu6ev enLarcdpxouaa §eycaxas.
2 1.112 ... xau auxrj, rcdxvua Xawv,
yupda Tictvxa napecxe Adxn, öujxeupa öuxadoov.
3
de Off. i.7,20, iustitia3 in qua virtutis splendor est maximus ex 
qua viri boni nominantur_, et huic coniuncta benefioentia3 quam 
eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.
 ^ Sen. de Clem, ii.5-8.
Phaen. 21-23, cf. p.14 above. Crates attributed a similar cosmic 
knowledge to Homer, although there was a difference in the relative 
positions of the sun and planets. Such differences were not 
altogether uncommon among the Stoics.




1 2Zeus to aid mankind. The clouds, called parhelia (or imagines Solis') ,
indicate fair weather, a phenomenon also described in Seneca’s Naturales
3 . 4Quaestiones" and probably re-presented on the authority of Posidonius.
Aratus’ explanation that comets are passing phenomena, many of which
herald a season of drought'’ is consistent with the theories of Panaetius
and Posidonius.^* Posidonius was probably the authority later followed
7by Roman writers who described Stoic meteorology; he is often
g
mentioned by Seneca in his meteorological expositions. Posidonius, in 
turn, had drawn often from Aratus.
In schools throughout the Greek and Roman world the Phaenomena, 
although concerned with astronomy, was discussed with little scientific 
or mathematical precision; the grammaticus may have referred cursorily
9to a model of the earth’s globe' (such an aid also being used by Crates 
in his teaching^), but the commentary was primarily literary and 
particularly explained the mythology, that was basically Stoic.^
STOIC INFLUENCES IN HOME EDUCATION
The pattern of secondary education that was finally 




4 Zeller, op. cit. , p.207 (note).
3 Phaen. 1092.
 ^ Cf. Zeller, op. cit., p.207.
7 Ibid.
g
Posidonius wrote on Aratus and Homer, comparing their interpretations 
of astronomy; and Posidonius' pupil, Diodorus of Alexandria,wrote a 
commentary of the Phaenomena. See J. Martin, op. cit., p.30.
9 Marrou, op. cit., p.255.
 ^ Kroll, op. cit., p.1636.
^ Marrou, op. cit., p.255.
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conducted in Rome by the grammaticus and by his Greek counterpart. Yet 
this level of education was initially introduced to Rome for the most 
part in well-to-do households.* It is relevant then, for this chapter, 
to look at the introduction of such education, which was mainly through 
slaves, together with its Stoic aspects. There had always been a 
tradition of household education in Rome, where a father was responsible 
for his son’s training from about the age of seven; and it was natural 
that in the developing educational pattern of the second century B.C. 
arrangements were made for the young pupil to be taught within the home 
situation.^
Cornelia the mother of the Gracchi, had a Stoic, Blossius of
3Cumae, teach her son Tiberius. Earlier, Aemilius Paulus procured Greek4masters to teach his sons grammar, dialectic and rhetoric. Panaetius 
and Polybius enjoyed the hospitality of Scipio’s home. This tradition 
continued beyond the second century B.C. and at levels of education 
other than that taught by the grammaticus. Cicero had a Stoic tutor 
Diodotus^ who stayed in Cicero's home until his death in 59 B.C.
Diodotus gave Cicero lessons in a variety of subjects, but especially in 
dialectic, and geometry as a discipline for dialectic. Also, Augustus 
had in his home the Stoic Greek teacher Theon who wrote a textbook on 
progymnasmata, which were taught as transitional preparatory exercises 
from literary study with the grammaticus to oratorical study with the
Marrou, op. cit., p.334: l'aristocratic romaine ... trouvait a
domicile un personnel enseignant parmi les nombreux esclaves que la 
conquete lui procurait.
2 Traditional Republican values meant that a boy should receive his 
training from his father. Even when schools became widely 
established, in the time of Quintilian education within the home was 
still being compared with school education, and the latter was not 
always favoured. Pliny, a strong supporter of this parental role, 
echoed a traditional Republican principle: Suus cuique parens pro
magistro (Epp. viii.4,6).
3 Plut. Ti. Gr. 8,17,20.
4 Plut. Aem. Paul. 6.
3 Brut. 309, ad Att. ii.20,6; Tusc. v.113; Acad, ii.15.
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1 2rhetor. Tacitus also upheld the value of home education that used to 
be traditionally provided.
In discussing the role of the Stoic teacher in the Roman home, 
it might be pointed out that Roman families themselves became group 
adherents of Stoicism. It was a consolidatory situation for Roman 
Stoicism when Stoic teachers were domiciled with Stoic families. Such 
families, who evinced strong ethical and moral feeling, rather than 
showing an interest in scholastic subjects, were the family of Laelius 
(of the Scipionic circle), whose daughters married Stoics C. Fannius and 
Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos 117 B.C.), the family of Scaevola himself, and 
in the first century B.C. the family of Cato. Later, in the Empire, 
when there was a resurgence of Stoic feeling, the most famous Stoic 
family was that to which Paetus Caecina, Arria, Paetus and Helvidius 
Priscus belonged.
Although from early Republican times there was a tradition of
3home education that was still commended by writers during the Empire, 
education at all levels was clearly for the most part provided by 
teachers who conducted their own schools in an independent and non-
4institutional manner. Consequently, the arguments presented throughout 
these chapters are predominantly relevant to education provided in 
schools, rather than to private household arrangements.
Gwynn, op. ait. , p.200.
2 Dial. 28,2.
Cf. especially Tac. Dial. 28,4. Also Quint, i.2. 
Marrou, op. cit. , p.360 foil.4
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CHAPTER III
THE STOIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE METHODICE, 
OR TO THE TEACHING OF GRAMMAR
In Roman and Hellenistic education, as mentioned, a knowledge
of grammar and of underlying principles for correct use of language was
considered essential. For literary appreciation, as taught in the
LGTopcKo'v, it was necessary to have a clear understanding of words and
forms for proper and intelligent reading. Grammar stood in relation to
YpayyaxtMi l  * just as Euclidean postulates, definitions and axioms were
2fundamental to geometry.
A knowledge of grammar, as well as being important for an
intelligent understanding of authors, was also regarded as necessary for
3correct speech and correct writing. Such a purpose was consistent with 
the ideal of ‘EAAnvtoyds or Latinitas, where a purity of language was to
4be developed. Seneca pointed out that the grammatious was responsible 
for seeing to a cura sermonis. It is interesting to note that the
rpayyaiLMri was a comprehensive term for the work of the grammatious; 
cf. definition in Dion. Thrax. 1, where YpayyaiLKil is defined as 
eynetpta xuiv Ttapa uotnxats xe Mat auYYpatpeuat u)S erct to koAu 
Acy°M^vwv> and its six ydpn are enumerated as cxvaY^wats; eCrfYhats 
Maxa Tpdnous; audöoots y\u>ooui\> Mat toxoptmv; eupeots exuyoAoYtasi 
avaAoYtas CMAoYtoyos; Mptats.
2 Philo, de Congressu, 26.
3 Quint, i.4.6. Quid enim tarn neoessarium quam recta locutio. 
i.9.1. recte loquendi scientiam.
4 Arnold, op. cit., p.149.
Also see C.N. Smiley, Latinitas and 'EAAnvtayds — the influence of 
the Stoic theory of style.
5 Ep. 88.3.
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ideal of *EXXnvpopds, although stated by Aristotle, was strongly upheld 
by the Stoics, and is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius* as the principal 
apexp of speech. So in contrast to present-day emphases in the teaching 
of English in schools, grammar and precise word study were regarded as 
indispensable for literary understanding and correctness in using 
language.
GRAMMAR AND DIALECTIC
2Grammar was first developed as a part of XoyLxri or dialectic 
in the philosophical schools, and in due course found its way into the 
grammatico-literary curriculum taught in secondary schools. Although it 
was researched and systematised to substantiate logic, it was readily 
applied in the grammar schools to teach the rules of correct speech. A 
study that was of importance to the philosophers, and of very great 
importance to the early Stoics under the leadership of Zeno, Cleanthes 
and Chrysippus ultimately became the province of the grammatici.
The Stoics, more than any other philosophical school, were
concerned with dialectic and the relating of a grammatical system to
their doctrine. Utterance, Xexxov, was the manifestation of thought and
3the al1 - important process. Aexxov may be either perfect or imperfect.
When it is perfect it expresses a proposition, and it is imperfect when
4the proposition is incomplete. This was the fundamental reason for the 
strong, far-reaching interest that the Stoics developed in grammar. In 
dividing Xexx ov  into complete and incomplete expressions, grammar which 
determined the function of parts of speech was basic to defining such 
expressions. For instance, incomplete Xexxd were divided into two 
groups: one including proper names and adjectives, the other including
verbs, or the predicate. So a proper name was o v o p a ,  and Tipoanyopua was
1 vii.140.
2 Dialectic was a method of inquiry involving conversation, and the 
interchange of question and answer. Cf. D.L. vii.42, eTiuaxnpn xou 
op$G3s 6uaXeyea§at ,  nepp x u v  ev eptoxnoeu x a t  aTioxppaet,  Xo'ywv.
3 Zeller, op. cit., p.92.
S e x t . Math, v i i i . 7 0 ,  xajv 6c Xexxwv xa pev eXXpTtfi xaXouou xct 6e 
a u x o x e X n .
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1 , t 2a common noun or adjective. A verb was xainyopriyct  or p o y a .  Then 
there were further divisions and subdivisions which required 
identification of other grammatical functions and forms.
There was a conditional proposition (auvnyu^vov)  formed from 
two single propositions by means of the connective 'if’ (cl, or e C x e p ) ;  
conjunction of propositions (aupiteTiXey p  efvov) was joined by m o i l ; a„ 3disjunctive proposition (6le£cuyp^vo v) was put together with 'or’ (n).
Such detailed grammatical analysis, developed to substantiate Stoic
logic or dialectic, led to a grammatical system and terminology, that
became firmly established in antiquity. This terminology was later used
by gramrnatici who were not Stoic. Dionysius Thrax, for instance, who
had no affinity with Stoic philosophy, used this terminology in his
famous if^ xvn; and this handbook was probably instrumental in passing
4Stoic grammatical terminology on to the present day.
ANOMALIST THEORY OF STOIC GRAMMAR
Stoic grammar was based on the cpdaet theory of language.
Before the emergence of Stoicism opposing theories had developed as to 
whether language was basically cpuaet^  or $£oeu, as asserted by 
Hermogenes.^ The cpuaeu theory was taken up and developed by the Stoics 
who considered that language existed by nature; they accepted the 
natural form of the word, and the fact that language as a direct 
expression of thought was anomalous. The Stoics then were the champions 
of the anomalist theory. They accepted word forms as they were and did 
not attempt to categorise language carefully in accordance with icAcacLS 
and by analogy.
1 D.L. vii.58.
 ^ D.L. vii.58,64; Cic. Tusc. iv.9.21.
3 B. Mates, Stoic Logic, p.33.
4 Sandys, op. cit. , p.147.
 ^ Cratylos, 383a.
384d: öl) yap cpuacL CMaax^ necpuM^vaL ovopa ou6cv  ou6c v l , aXXa vopi^
moil e$CL to)V e^Loavia iv  xe n a l  MaXouvxwv.
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The Qffoeu theory, as maintained by Aristotle, set down that 
language was convention; and this was the basis of the analogist school 
that was established in the third century B.C. and whose leading 
protagonists were Aristarchus of the youoeuov at Alexandria and 
Aristophanes of Byzantium. ‘Analogy became the name of this philological 
system, although properly speaking■analogy‘was the name of the principle 
used in the science of xAuacs rather than for the science itself."^
With the Stoics consuetudo or auvr^eua was the governing rule;
usage was the basis for their linguistic analysis; they accepted the
fact that word forms and endings could be inconsistent, and that there
2could be ambiguity. Such ambiguity existed in a word like acies, but 
usage in associating this word with others in such phrases as acies
3militum, acies ferri and acies oculorum provided definite meanings.
Chrysippus who wrote a number of books on dvwyaXLot (ncpt ins auvn^euas,
Tiepc xhs «ala iocs avwyaAuas), pointed out that as language did
not present a true image for dialectic relationships, anomaly prevailed 
4in language; the form of speech and the content of what is expressed 
frequently do not correspond, and are often conflicting.^
On the other hand the analogists denied that such disorder 
existed; they claimed that declension indicated clear arrangement and 
consistency, and was in keeping with common usage.^ Order in inflexions, 
whether for noun (also adjective) or for verb was referred to under the 
comprehensive term declinatio. However, the argument mainly concerned
F. Colson, 'The Analogist and Anomalist Controversy', Classical 
Quarterly, Vol. 13, 1919, p.25.
 ^ Varro ZZ-.ix.l: similes res dissimilibus verbis et dissimiles
similibus esse vocabulis notatas.
A. Gell, N.A. xi.12 quoting Chrysippus orrrne verbum ambiguum natura 
esse3 quoniam ex eodem duo vel plura accipi possint.
3 Augustine, Principia dialecticae, 9.
4
H. Steinthal, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und 
Römern, Vol. I, p.301.
 ^ Ibid.
Varro, Z-Z.x.74: analogia est verborum similium declinatio similis
non repugnante consuetudine communi.
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the noun, rather than the verb, the basic issue being nouns of similar 
nominatives but different declension, such as in lepus and lupus.^
It is probable that becuase of the controversy the analogists
2formed canons or rules of declension. To answer the criticisms of the
anomalists, the analogists needed to have at their disposal a systematic
arrangement of language, to which they could readily refer. Some
analogists went so far as to suggest that where analogy had been lost,
3it should be restored, and Quintilian, an anomalist for the most part, 
satirises analogists for their forced, somewhat pedantic use of
4language. It appeared that by the end of the first century A.D., the 
main controversy had died down and a compromise prevailed, where it was 
allowed that analogy applied to inflexion and that where custom was 
firmly established, anomaly held sway.
The points to note in regard to the philological conflict are:
(i) the Stoic anomalist theory was largely responsible for a
Stoic terminology of grammar that came to be generally used 
— even by their analogist opponents;
(ii) the anomalist theory was initially developed by a
philosophical school, whereas the analogist system was 
developed mainly by Hellenistic grammarians of the third 
century B.C.;
(iii) in Rome the Stoic anomalists were in a strong position from 
the time of Crates until the middle of the first century 
B.C. and the time of Aelius Stilo and Nigidius Figulus;3
(iv) following Varro,^ who presents both systems, the analogists 
began to gain the upper hand. Remmius Palaemon, teacher of
* Quint. i.6,12 .
2 Colson, op. cit., p .30.
3 Ibid.
 ^ i.6,27: ... aliud esse Latine loqui3 aliud grammatice.
In Chapter V are discussed Roman grammatici who were Stoic.




Persius and Quintilian, and the author of an ars grammatica 
of lasting influence was an analogist; in this controversy 
grammarians tended ultimately towards analogism;^
(v) to consider the whole question of grammar in perspective, it
must be realised that philology in its various aspects was
pursued in Roman and Hellenistic times as a scientific study 
2of importance. Cicero, Varro, Quintilian and Pliny wrote 
at length on grammatical problems, and to Caesar is 
attributed a treatise de analogia. Linguistic study in this 
strong literary culture was earnestly undertaken by many, in 
contrast to the very much specialised linguistic interests 
of present-day scholars;
(vi) the above outline of the anomalist/analogist controversy can 
be elaborated in many particular aspects of philology — 
etymology, parts of speech, case forms, verb forms, 
glossemata, barbarisms, solecisms and even orthography.
But as the theme of this study is the teaching of grammar in 
secondary schools with an explanation of Stoic influences, it is now 
time to shift emphasis from this controversy, and to consider the Stoic 
elements in the grammaticus ' treatment of parts of speech, etymology, 
etc.
For the period under consideration a very coherent and the
best outline of the methodice, or the grammaticus' function in treating
3grammar, is provided by Quintilian. The arrangement and content of the 
part of Quintilian's first book, from i.4.1 to i.5.54, could well be 
regarded as a compact ars grammatical There is clearly set out 
throughout this part of his first book a series of requirements for the 
guidance of grammatici. And a discussion of such requirements will be a 
very useful basis for pointing out relevant Stoic elements.
* Colson, op. cit. , p.25.
2 Varro testifies to the large number of commentaries, VI. viii.10.23,
... de eo Graeci Latinique libros fecere rrrultos.
3 Book I, passim.
4 L. Nettleship, Lectures and Essays, p.165.
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IDENTIFICATION OF PARTS OF SPEECH
A very important early step in analysing the text is to 
identify the parts of speech: Turn videbit3 ad quern hoc, pertinet, quot
et quae partes orationis* and also ... grammaticus ... ut partes
2
orationis reddi sibi disideret. Quintilian regards this identification
as important, and also firmly acknowledges the strong Stoic contribution
3in this systematisation.
Parts of speech were only broadly categorised by Plato into
ovoya and phya, which could be regarded as the subject and predicate,
4necessary elements for a sentence. Aristotle applied particular terms 
to the subject and predicate, the unoxeuyevov and xaxriYopodyevov, and 
added a third part of speech, the odvöeoyos, to identify the conjunction 
and particle. The ap§pov was added by the Stoics, as a term to refer to 
the pronoun and article, while they restricted the odvöeoyos to an 
uninflected form.'’ Chrysippus made an important division, that was to 
prevail till the present day, when he categorised the noun into the 
nomen proprium (ovoya) and the nomen appellativum (ovoya npoanY0 PL'Hov) 
e.g. 'Socrates* and 'horse', 'man' respectively.
The Stoic Antipater of Tarsus added the adverb (yeodins/
8 9adverbium); other Stoics preferred the term navdexins to yeooins.
x i.4.17.
2 i.8.13.
3 i.4.19, Paulatim a philosophis ac maxime Stoicis auctus est numerus3 
ac primurn convinctionibus articuli adiecti post praepositiones3 
nominibus appellatio deinde pronomen3 deinde mixtum verbo 
participium3 ip sis verbis adverbia.
4 Gudeman, 'Grammatik', Pauly-Wissowa VII,2, p.1785.
8 Sandys, op. cit. , p.147.
 ^ Cf. D.L. vii.192 — nept twv udvie mmaemv and nepu npoonYoPLK^v •
7
Pupil and successor of Diogenes as leader of the school; was referred 
to as being among the magnos Stoicae sectae auctores — Sen. Ep. 92,5.
8 D.L. vii.57.
9
Char, gramm. i.190.24; 194.20. Later the term enCppnya replaced
yeao'xns or navödxTns.
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They related the adverb closely to the verb — quasi adiectiva verborum 
nominabant. *
The Stoics proceeded to sub-classify the ap§pov (pronoun) more 
precisely. The apdpa wptay^va referred to personal pronouns, reflexive, 
possessive, and demonstrative, while the ap§pa aopuaxwön included the
2relative, interrogative and indefinite pronouns as well as the article.
l
The participle was originally regarded as a noun form by the
Stoics, under the term dvxavdxXaoxos npoanyopda. Later it was termed
nomen verbale by the Stoics. The term yexoxtf had been applied to it,
because it was felt that a particular part of speech was required to
describe these noun-verbal relationships. The Stoics, however, were
loth to identify the participle as a particular part of speech, because
3the participle was considered a derived and not a basic form.
The Stoics divided the verb into personal and impersonal forms,
4with further classification into transitive and intransitive kinds.
The personalintransitive verb was called ouyßayct, e.g. Cicero ambulat; 
the impersonal intransitive form was called mpacruyßaya (i.e. where 
there is no functional object and the accusative form is a virtual 
subject), e.g. Ciceronem oportet; the personal transitive was eXaxxov 
xaxnYopnya, e.g. Cicero rempublicam amat; the impersonal transitive 
verb was eXaxxov n Ttapaauyßaya (where the transitive quality could be 
expressed by a genitive object), e.g. Ciceronem miseret reipublicae.
The Stoics also arranged verb tenses about which there was no 
or little contention with the Alexandrians,  ^ except in the terms used. 
The division into four basic tenses^ meant that these were: the present
(cveaxws uapaiaiLMos), the imperfect (nap^xnyevos Tiapaxaxlxos), the
1 Prise, ii.54.11.
2 Steinthal, op. cit., p.215.
3 Steinthal II, op. cit., p.217.
4
Steinthal I, op. cit., p.306; also Sandys, op. cit., p.147.
 ^ Steinthal I, op. cit., p.310.




perfect (cveotws auvTeXtxos), the pluperfect (mp^xnydvos ouvtcAlkos).
2
This was the system stated by Varro^ and is the system referred to by
3Diogenes Laertius.
Prepositions were named npo^eiuxoL auvöeayou^ by the Stoics 
who like others concerned with grammar found it difficult to reconcile 
the function of a preposition in relation to accidence and the position­
ing of a preposition which could be adverbial, as in post longum tempus 
and longo post tempore.'*
The adjective was generally regarded as a noun form, although 
Varro is one who identifies adiectivum as a distinct part of speech.^
The adjective (etclSctov) indicated, like any other noun, a owya n itpayya,
an ouotci; Aeuxov is the white(ness), the white object; o w o r d  ilc*.
» 7to/c .r is not to be distinguished from any other ovoya. An adjective 
could be classified as a noun in the same way as the proprium and
g
appellativum were kinds of nouns.
DECLINING OF NOUNS AND CONJUGATING OF VERBS
The next clearly defined function of the grarmaticus, as9indicated by Quintilian,' is the declining of nouns and conjugating of 
verbs — Nomina declinare et verba in primis pueri sciant. Although the 
systematic and elaborate organisation of nouns and verbs was undertaken




Steinthal II, op. cit., p.320.
3 Gudeman, op. cit. p.1806.
^ 7Z-.viii.44. Has vocant quidam appellandi dicendi, adminiculandi3
iungendi. These terms correspond respectively to ’nouns, ’verbs', 
'adjectives' and 'adverbs'. Cf. Steinthal II, p.219.
7 Steinthal II, op. cit., p.252.g
Ibid., op. cit., p.254.
9 i.4.22.
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by the Alexandrian analogists,1 *345 the Stoics had been responsible for
important preliminary developments. Originally Aristotle had simply
differentiated the nominative case (called ovoya) from the oblique cases
(comprehensively termed nTwaeus). The Stoics later applied the term
2TiTwaus to the nominative as well. According to Diogenes Laertius the
yevexn, 6 otlxh  and aLTyciTuxn cases were called TtAdyuai, n T w a e u s .
Diogenes Laertius also refers to a treatise on five cases written by 
3Chrysippus.
The terms yevuxn and aLTLaxuxn were somewhat erroneously 
translated into Latin. The original meaning of the accusative did not 
describe the case that denotes the object of an accusation, but rather 
the case denoting the effect of ( to auxuaxov) an action;^ instead of 
accusativus a more appropriate term would have been oausativus or 
effectivus. The Stoics regarded the yevuxd as the case denoting ydvos
or class; the term that came to be established in Latin, genetivus, is 
not as meaningful as the term later used by Priscian — generalis. The 
Stoics do not appear to have been interested in the xAnxuxtf or vooativus, 
no doubt because it would have little or no importance for their system 
of propositional dialectic. The distinctively Latin case, the ablativus, 
does not appear to have a Stoic connection; it is interesting that the 
forming of the term has been attributed to Caesar, and its use was 
firmly established with later grammarians.^ Even though Latin 
grammatioi may have mistranslated certain terms originally evolved by 
the Stoics, the basic Stoic division of cases as used by Greek 
ypayyaxuxot was adopted directly by the Romans together with its basic 
terminology.
Colson, op. eit., p.32.
 ^ vii.65.
3 vii.192.
4 Sandys, op. cit., p.147.
5 Ibid.
Cf. Steinthal II, op. ait., p.266. Die späteren Grammatiker und
schon Quintilian (i.4) haben den schwerlichen von Caesar (xvii. 
fragm. Lersch. I) gebildeten Terminus 'dblativus' 3 neben dem auch 
' comparativus r versucht ward.
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GENDER
Gender (ye\>6g/genus)was to be indicated* basically as 
masculinum, femininum or neutrale. The Roman grammatious might also 
point out that some irregular nouns are c tit w o l v c x , where one form may
encompass both masculine and feminine gender (e.g. oolumba: dove/
2 3pigeon), or where a feminine form may indicate a male (e.g. Murena).
Of the three basic genders the neuter form was regarded by the Stoics as
having been ouödrepov, a virtual negation of the two 'positive' genders,
dpaevLHov, §nAuxov.^
Careful grammatical description of each word in the text was 
regarded as essentially important, and although grammatici may have 
given this grammatical explanation and required it from their pupils in 
varying degrees of depth and detail,^ it is clear from the reading of 
Quintilian, Dionysius Thrax, Priscian and the Grammatici Latini* 256 
generally that there was a fundamentally standard procedure followed.
ETYMOLOGY
As well as such grammatical description, very often with just
as much emphasis the grammatious taught the etymological associations of
many words: Scrutabitur ille praeceptor acer atque subtilis origines
7 8nominum ... Etymology, concerned with word origin and derivatives,
Quintilian i.4.23, ... non erit contentus tradere in nominibus tria 
genera et quae sunt duobus orrmibusve communia . ..
2 The form columbus only appeared about the time of Varro (Z-7.ix.56). 
 ^ Quint, i.4.24.
 ^ Cf. Steinthal II, op. cit. , p.244.
5 Quint, i.4.23.
 ^ Cf. H. Keil, Grammatici Latini.
 ^ Quint, i.4.25.
o
Varro 77.v.2-4, ... ubi cur et unde sint verba scrutantur3 Graeci 
vocant eiuvioAoyLa. Quint, i.6, Etymologia ... verborum originem 
requirit.
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especially with regard to nouns, was a vast field of study and research 
extensively and earnestly pursued by Hellenistic and Latin philologists. 
And it constituted a very important part of the grammaticus' teaching of 
the methodice. But as well as being a field of word analysis taught by 
the grammaticus for its intrinsic value and interest, etymology also 
provided the basic principles for the treatment of solecisms, barbarisms, 
glossemata and very often orthography.*
Etymology was predominantly a field of study undertaken and
consolidated by the Stoics. It was important for their system of logic
or dialectic, where the aim was to establish the truth. The close
association of etymology and dialectic is indicated by the fact that
Augustine's De diatectica or Principia dialecticae contains a clear
exposition of the Stoic principles of etymology, which are regarded as
important. The word itself, exuyoXoyLct, suggests a theory of knowledge
or truth based on philology; for the Stoics regarded ovdyaxa as 
2originally exuycx. The function of £xuyoXoyta was to prove the truth or
validity of words, by showing how the word corresponded to the object
named, and also to show that exuya revealed true religious, social and
3metaphysical values.' Consequently, etymology could be relevant to the 
grammaticus ' treatment of the uaxopunov where the implied meaning of a 
word and the poet's use of it could be explained.
The Stoic system of etymology was consistent with their theory 
of (puaeu, a doctrine that supported the natural truth in language, in 
contrast to the conventional, organised principles of language as upheld 
in the Sdaeu theory. Etymology allowed that, although the roots of the 
word were true or valid, the derived word itself, as it came into being, 
might not have a form that reflected validity (exuya).** Such an 
argument fitted into the Stoic anomalist theory. The analogists did not 
concentrate on etymology, and furthermore vehemently criticised what
Each of these responsibilities of the grammaticus ’ teaching will be 
discussed a little later in this chapter as a development from the 
treatment of etymology.
2 Steinthal I, op. cit., p.331.
 ^ Ibid.
4 Colson, op. cit., p.25.
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they regarded as forced, pseudo-scientific explanations. They could
not accept such anomaly in word derivatives; and being philologists,
and not philosophers, had no use for etymology and subtle word analysis
in logic or dialectic. The resistance of the Alexandrians to etymology
was unsuccessful, because as recommended by Quintilian and upheld by
2later grammatici, especially Priscian, the study of word origins — 
verba primigenia, primitiva and derivativa — was regarded as the 
teacher's function and responsibility. The extent of the Stoic 
comprehensive contribution to etymology is indicated from the time of 
Chrysippus who alone wrote ten books uept exuyoXoyLxwv, and as late as 
Augustine who declared that Stoici autumant nullum esse verbum cuius 
non certa explicari ovigo possit.
Onomatopeia, in keeping with the Stoic cpuaeu theory of
4language, was a principle on which words could be first formed. 
Augustine, although writing considerably later than for the period under 
consideration in this study indicates the Stoic argument for onomato- 
poetic word formation: the word could directly represent the sound as
in aeris tinnitum, equorum hinnitum, ovium balatum, tubarum clangorem, 
stridorem catenarum, but also the tone of a word could have an 
appropriate effect on the senses,^ as with voluptas which is somewhat
Cf. Varro £Z-.vii.l09, ... in primo volumine est quae dicantur, cur 
exuyoXoytxn neque ars sit neque ea utilis sit.
 ^ See pp.71-75.
 ^ de Dial. 6.
4 Aug. de Dial. 6, ... ut res cum sono verbi aliqua similitudine 
concinat ... Perspicis enim haec verba ita sonare ut ipsae res quae 
his verbis significantur.
Also: Origen, contra Celsum i.18, Xoyog BaSug Mai axopprixos 6 uepu
cpuaews ovoyaxwv, rcoxepov, wg ouexau ’ApuaxoxeXng, Seaeu etau xa 
ovoyaxa, n, wg voytCouat oil onto xfjs Zxoäg, cpuoeu, yuyouyevwv xwv 
itpcoxwv cpwvwv xa ipayyaxa x a § ’ wv xa, ovdyaxa, xa$o Mai axoxeca xiva, 
exuyoXoytag tie ayouotv.
 ^ Aug. de Dial. 6, Sed quia sunt res, quae non sonant3 in his
similitudinem tactus valeres ut si leniter vel aspere sensum tangunt3 
lenitas vel asperitas litterarum ut tangit auditum sic eis nomina 
peperit: ut ipsum lene cum dicimus, leniter sonants quis item
asperitatem non et ipso nomine asperam iudicet?
66
euphonious and with crux which is harsh sounding.
The Stoics postulated a number of different principles for 
word formation and meaning, but the suggested processes can hardly be 
invariably accepted as sound.
2(i) The principle of vicinitas meant that a word which had a 
precise meaning, could extend its application to allied 
objects. Such a word was piscina which had the precise 
meaning 'fish pond', but by extension came to mean 'pond' or 
large water container, although there was no association 
with fish.
(ii) The progressio ad contrarium suggested a very strange and 
erroneous reasoning, whereby a derived word implied an 
opposite idea to the meaning of the original word. For 
instance, bellum was supposed to have a contrary meaning to
bellus . ^
(iii) The formation of a word per id quo continetur meant that a 
word such as urbs was claimed to be derived from orbis.* 234
(iv) Correspondingly, a word could be formed per id quod
continetur; for instance, horreum was to be derived from 
hordeum (just as 'granary' in English is formed from 
'grain').5
Ibid. Lene est auribus, cum dicimus 'voluptas'3 asperum (est)3 cum 
dicimus 'crux'. Ita res ipsae adficiunt3 ut verba sentiuntur.
2
Ibid. Ventum est3 ut usurpetur nomen non tarnen rei similis3 sed 
quasi vicinae . . .  Ita vocabulum non translation similitudine3 sed 
quadam vicinitate usurpatum est.
3
Ibid. ... bellum3 quod res bella non sit3 ... In actual fact, 
bellusis derived from benulus, a diminutive of benus, an early form 
of bonus', an early form of bellum was duellum (see Lewis and Short,
A Latin Dictionary).
4 Ibid. . . .  ut urbem ab orbe appellatam volunt3 quod auspicato locus 
aratro circumduci solet. The example given is false: urbs is from
the Sanskrit vardh-, 'to make strong', while orbs is from the 
Sanskrit dhvar-, 'bend', 'twist' (see Lewis and Short, op. cit.).
Ibid. . . .  ut si quis horreum rnutata d littera affirmet ab hordeo 
nomination.
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(v) The principle of metonymy meant that rnucro (the point of a 
sword) could take over the full meaning of gladius. ^
(vi) Correspondingly, it was argued that the whole could give its
2meaning to a part, so that capillus was formed from caput.
(vii) Efficientia was a principle that enabled a word such as
vinculum to be derived from vis . The argument was that
chains use force, and that vis as a word implied force
3because the sound u has a forcible sound.
(viii) A principle that prevailed per effecta indicated that puteus
4was the origin of potatio.
Etymology was a field of study for which many principles were 
set down; the above-mentioned processes do not comprehensively describe 
the full range of possible etymological methods.'’ However, although 
many of their basic principles could accurately explain the evolution of 
certain words, there was a tendency to rationalise and force 
explanations which were invalid.^ It is clear that from the time of 
Varro Roman grammatici maintained a lively interest in etymology and it 
is a justifiable claim that 'the world of words had a glamour and a
7wonder for them (i.e. educated people), which it cannot have for us.'
The pupil of the grccmmaticus would hear explained the primitiva and
Ibid. ... vel a parte totum> ut mucronis nomines quae summa pars 
gladii est3 gladium vocamus.
2 Ibid. ... vela toto pars, ut capillus quasi capitis pilus.
Capillus as a diminutive of caput is the probable etymology (see 
Lewis and Short, op. cit.). It is most doubtful that pilus should be 
associated.
3 Ibid. Again, the suggested etymology for the example given is unsure.
 ^ Ibid, puteus quod eius effectum potatio est. The example is not 
convincing. Potatio is from poto, which is derived from tilvoj, while 
puteus is connected with pu- indicating 'cleanse' (cf. purus). (See 
Lewis and Short, op. cit.)
5 Cf. Quint, i.6; Varro ll. , Books v-vii.
 ^ Cf. R.G. Kent's comments on Varro's etymological explanations, Loeb 
edition de Lingua Latina.
Colson, op. cit., p.24.7
68
derivativa of many words, and especially nouns.
GLOSSEMATA
As well as having an intrinsic interest in word origins and
derivatives the grammaticus drew on etymology to explain 'glossemata'.
'Glossemataf were words that were no longer in common use and naturally
were very often to be discussed in the explication of verse. Quintilian
emphasises the grammaticus ' responsibility in this regard: Circa
glossemata etiams id est voces minus usitatas, non ultima eius
2professionis diligentia est. A pupil often was required to set out in
a systematic list brief explanatory comments on the author being
studied; this exercise was especially relevant to the explanation of
■yXajaaau. The Stoic principles of etymology outlined above could assist
the grammaticus ' interpretation of such yAukraaL; and this approach is
especially applicable to Crates of Mallos who was so careful to
4interpret Homer from a Stoic viewpoint. Varro in discussing etymology 
(see Books v-vii) presents the Stoic viewpoint^ and relates glossemata 
to etymology: Camillam qui glossemata interpretati dixerunt
Cf. Priscian.
i.8.15. Also note the emphasis placed on the treatment of yAöaaau in 
Dion. Thrax 1.
Cf. Marrou, op. cit. , p.232, who cites from a fragment such an 
explanation of words from Homer — the Homeric forms are on the left, 








See Chapter II, pp.39 foil.
l.l.vi.2, Huius rei auctor satis mihi Chrysippus et Antipater et illi 
in quibus si non tantum acuminis3 at plus litterarum3 in quo est 
Aristophanis et Apollodorus ... Varro, of course, presents the 
argument for analogy in his de Lingua latina, viii-x.









administram ... Hina Casmilus nominatur. * The treatment of 
'glossemata' was regarded as important, and the Stoics through their 
system of etymology could contribute to this part of the grammaticus ' 
teaching.
BARBARISMS AND SOLECISMS
'Barbarisms' and 'solecisms' were to be remedied by the 
2 3teacher, if necessary;“ although it is allowed that at times these are
4
acceptable, particularly in verse. A 'barbarism' is defined as a fault 
that occurs within a single word, while a 'solecism'^ usually applies to 
more than one word. Examples of barbarisms are:
(i) the 'Latinising' of a foreign word, e.g. cantus (iron tyre 
of a wheel), which was of Spanish or African origin; 
mastruca, which was Sardinian for 'a rough cloak';
(ii) the use of gladia, instead of gladii
(iii) the tendency to change a deponent form, so that it conformed 
to the rules of a regular active verb, e.g. the use of the
7
form adsentio instead of adsentior.
 ^ Z-Z.vii.34. Also see vii.107: itaque sub hoc glossema 'collide'
subscribunt.
2 Quint, i.5.5, Prima barbarismi ao soloeoismi foeditas absit ... et 
grammatiaos officii sui commonemus.
3
Ibid. Sed quia interim excusantur haec vitia aut consuetudine aut 
auctoritate aut vetustate aut denique vicinitate virtutum ...
4
Quint, i.5.6, Interim vitium3 quod fit in singulis verbis3 sit 
barbarismus.
Quint, i.5.34, Cetera vitia omnia ex pluribus vocibus sunt3 quorum 
est soloecismus ...
 ^ Quint, i.5.8.
^ Quint, i.5.16.
Quint, i.5.13, nam sive est 'adsentior'3 Sisenna dixit 'adsentio' 
multique et hunc et analogiam secuti3 sive illud verum est haec 
quoque pars consensu defenditur.
7
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It is evident that pupils would have perpetrated barbarisms by
making errors in what was regarded as basically correct language in
speaking and writing; however, in the latter two instances, relating to
the forms gladia and adsentio, barbarisms were committed in the cause of
analogy. According to Quintilian anomalous forms were acceptable and
correct because of consuetudo. Consuetudo was fundamental to Stoic
anomalism, which firmly supported such forms as gladii and adsentior.
Quintilian, although not a Stoic, was an anomalist at heart^ and uses2Stoic anomalist argument at times. Anomalist philology, which was of 
Stoic origin,could offer a defence and present arguments against 
barbarisms, w/ti-VA. were urged in the name of analogy.
Solecisms usually occur where more than one word is involved,
and very often when licence is taken with what is regarded as correct
3grammar, e.g. Aegypto venio; ambulo viam. Solecisms can occur with 
gender, number and more especially case.^ Naturally it was the 
grarmaticus' function to note and remedy solecisms, when they were 
clearly grammatical errors. Even though the grarmaticus would have 
treated solecisms independently of Stoic doctrine, there was to some 
extent a Stoic background to this part of the grarmaticus' teaching.
This contribution was in the use of grammatical terminology, as 
previously outlined, and in the treatment of solecisms by Chrysippus.^
ORTHOGRAPHY
Orthography was to be given careful attention by the 
grarmaticus’, and it was equated with the recte scribendi scientia.
Colson, op. cit., p.31.
2 See Book v, passim.
3 Quint, i.5.39 — the correct forms are ab Aegypto venio’, ambulo per 
viam.
4 Quint, i.5.45, ... fit soloecismus generenumero proprie autem 
casibus .. .
5 D.L. vii.192.
^ Quint. 1.7.1, ... dicendum, quae scribentibus custodienda, quod Graeci 
opSoypoKpuav vocant; hoc nos recte scribendi scientiam nominamus.
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It involved not only mechanically correct spelling, but also a clear
understanding of vowel quantities, and variation of meaning as
influenced by pronunciation.^ Orthography was regarded as an important
study by Roman grammatici and was researched and pursued independently 
2of Greek theory.
It is difficult to associate Stoic philological principles
with orthography. However, it was an aspect of the grammaticus '
teaching that was upheld by consuetudo, the Stoic keyword which
emphasised usage. Anomaly prevailed in spelling, as emphasised by
Quintilian: Verum orthographia quoque consuetudini servit3 ideoque
saepe rrrutata est. Orthographic problems had been looked at earlier in
the second century B.C. by Lucilius, who was influenced by Stoic 
4etymology; but such Stoic influence was short-lived because Lucilius* 
determinations on spelling were, in general, not consolidated in later 
literature. For instance, Lucilius argued strongly that the plural form 
in -i should be represented as -ei, but this inflection did not survive 
into the classical age.'’
PRISCIAN'S GRAMMATICAL EXPLANATION 
ANALYSED FROM THE STOIC VIEWPOINT
The teaching of the methodise, principally as outlined by 
Quintilian, has now been discussed from the viewpoint of Stoic elements 
in various aspects of this teaching. To substantiate and to exemplify
Ibid. Cuius ars non in hoc posita est3 ut noverimus3 quibus quaeque 
syllaba litteris constet ... sed totam ut mea3 fert opinio3 
subtilitatem in dubiis habet.
Gudeman, op. cit. , p.1798.
See F. Sommer, 'Lucilius als Grammatiker', Hermes xxix.1909, p.77 ... 
vielmehr darf man ihren Ursprung gestrost in den älteren Zeiten der 
Stoa suchen. Im Grunde genommen handelt es sich dabei um nichts 
anderes als um einen Ausläufer der Lehre von der ydynous in der 
Wortbildung 3 nach Stoikerart hochgradig ins symbolistische verzerrt.
See 11.364-364 iam puerei venere e postremum facito atque i3 
ut puerei plures fiant, i si facis solum, 
pupillis pueri3 Lucili3 hoc unius fiat.
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these procedures it is informative to look at the detailed procedures
described by Priscian. Although writing considerably later than
Quintilian,^ Priscian is often referred to as clearly illustrating the
2established and traditional methods of the grammaticus. He uses the
grammatical terms that were applied by his predecessors of the first
3century B.C. and first century A.D." Also, he chose to make his treat­
ment of the first lines of each book of the Aeneid the basis of his 
analysing — Partitiones duodecim versuum Aeneidos principalium, Virgil 
being of great interest also to grammatici of the first century A.D. 
Consequently, for a number of reasons Priscian can be enlightening for 
the methods of the grammaticus generally.
The extent to which grammar was influenced by Stoicism is 
apparent when Priscian's explanations are analysed from the point of 
view of Stoic elements that were long established in Latin grammar. As 
a basis for such analysis, it is necessary first to realise the coherent 
and comprehensive approach outlined by Priscian. Details of his treat­
ment of line 1, Aeneid iv (... at regina gravi iam dudum saucia cura) 
were variously as follows:
Scande vers urn.
Die caesurus.
Quot figuration est? ... Decern ... tres spondeos et duos dactylos. 
Partes orationis quot habet? ... Septem.
Quot nomina? ... Quattuor: regina/gravi/saucia/cura.
Et quid aliud? ... Unam coniunctionemat duo adverbia3 iam dudum.
Tracta singulas partes.
At —  quae pars orationis? Coniunctio.
Quid est coniunctio? Pars orationis adnectens ordinansque 
sententiam.
Priscian lived during the age of Justinian (483 - 565 A.D.).
Marrou, op. cit., p.376, refers to Priscian's methods as typical of 
the methods of the grammaticus throughout antiquity.
Cf. Varro and Quintilian, who use identical terms such as partes
orationis, species, genus, nomen appellativum, etc. Such a tradition 
was long-lasting and appears almost invariable.
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Regina — quae pars orationis est? ... Romen.
Cuius est speciei? Derivativae.
Die primitivum. Rex. Roc quoque unde naseitur? A rego 
verbo; unde genetivum in -gis terminat.
Quale est? Appellativum 3 generis femini, numeri singularis3 
figurae simplicis3 casus hie nominativi3 declinationis primae. 
Quae nomina ex eo derivantur3 hoc est a rege? Regius et 
regalis.
gravi — quae pars orationis? ... Romen.
Quale ... Adiectivum. Cuius speciei? Primitivae generis 
communis. Fac ab eo derivativum. Gravior gravissimus 
gravitas et gravida. Hinc est grandis et grando et verbum 
gravo.
iam — quae pars orationis est? ...
Adverbium. Quid est adverbium? pars orationis quae adiecta 
verbo significationem eius explanat atque implet.
dudum — quae pars orationis est? ...
Adverbium est temporis.
saucia — quid est? Romen. Quale?
Appellativum. Cuius speciei?
Derivativae sive participialis. nam a participio sauciatus 
naseitur saucius.
cura — quid est? Romen. Quale?
Appellativum ipsius rei; potest tarnen et dea aliqua 
intellegi. ... videtur ergo esse derivativum verbale a verbo 
euro curas curat. Die nomina derivativa ex eo. Curiosus 
curagulus curator.
To illustrate how Stoic grammar became basic and integral to 
the established grammatical system, the above descriptions provided by 
Priscian may be considered in the light of their Stoic elements.
With regard to at, the conjunction had been identified as a 
part of speech before the Stoic systemisation of grammar.^ Roman
1 See p .59.
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grammatici were not greatly concerned with classifying conjunctions,
although Hellenistic Stoics with their deep interest in dialectic were
very much concerned with identifying various conjunctions and their
2significance for clauses. It appears that the coordinate conjunction
3was classified as the coniunctio copulativa' by Latin grammatici, but 
this term was used after the first century A.D.; it does not appear in 
Quintilian nor Pliny, and there is no indication of the use of the term
4by Remmius Palaemon.
Regina is one of four nouns (nomina) identified in this line, 
adjectives also being included in this classification. In the 
grammatical description of regina Stoic elements are incorporated in the 
terms derivativae, primitivum, the etymological comment on the word, the 
reference to the genitive case and in the term appellativum. On the 
other hand, the classification relating to declinationis primae is a 
result of the analogist systematisation which for Latin grammar was 
probably carried out by Palaemon.
Gravi is treated as a noun; grammarians generally in 
antiquity did not distinguish the adjective as an independent part of 
speech; again the terms primitivum and derivativum stem from the 
established Stoic concern with etymology.
Iam and dudum are described in terms completely in the Stoic 
tradition. The adverb, as mentioned above, was added to the basic 
Aristotelian classification of parts of speech and related to the verb 
by the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus.
Saucia is to our grammatical understanding somewhat oddly 
regarded as a nomen. Participles were considered as noun forms,
Steinthal II, op. cit. , p.325, refers to Priscian's classification 
of conjunctions, but points out that hitherto Romans had been little 
concerned with conjunctions: ... während doch ein Vertreter
derselben im Lateinischen nicht vorkommt.
2 Steinthal II, op. cit., p.324, Die Arten der Cong. wurden von den 
Stoikern auf gestellt in Parallele zu ihrer Einteilung der Sätze.
3
4
Steinthal II, op. cit., p.325. 
Steinthal II, op. cit., p.326.
75
although naturally there was a clear understanding of their verb origin. 
In this grammatical description of saucia there is an admixture of Stoic 
classification in the term appettativum and of Aristarchus' analogist 
terminology in the use of the words participialis and participio 
(ijcroxn).1
Cura is explained as a nomen; and, as for regina, there is 
provided in the Stoic tradition a philological explanation in an 
etymological and allegorical manner.
It is possible to continue a 'Stoic' analysis of Priscian's 
treatment of each of the first lines of the Aeneid to emphasise further 
the Stoic elements that became established in Latin grammar. It is 
evident, however, from the discussion on grammatical forms contained in 
the body of this chapter and from the above analysis, that the methodice 
incorporated a substantial Stoic contribution. The importance of this 
contribution is enhanced by the fact that the methodice was given so 
much weight by the grammaticus, as evidenced by the number of handbooks 
on the ars grammatica written as educational guides.
In researching a particular topic it is encouraging to read a
statement that there is a need for such research. With regard to the
teaching of grammar in antiquity the opinion has been expressed that
'the terminology of the studies, which formed the staple of general
2education, deserves more study than it generally receives.'
Consequently it is hoped that this chapter in some measure has some 
meaning in relation to such a need.
Gudeman, op. cit., p.1792.
%
Colson, op. cit., p.36. The author continues: 'It is not
sufficiently remembered that grammar in particular was a science 
which aroused a vast amount of interest and that it was ... a study 




STOIC ELEMENTS IN LATIN AUTHORS 
READ IN SCHOOLS
To explain the importance of Stoic elements in the literature 
read in Roman schools, it is necessary first to determine the curriculum 
of authors that was taught by the grammaticus. Also, it is informative 
to compare the nature of this curriculum, with that taught by the 
Hellenistic ypayyaiLMds; such a comparison gives greater significance 
to the Stoic content of Latin authors read in schools.
THE LITERARY CURRICULUM OF THE GRAMMATICUS
From the mid-second century B.C. to the end of the first 
century A.D. the literary curriculum taught by the Roman grammaticus, as 
discussed in the following pages, underwent considerable change. The 
rich and vigorous development of Roman literature meant that the 
curriculum of the grammaticus was to vary, expand and be more extensive­
ly taught, while the teaching of Greek literature in Rome by the 
YpauyaiLxds became correspondingly less widely taught. Also, in 
contrast to the established literary curriculum taught by the 
Hellenistic YPaRRaTlxo's , the Roman grammaticus came to give emphasis to 
the teaching of contemporary Latin literature.
The YPaRRaTt-xos taught from a range of authors whose quality 
and worth had been established and were unquestioned. Consequently 
there was a tendency for the Hellenistic teacher not to teach 
contemporary authors, as indicated by Quintilian who points out that in 
the time of Aristarchus and Aristophanes (of Byzantium), Apollonius of 
Rhodes was not included in the list of authors to be taught, as this 
would have been contrary to a distinct policy only to teach established
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authors of an earlier period.1 It would appear from excavations at
Oxvrhynchus and Antinoopolis that a Hellenistic syllabus in Greek
literature in the third century B.C. was made up largely of earlier
major authors — Homer, Demosthenes, Didymus, Euripides, Menander, Plato,
Thucydides, Hesiod, Isocrates, Aristophanes, Xenophon, Sophocles and
Pindar. In the Hellenistic period the ypayyaiuxo's probably chose to
teach authors that were included in codified lists; and by the middle
of the second century B.C. there was the ’canon' of ten Attic orators,
ten historians, ten painters, ten sculptors, ten poets, ten philosophers, 
3
ten physicians. However, at times contemporary authors were included 
such as Callimachus, Aratus and the Epigrammatists — and also authors
4
who were not of the first rank. But it was predominantly a pre- 
Hellenistic curriculum comprising established authors of stature. Such 
a curriculum, of course, meant that there was no actual Stoic content 
studied in school Greek authors, except in Aratus, who appears to have 
been the only Stoic author read by school pupils. Stoic elements would 
have been taught only by interpretation of Greek literature, as 
instanced by the methods followed by Crates and the Pergamum school, and 
especially in their study and teaching of Homer. In contrast, the very 
important argument to be emphasised and developed later in this chapter 
is that in Latin authors taught by the grammaticus a substantial Stoic 
content was consciously and systematically included. But this situation 
does not relate convincingly to the second century B.C.
x.1.45. Apollonius in ordinem a grammaticis datum non venit3 quia 
Aristarchus atque Aristophanes 3 poetarum iudices3 neminem sui 
temporis in numerum redegerunt.
As a matter of interest Quintilian (x.l.foll.) recommends the follow­
ing lengthy list of authors, which he states is not intended to be 
completely comprehensive — Homer, Hesiod, Antimachus, Panyasis, 
Apollonius of Rhodes, Aratus, Theocritus, Callimachus, Philetas, 
Archilochus, Pindar, Stesichorus, Alcaeus, Simonides, Aristophanes, 
Eupolis, Cratinus, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Menander, 
Philemon, Thucydides, Herodotus, Theophrastus, Philistus, Ephorus, 
Clitarchus, Timagenes, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides, Lysias, 
Isocrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle.
J. Bowen, op. cit. , p.149.
Marrou, op. cit., p.225.
Marrou, op. cit., p .227.
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In the second century B.C. was established a bilingual
educational pattern, where Roman teaching followed established
Hellenistic methods. Parallel teaching was undertaken in Latin and
Greek. This parallel, bilingual system was exemplified in the teaching
of Livius Andronicus and Ennius, both of whom taught in Latin and
Greek.'*’ They were poetae grammatiei who taught from their own Latin
2versions, and their works were both literature and school texts.
Succeeding grammatiei had at their disposal these school Latin 'texts'.
About 50 B.C. Horace as a boy had been taught the poems of Livius
3Andronicus by his grammaticus, Orbilius. And in the latter part of the 
first century A.D. Quintilian was reconunending Ennius as a school
4author. Other writers of the second century B.C. appear at some stage
to have been used as school texts, although it is difficult to determine
precisely their periods of popularity. One grammaticus, Curtius Nicias,
a contemporary of Cn. Pompeius and C. Memmius, had a strong interest in
Lucilius (180- 103 B.C.); and his commentaries were very highly
regarded.^ Nicias undoubtedly would have read Lucilius with his pupils.
Lucilius is strongly recommended as a school author by Quintilian^ who
7also attests to his large number of supporters. In Horace's well knowng
criticism of Lucilius is implied a wide spread popularity.
1 Suet, de gramm. 1, ... qui idem et poetae et semigraeei erantLivium
et Ennium dico_, quos utra lingua domi forisque docuisse adnotatum est.
Ibid. ... nihil amplius quam Graecos interpretabantur, aut si quid 
ipsi Latine eoniposuissent praelegebant. Praelegere was a particular 




Suet, de gramm. 14, Huius (i.e. Nicias) de Lueilio libros etiam 
Santra comprobat.
x.1.94, Nam eruditio in eo (i.e. Lucilius) mira est libertas atque 
inde aeerbitas et abunde salis.
x.1.93, Satura quidem tota nostra est3 in quam primus insignem 
laudem adeptus Lucilius quosdam ita deditos sibi adhuc habet amatores 
ut eum non eiusdem modo operis auetoribus sed omnibus poetis 
praeferre non dubitent.
Sat. i.10.2, ... quis tarn Lucili fautor inepte est3 ut non hoe
fateatur?
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The tragedies of Accius (170 - 90 B.C.) and Pacuvius (220 - 132
B.C.), and the plays of Terence (194 - 159 B.C.) and Caecilius (219-160
B.C.) were studied, and were well known to Cicero and other orators, who
frequently quoted these veteres Latini poets.1 *34 Quintilian firmly
supported the study of these old Latin poets but would prefer that they
2
were read after the years of school. Tacitus indicated that Accius and
Pacuvius had been read and studied over a long period of time, when he
referred with satisfaction to the fact that they have yielded their
3position to Horace, Virgil and Lucan. Aelius Stilo, a very influential 
grammaticus of considerable standing, commended Plautus’ diction so 
highly^ that Varro quoted him as saying that 'if the Muses wished to 
speak Latin, they would use the language of Plautus.’ Such faith in an 
author strongly suggests that Stilo would have taught Plautus to his 
pupils. So, then, evidence supports the argument that leading Latin 
authors from the second century B.C. became established in school 
curricula. However, until the time of Cicero the teaching of Greek 
literature appears to have been given more weight. This was the 
situation from the period of the Scipionic circle, as evidenced by the 
fact that educated Romans had such a good knowledge of Greek literature 7* 
The strong standing of the study of Greek is indicated by the 
interesting situation that arose in 93 B.C. when L. Plotius,^ who was 
primarily a teacher of rhetoric, chose to teach boys in Latin; his
Quint, i.8.2. Nam praecipue quidem apud Ciceronem frequenter tarnen 
apud Asinium etiam et cetero3 qui sunt proximi videmus Enni3 Acci3 
Pacuvi3 Lucili3 Terenti3 Caecili et aliorum insert versus summa non 
eruditionibus modo gratia sed etiam iucunditatis3 cum poeticis 
voluptatibus aures a forensi asperitate respirent.
 ^ Quint, i.8.12.
3 Tac. Dial. 20. Exigitur enim iam ab oratore etiam poeticus decor non 
Acii aut Paouvii veterno inquinatus3 sed a Horatii et Virgili et 
Lucani sacrario prolatus.
4
Quint, x.1.99. Licet Varro Musas3 Aelii Stilonis sententia Plautino 
dicat sermone locuturas fuisse3 si Latine loqui vellent ...
 ^ See above, Chapter II, pp.39,40.
 ^ Cic. ad Titinium, quoted in Suet, de rhet. 2. Equidem memoria
teneo pueris nobis primum Latine docere coepisse Plotium quendam ... 
Continebatur autem doctissimorum hominum auctoritate qui 
existimabant Graecis exercitationibus ali melius ingenia posse.
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school was closed in the following year ostensibly because it was 
considered that Greek was more effective for the purpose.
Throughout the first century B.C. there was a transitional
period during which education in Latin grew in importance. Strong
impetus to such a development was given by Cicero, whose stated aim in
his writings was to enable his readers to study in Latin a content that
had previously been available only in Greek. This growing importance is
reflected in the increasing number of grammatici and in the studies
written by them on Latin literature.^ By the time of the grammaticus
2Caecilius Epirota, (circa 25 B.C.) the situation was ready to introduce 
into schools the study of Virgil and other 'modern’ poets. Suetonius 
attributes this development to Epirota, but educational change is rarely 
effected by individual persons and undoubtedly this trend had prevailed 
before Epirota may have been involved in this implementation.
It is well established that from the latter part of the first 
century B.C. many Roman authors were read in schools during their own 
life time, a situation that hardly applied to Hellenistic Greece.
Virgil became the most important poet taught in Roman schools. In
enjoying such a pre-eminent position he was placed on a level comparable
3 4to that of Homer, and well ahead of other Roman poets. Horace was
firmly commended by Quintilian,^ who argued that he was the only lyric
poet worth reading. Horace's own fear that he might become an author
read in schools was actually realised.^* An interesting point is that
Cf. comments on the work of the grammatici in the following chapter.
2 Suet, de gramm. 16. Primus dioitur Latine ex tempore disputasse, 
primusque Vergilium et alios poetas novos praelegere coepisse ...
3 Quint, i.8.5. Ideoque optime institution est3 ut ab Homero atque 
Vergilio lectio inciperet ... Itaque ut apud illos Homerus sic apud 
nos Virgilius auspicatissimum dederit exordium, omnium eius generis 
poetariAm.
 ^ Quint, x.1.87. Ceteri omnes sequentur.
5 x . 1 . 9 6 .
 ^ Sat. i.10.74. ...an tua demens
vilibus in ludis dictari carmina malls? 
non ego3 nam satis est equitem mihi plaudere 3 ut audax.
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Horace's comment indicates that the reading of Latin authors had become
a wide-spread practice. On the other hand, the Stoic poet Persius, also
1 2 commended by Quintilian, is pleased to be read widely in schools.
Statius expresses a similar sentiment — that 'the youth of Italy eagerly
3learns and recites his verse.' Although many contemporary poets were 
taught throughout the first century A.D., some poets and lyric poets, in
4particular, were often regarded as not suitable for classroom teaching. 
Correspondingly, if Quintilian is a guide, an author was recommended and 
might be read because of his sound moral precepts.^
THE TEACHING OF PROSE
Traditionally the grammaticus taught only the poets, and the 
rhetor was concerned with prose writers. But this division of function 
was not always strictly observed; a possible 'confusion of roles' 
occurred often when:
(i) a teacher could be both a grammaticus and rhetor
(ii) grammatici were criticised by Quintilian for usurping the 
role of the rhetor by holding back pupils in their schools 
to teach them rhetoric, instead of permitting them to 
advance to the rhetor's school for instruction.^7
x.1.94. Multum et verae gloriae quamvis uno libro Persius meruit.
Sat. i.28-29. At pulohrum est digito monstrari et dicier hie est! 
tarn cirratorum centum dictata fuisse pro nihilo pendes?
Thebaid, xii.815. Itala iam studio discit memoratque iuventus.
Mart. i.25.1-3. versus scribere me parum severos
nec quos praelegebat in schola magister 3 
Corneli3 quaeris.
Cf. Quintilian on Hesiod, x.1.52. tarnen utiles circa praecepta 
sententiae levitasque verborum et compositionis probabilis.
Suet. de gramm. 4. Veteres grarmatici et rhetoricam docebant3 ac 
multorum de utraque arte commentarii feruntur ...
ii.1.4. nam grammatice tenuis a forte assimnptis historicorum
criticorumque viribus pleno iam satis alveo fluit3 cum praeter 
rationem recte loquendi non parum alioqui copiosam prope omnium 
maximarum artium scientiam amplexa sit.
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(iii) the rhetor often taught poetry, for the inclusion of verse 
quotations could adorn the orator's speech.^
These circumstances, firmly substantiated by the references given below, 
indicate that the grammatious taught prose authors, as well as the 
poets. The fact that prose writers were introduced into the curriculum 
of the grammatious meant that at this particular level of education they 
were read and studied by a larger number of pupils than if they were 
completely left to the school of the rhetor, for only a proportion of 
the grammatious ' pupils became students of the rhetor.
The syllabus of prose authors was naturally headed by Cicero; 
his quality of diction and unrivalled rhetorical models ensured his pre­
eminent position. His standing was so great that other writers were
2recommended only as they might approach or resemble him. Then,
3according to Quintilian, Sallust and Livy followed Cicero. In a third 
category might be included Asinius Pollio, M. Valerius Corvinus, Julius 
Caesar, M. Rufus Caelius, C. Licinius Calvus, Servius Sulpicius, Cassius 
Severus, Domitius Afer, Julius Africanus, Vibius Priscus, M. Galerius, 
Julius Secundus, Cornelius Celsus, Seneca. It is interesting to note 
that Latin poets from the early second century B.C. were studied into 
the first century A.D. On the other hand, the prose writers to be 
studied did not appear until at a much later period. In the first 
century A.D. the two prose authors mainly read were Cicero and Sallust. 
Although Quintilian placed Livy on the same level as Sallust, and in 
later centuries preference was given to Livy, Sallust in actual fact was
4generally and indisputably regarded as the historian of first rank.
Quint, i.8.10. Denique credamus sumrnis oratorihus qui veterum 
poemata vet ad fidem causarum vet ad ornamentum etoquentiae adsumunt. 
See also Tac. Diat. 20.
2 Quint, ii.5.20. ... ut quisque erit Ciceroni simittimus.
 ^ Quint, ii.5.19.
Cf. Marrou, op. cit. , pp.374-375.
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BRIEF SURVEY OF CURRICULUM
What conclusions can be reached on the curriculum taught from 
the mid-second century B.C. to the end of the first century A.D.? Until 
the middle of the first century B.C. the Roman grammaticus probably 
taught from a number of verse writers such as Livius Andronicus, Ennius, 
Lucilius, Accius, Pacuvius, while throughout this period the teaching of 
Greek literature enjoyed a stronger position. However, there was a 
gradual yielding to the growing importance of the teaching of Latin 
literature by the grarmaticus. From the latter part of the first 
century B.C. into the first century A.D. the grammaticusr position 
strengthened, while correspondingly the teaching of Greek literature, 
while still pursued, was not given priority.
From the first century A.D. the grarmaticus had at his
disposal a substantial body of Latin literature from which he might
select his curriculum. Although this curriculum could vary in
accordance with the preferences of individual grammatici and also could
comprise a wide range of authors, the principal authors taught appear to
be from the poets — Virgil, Horace and Terence; and from the prose
writers — Cicero and Sallust."^ In due course, according to Arusianus 
2Messius, there was established a quadriga of Latin authors: Virgil,
Terence, Cicero and Sallust. Throughout the first century A.D., however, 
Horace's standing was high and he was undoubtedly read in schools at 
that time as a standard author in the curriculum. And Terence, although 
in the second century B.C. rated behind Caecilius and Plautus, was 
upheld from the first century A.D. as the outstanding verse dramatist.
So, evidence suggests that by the first century A.D. the authors that 
were given prime place in the curriculum were Virgil, Horace, Terence, 
Cicero and Sallust; but also a considerable number of other verse and 
prose writers were taught.
Cf. Marrou, op, cit. , p.553. ' Exempla elocutorum as
recommended to the consuls (395 A.D.) were ex Virgilio3 Sallustio
TerentiOy Cicerone digesta per litteras.
2 Quint, x.1.94. Horatius et ... praecipuus.
Also, x.1.96. At lyricorum idem Horatius fere solus legi dignus.




The question now is to relate Stoicism to this literary 
curriculum. And the teaching of the grcomaticus and the significance of 
Stoic elements in the literary aspect of it can be considered in a 
number of ways.
Many gvammatioi were themselves Stoic. They might choose to 
teach authors who were professed Stoics such as Seneca, Celsus etc. Or, 
they would exegetically interpret literature taught from a Stoic view­
point, in the tradition of Crates of Mallos. Stoic gvammatici will be 
identified and discussed in the following chapter.
By the first century A.D. there were a number of Latin authors
who were themselves Stoics. Quintilian's syllabus included a number of
such authors, namely Persius, Lucan, Seneca, Cornelius Celsus, Servius
1 2Sulpicius, Bibaculus. Of these Persius and Seneca appear to have been 
the most widely read and the most popular. It is very significant then 
that writers who strongly and unequivocally professed Stoicism were read 
as school texts. Their inclusion in the syllabus is in marked contrast 
to the curriculum of the Hellenistic ypayviaiLKOs whose policy was to 
teach Greek authors of an earlier period. The principles of Hellenistic 
philosophies were therefore taught more positively and given definite 
attention by the Roman grammaticus, in comparison to the teaching of his 
Hellenistic counterpart. Consequently there was a wider diffusion of 
Stoicism at the school level in Rome, th<3n in Hellenistic schools. Such 
a situation also gives force to the argument that Stoicism became 
stronger in Roman society, than in Hellenistic communities. Without 
underestimating the very important significance for Stoic elements in 
the curriculum and for the influence of Stoicism in Rome, that actual 
Stoic authors were read in schools, I feel that an analysis of these 
authors would be somewhat superfluous. Their writing has been 
researched, and an interpretation of their Stoicism would be for the 




Cf. Sat. i.28-29. See above p.81.
Quint, x.1.126. Turn autem solus hie (i.e. Seneca) fere in manibus
adulesGentium fuit.
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In acknowledging the very important fact that Stoic literature 
was taught in schools, it must be kept in mind that of authors 
comprising the literary curriculum generally taught, Stoic authors were 
secondary to the writers who were most favoured. To look at the 
situation in perspective, it is essential to identify the Stoic elements 
in the foremost authors taught and to determine what pupils would learn 
of Stoicism from the reading of Horace, Virgil, Terence, Cicero and 
Sallust. For we can assume that most of the grammaticus ’ pupils would 
have studied these writers. Such interpretation is much more complex 
than a discussion of purely Stoic authors, but is essential for this 
study.
The varied range of Stoic elements in these principal authors 
of the school curriculum is considerable. For instance, it is possible 
to analyse Stoic influences in the Aeneid with an interpretation of 
Stoic aspects in Aeneas’ character; to identify the eminent position of 
the Stoic Cato who is upheld so highly by such a large number of writers; 
to consider Stoic influences in Horace and, in particular, his 
references to the Stoic paradoxes; and to survey the comprehensive 
treatment of Stoicism, principally in regard to ethics and theology, 
provided by Cicero throughout his philosophical works. The following 
discussion in this chapter will be concerned with these subjects.
STOIC ELEMENTS IN THE AENEID
It is clearly possible to determine Stoic elements in the 
Aeneid and to identify certain Stoic qualities in the character of 
Aeneas.1 But the influence of Stoicism on Virgil, although strong, is 
not absolute. Virgil's philosophy is very much eclectic, although the
Cf. especially C.M. Bowra, 'Aeneas and the Stoic Ideal', Greece and 
Rome, 1933.
Also, Arnold, op. cit. , pp.390-391.
Mark W. Edwards, 'The Expression of Stoic Ideas in the Aeneid', 
Phoenix, Vol. 14, 1960, p .151 foil.
Brooks Otis, Virgil> A Study in Civilised Poetry.
C. Bailey, Religion in Virgil.
P. Boyance, La Religion de Virgile.
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Stoic influences appear as strong as any other. It is important to note 
that Virgil's Stoicism is balanced by other elements and influences, 
such as Homeric allegory, Pythagoreanism, Platonic philosophy and 
Lucretian Hpicureanism.* However, a thorough interpretation of these 
aspects of Virgil's philosophy is very complex, and not fully relevant 
to the present study. On the other hand, there will be no attempt, nor 
is it justified, to establish the Aßneid as a Stoic poem, and Aeneas as 
a completely Stoic character. But markedly Stoic elements are clearly 
evident, and many grammatici would have identified and described them as 
such in their teaching.
Aeneas' character must be considered as one that fits into a 
world presented in accordance with the Stoic system. Aeneas' character 
and its Stoic qualities relate to a Virgilian Stoic cosmos. This 
concept of the universe is one where Zeus/Jupiter, transcending a
polytheistic structure, represents the orderly arrangement and develop-
2 3ment of the world. Jupiter is the pater orrmipotens Aether. Virgil's
theology, like that of the Stoics, moves towards monotheism. God, as
Jupiter, is the great and rational divine force in the universe, and is
4also synonymous with the universe and its order.
Such a concept of the universe means that divine will controls 
destiny. The Stoic npovoua is virtually the same as Virgil's fatum. 
Providence is fundamental both to Stoicism and to Virgil's theology.
The aspect of Stoic philosophy relevant to Aeneas' role in the world is 
that his destiny is determined by the divine law and order in the 
universe. According to Chrysippus, basically the consequences of human 
actions and the actions themselves are fore-ordained.'’ However, the 
Stoic view of fate was not absolute; there was some doubt expressed 
about the inexorable nature of a person's destiny. It was also
* See P. Royance, op. cit., passim.
2 Cf. Hymn of Cleanthes, p.48; Aratus, p.48 foil.
 ^ Cf. Georgies ii.325.
4 Cf. Seneca, N.Q. ii.45.3. Quid est Deus? Mens universi. Quod est 
Deus? Quod vides totum et quod non vides totum.
5 Cic. de Fato, 12,21.
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acknowledged that the actions of man are determined by his relations to 
things: one individual can differ from another in the way he follows
his impulses and feelings; while another individual under restraint and 
possible compulsion may with reluctance conform to the external law of 
the world.*
These two markedly different roles for individuals to play in
life are exemplified clearly in the Aeneid. Aeneas, although at times
his feelings are swayed by the intensity of circumstances, especially
throughout Books I - VI, proceeds in conformity with destiny. It is
constantly reiterated that in accordance with fate or Providence he has
2very great responsibilities. Aeneas' character is consistent with the 
Stoic concept that the individual should fit into the pattern of life 
ordained by the divine and ordered nature of the cosmos. Aeneas' 
attitude is emphasised when we consider the characters of Dido and 
Turnus; they are foils to Aeneas. Although at times Aeneas' feelings 
may conflict with his allotted destiny, rational thought together with 
divine law prevail. On the other hand, Dido and Turnus are the victims 
of their own passionate feelings. They are swept on by emotion, their 
intense feelings take control and their impassioned characters lead them 
to tragic deaths. They are, of course, the antithesis of Stoic types, 
yet they are intensely human and, especially in Dido's case,evocative of 
human sympathy. Their characters help throw into relief the Stoic 
qualities in Aeneas' character. As well as being a hero and individual, 
who plays out his part in a Virgilian Stoic world, Aeneas possesses 
certain Stoic qualities and values, which would have been identifiable 
as such by Roman readers.
Sen. Ep. cvii.2. Ducunt volentem fata nolentem trahunt.
Also cf. Sen. de Prov. 5.4. boni vivi ... trahuntur for tuna, 
sequuntur illam.




i.22; i.339; i.546; i.608; ii.13; ii.350;
iii.444; iv.13; iv.340; iv.440; v.22; v.56;
viii.12; viii.398; viii.47; ix.133; ix.204;
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AENEAS' STOIC COURAGE
There are three main requirements in Stoic courage, and each 
of these is filled by Aeneas.
(i) Bravery is fearless compliance with and obedience to the law 
of reason, as it applies to boldness and endurance. This 
form of courage, as set down by Chrysippus, clearly applies 
to Aeneas throughout the poem, although at times in the 
earlier books this resolution is firmly tested;"^
(ii) The brave man should be superior to bad fortune, however
2adverse. In Book VI the prophetess passes such advice on
to Aeneas, drawing on a reference to destiny, to support her
words. Until Book VI Aeneas at times was somewhat confused
and even defeatist, but throughout the latter part of the
poem he is resolute and quite capable of overcoming ill-
fortune. The very important aspect of such development is
that Aeneas grows in strength. His development in character
is consistent with the Stoic concept of the 'sage-in- 
3progress'. The validity of this argument is substantiated 
by considering the various qualities in Aeneas' character, 
as discussed in this chapter;
(iii) Stoic courage requires a person to be prepared for any
4exigency and to maintain a confident balance. Aeneas 
acquires this kind of courage and in referring to it uses a 
term'’ (praecepi) that is actually Stoic: omnia praecepi
atque animo mecum ante peregi. The Stoic appropriateness of 
these words is indicated by Seneca who quotes this line when
Cic. Tusc. iv.24.53. Fortitudo, inquit (i.e. Chrysippus), soientia 
perferendarum rerum, vet affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo3 
summae legi parens sine timore.
2 vi.95. tu ne cede malis3 sed contra audientior ito 
quam tua te fortuna sinet.
3 Cf. conclusions of C.M. Bowra, op. cit.
4 Cf. Cic. de Off. i.80.
 ^ Praecipere is itself a Stoic word, cf. Cic. de Off. i.80.
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describing a good man.* Such preparedness was not always 
shown by Aeneas; for instance in Book I following the 
storm, and in Book V when some of his ships are burned, he 
is in despair and loses his resolve regarding his progress 
to Italy. But after his arrival in Italy he acts with 
confident preparedness.
THE STOIC ASSOCIATION OF 
PIETAS AND IUSTITIA IN AENEAS
The close association and virtual identification of pietas and
iustitia is a strong Stoic concept. Such a connection emphasises the
Stoic idea of the individual's responsibility to gods, family, country,
society. Cicero often refers to the ’equation' between piety and
2justice, drawing on Stoic thought. Pietas and iustitia were closely 
associated Stoic qualities for the individual in a world community, 
ordered by a divine strength, so that respect for gods and man meant a
3strong concern for social justice. Aeneas is renowned for his pietas, 
and to him often at the same time is attributed iustitia:
rex erat Aeneas nobis, quo iustior alter 
nee pietate fuit, nec bello maior et armis.* 234 5
Justice is represented as synonymous with piety in the single line:
discite iustitiam moniti et non terrmere divos. ^
And also concern by the gods and regard for justice, which are Stoic 
teaching, are emphatically mentioned.^ Force is given to these Stoic
Ep. lxxvi.33.
2 Cf. de Fin. iii.30; ii.73; N.D. ii.119; de Pep. iii.20,24; de 
Rep. vi.23.13.
3 Cf. the epithet constantly applied to Aeneas — pius.
4 i.544.
5 vi.620.
6 i.603. di tibi, si qua pios respectant numina, si quid 
usquam iustitia est, et mens sibi consaia recti, 
praemia digna ferant.
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qualities in Aeneas' character by comparing the line describing the 
Stoic Cato on the shield of Aeneas forged by Vulcan,^ where again the 
association of piety and justice is stated:
secretos pios, his dantem iura Catonem.
Throughout the poem Aeneas is consistently 'pious' and 'just'; these 
qualities represent a Stoic aspect of his character that he possesses 
from the outset, while his Stoic qualities generally are acquired as he 
progresses through his experiences.
DETACHMENT FROM EMOTION
The Stoics had much to say on emotion and an emotionless
2attitude. Aeneas has the capacity to be detached and emotionless, as 
evidenced in the lines:
3mens irmota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes.
and
Aeneas, magno iuvenum et maerentis Iuli 
concursu, laevimis immobilis. ^
But surely a completely emotionless hero was hardly acceptable to Roman 
readers. Virgil does not depict Aeneas as a hero of absolute Stoic 
anadeua. There are certain expressions of human emotion to counter­
balance a Stoic detachment; and to consider Aeneas' character in its 
full perspective it is important to comment on certain aspects:
(i) the Stoics deplored anger, but as a warrior of dynamic force 
he invariably shows rage in the heat of battle;'’
Aen. viii.670.
2 See Chapter I.
 ^ Aen. iv.449.
4
Aen. xii.399.
Cf. when he pursues Turnus, xii.527. ... fluctuat iva intus.
Also, xii.107. Nec minus interea maternis saevus in armis 
Aeneas acuit Mortem et se suscitat iva, 
ablato gaudens componi foedere bellum.
(ii) the Stoics considered that there should be no overt display 
of pity, let alone that one should feel anguish on behalf of 
another. Aeneas, however, emotionally expresses pity 
because of misfortunes that befall his companions; and 
feels strong human pity when he meets Dido again in Book VI?
Aeneas' martial rage and at times, his anguished pity are non-
phi losophical elements in a character that nevertheless can ultimately
be established as having many Stoic qualities.
91
AENEAS AS A 'SAGE-IN-PROGRESS'
There is a contrast in Aeneas' character as revealed in Books
I to VI, and in Books VII to XII. As mentioned, except for his constant
qualities of piety and justice, Aeneas' courage develops in accord with
a Stoic tradition. He also acquires in due course a stronger capacity
for rational thought, which implies a developing wisdom. Frailties of
which he is guilty in the earlier part of the poem do not apply to him
as a considerably more mature character following Book VI. As he
recounts his adventures during the sack of Troy he and others are
2
immemores caecique furore; he refers to his irrational behaviour in
3the words arma omens capio; and he describes his own frenzy as he 
looks for revenge:
exarsere ignes animo; subit ira oadentem
ulcisci patriam et sceleratas sumere poenas.4
And, of course, with Dido he is to be enslaved turpique cupidine d*
Aen. v.467. talibus Aeneas ardentem et torva tuentem 
lenibat dictis animum lacrimasque ciebat.
Aen. ii.244.
Also xii.888. sic pectore fatur.
xii.938. ... stetit acer in armis
Aeneas volvens oculos3 dextram repressit.




Later, he may wage war furiously and feel sorrow at the tragic end of 
others, but he is never at any time immemor, caecus furore or omens. 
There is a clear development, and although not ultimately a sage in the 
full Stoic sense, his growth in character is consistent with the Stoic 
concept of the 'sage-in-progress'. A Stoic term is applied to Aeneas in 
this regard in the use of exeroere:
note Iliads exerdte fatis ... ^
Exeroere means to ’test by ordeal’; to acquire or to approach the ideal
of being a wise man, it was essential to be tested. This idea occurs in 
2Seneca, and Cicero's use of the term exercitatio conveys the same 
3idea. Whereas in Stoic exegesis, as undertaken by Crates and Stoic
4grammarians, Ulysses’ and Hercules' characters were interpreted as 
possessing Stoic elements, and were described as developing in accord 
with the idea of ’the sage-in-progress', qualities portrayed in Aeneas’ 
character are the direct result of actual Stoic influences.
AENEAS AND THE STOIC IDEA 
OF WORLD CITIZENSHIP
According to the Stoics the individual was not so much a 
citizen of one particular country or nation, but was a member of a world 
community;'’ the individual’s responsibility was to mankind, he was to 
contribute to the welfare of all, and this was in keeping with his close 
association with and his observance of the divine.1 234*6 The world then was
1 Aen. iii.182; v.725.
2
Dial. i.4. deus quos p r o b a t quos amat3 indurat3 recognisoit.
3 Bowra, op. oit. , p.15.
4 See Chapter II.
Sen. de Ot. 4; Ep. 68.2.
Vit. B 20, 3 and 25. Unum me donavit omnibus natura deorum et uni 
mihi ormis ... patriam meam esse mundum sciam et praesides Deos.
de Tranq. 4.4. Ideo magno animo nos non unius urbis moenibus 
clusimus3 sed in totius orbis commercium emisimus patriamque nobis 
mundum professi sumus3 ut liceret latiorem virtuti campum dare.
Epict. Dis. iii.22.83. ••• man is not of a particular country but
xdayuos and ul-os 6eou.
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one great community, where reason and one common law should prevail.
2When Anchises in Book VI describes Rome's future destiny to Aeneas he
presents a picture of human progress moving towards a world community
consistent with the Stoic scheme. The pax Romana of Augustus could be
rationalised from the point of view of Stoic philosophy. The vision
presented to Aeneas by Anchises refers to a world empire in close
3 4association with the divine, to a universal law and order, to the 
great force of ethereal fire in the world,^ and to a great ordered 
cosmos.^ Aeneas' role is to be instrumental in the preliminary measures 
for the establishment of a world community, similar to that idealised by 
the Stoics.
Kpujls OF AENEAS
It was the function of the grammaticus to present his xpuöus, 
or moral judgment, on the text read with his pupils. This, of course, 
could involve a certain subjectivity. In respect to the Aeneid and the 
character of Aeneas, such xptats would undoubtedly be influenced by 
prevailing values at the time. And the Stoic elements discussed above 
would surely have had considerable bearing on the grammaticus' judgment. 
Aeneas' character was certainly upheld by Virgil's contemporaries and by 
writers throughout the first and second centuries A.D. Aeneas was 
regarded as a model of piety and courage by Horace, and by a series of 
poets from Horace, Tibullus and Ovid to Statius, Juvenal and Sidonius
Flut. Alex. M. Virt. i.6.
2 1.756 foil.
3 Aen. vi.781. en huius3 nate3 auspiciis ilia, incluta Roma 
imperiwn terris3 animos aequabit Olympo.
4
Aen. vi.851. tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento3 
(hae tibi erunt artes) pacique imponere morem.
 ^ Aen. vi.730. igneus est ollis vigor et caelestis origo.
 ^ Aen. vi.724. Principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentis 
lucentemque globum lunae Titaniaque astra 
Spiritus intus alits totamque infusa per artus 
mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet.
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1 2Apollinaris. Seneca cites his filial loyalty, and the emperor 
Pertinax' claimed descent from him. The clear implication is that 
Aeneas' character was understood by writers and readers of the time.
4Later, Aeneas' character was to be criticised by early church fathers 
and by a long succession of critics to the present day. An assessment 
of Aeneas' character must be based on prevailing moral values of the 
time. A consideration of the Stoic elements together with traditional 
Roman qualities, can aid an understanding of the moral values in Aeneas' 
character. Surely Virgil's purpose was to endow Aeneas with qualities 
that could be understood and appreciated by his readers; consequently 
the Stoic elements would have meaning both to sophisticated readers and, 
by explanation, to the pupils of the grammaticus. In being 'a stock 
part of the educational curriculum',^ the Aeneid would have been known 
to very many Romans, who would have understood and appreciated its Stoic 
elements.
STOIC CHARACTER OF CATO IN LATIN LITERATURE
A discussion of the character of the younger Cato is of course 
very different from a study of the character of Aeneas. An analysis of 
Aeneas' character, determining a variety of subtle and sophisticated 
elements that influenced Virgil is not altogether a straightforward 
process. A description of Cato's Stoic character is, on the other hand, 
a direct and unequivocal explanation. For the purpose of this chapter, 
it is important to note that Cato as a Roman hero, and as a Stoic 
prototype in the practical sense, was known to every Roman pupil. This 
is no exaggeration, for Roman literature is rich in references to Cato;
 ^ Bowra, op. eit., p.9.
2 de Ben. 3.37.1.
 ^ Herodian 2.3.3.
4 E.g. Augustine's condemnation of his inhuman attitude to Dido {Cvv. 
Dei); also cf. Lactantius.
 ^ Bowra, op. cit., p.9. 'But it is also beyond question that the
Aeiieid. was so vital a part of Roman education that its character was 
accepted beyond cavil or criticism by the orthodox ...'
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and a clear portrayal of his character is available in authors 
principally read in schools, namely Cicero, Sallust, Virgil and Horace.
It is appropriate then to outline Cato's character as represented by 
these writers and consequently as known to Roman pupils.
Virgil has a place for Cato in the historical episodes set out 
on Vulcan's shield;^ Cato is passing on laws to those who can put them 
to good use — the pii, an instance of the Stoic association between
iustitia and pietas.
Horace allots Cato a significant place in Roman history when
he wonders whether he should tell of a number of historical occasions
2(including Cato's death), before ultimately referring to Augustus'
grandeur. He upholds Cato's courage and strength as superior to other
3leaders at the time of the civil war of 48 B.C.,‘ in the ode that he 
addresses to Pollio who is in the process of writing his history. The 
virtue and morals of Cato's character and sincerity are contrasted with 
the assumed manners of a person whose actual character may lack 
strength.^
Sallust,^ the most widely read historian in Roman schools 
presents Cato's character through the words of his Catilinarian speech, 
and then even more convincingly in his comparison of Cato's and Ceasar's 
characters; in this comparison Cato, whose proposals to the senate and 
not Caesar's are accepted, is really given preference for his qualities 
of character. The Stoic qualities portrayed by Sallust are his moral
* Aen. viii.670. secretosque pios his dantem iuva Catonem.
2
Od. i.33. Rorrrulum post prius an quietum
Pompili regnum memorem an superbos 
Tarquini fasces, dubito, an Catonis 
nobile letum.
3 Od. ii.1.21. audire magnos iam videor duces 
non indecoro pulvere sordidos 
et cuncta terrarum subacta 
praeter atrocem animwn Catonis.
 ^ Epistles i.19.12. quid? si quis voltu torvo ferus et pede nudo 
exiguaeque togae simulat text ore Catonem, 
virtutemne repraesentet moresque Catonis?
5 Cf. Marrou, op. cit., p.374.
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restraint, an independent spirit free from passion, his austere 
3 4integrity," his steadfastness, his self-control and strong sense of 
honour,"’ his absolute and unquestioned virtue/’ The standing and 
popularity of Sallust as an historian undoubtedly gave esteem to the 
character of Cato.
Cicero is rich in references to Cato. His correspondence very 
often mentions Cato’s participation in the day to day affairs of the 
senate, although it is questionable whether Cicero's letters were 
studied in schools. His speeches Pro Murena and Pro Sestio contain 
particular references to Cato, and firmly emphasise his qualities. And 
surely Cicero's speeches were studied in the vocational, rhetorical 
system of Roman education. The Pro Murena was probably well known to
7students, for it was cited and recommended by Quintilian. In the Pro 
Murena Cicero finds it convenient to satirise the Stoics, yet he
portrays and acknowledges the positive qualities in Cato's character.
. . .  8 9He refers to his firm self-discipline, his earnestness and integrity,
his high standing  ^and his all-round exemplary qualities/^ And then
he relates Cato's character directly to the Stoics, attributing to him
Belt. Cat. lii.8. Qui mihi atque animo meo nullius umquam delioti 
gratiam fecissem, haud facile alterius lubidini male facta 
condonabam.
2
Bell,. Cat. lii.21. <
lubidini obnoxius.
3
Bell . Cat. liv.2-3.
4 Bell . Cat. 1iv.3.
5 Bell . Cat. liv.5.
6 Bell . Cat. liv.6. e




passage of Pro Murena xiii.29 as being an excellent example of 
redditio (reciprocal representation).
ii.3. ... M. Catoni vitam ad certam rationis normam derigenti et
diligentissimi perpendenti momenta officiorum omnium de officio meo.
Ibid. ... gravissimo atque integerrimo vivo.
xxviii.58. ut ... auctoritatem ... pertimescam.
xxvi.54. M. Ca.tonis homini in orrm.i virtute excellenti.
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honesty, dignity, temperance, magnanimity, justice, and a generally
2outstanding character; although for the purposes of his argument in
the Pro Murena he describes Cato's Stoicism as somewhat harsh and 
3severe/ In the Pro Sestio Cato's qualities are represented in his
. 4
gravitas, integritas, magnitudo animi, unshakeable virtus, his strong 
sense of civic responsibility'^ (an emphasised Stoic value) and his
auctoritas. ^
In Cicero's Pe Finibus Cato is chosen to play a leading role,
f 7and at times appears in other philosophical treatises of Cicero. 
Throughout Books III and IV of the De Finibus is presented and contested 
the system of Stoic ethics. Cato is accordingly portrayed as a
g
dedicated student^ of Stoic philosophy and as a person who epitomises 
its values/
As well as appearing prominently in the authors mainly read in 
schools, there are many references generally to Cato in Latin literature, 




xxix.60. honestatem ... gravitatem ... temperantiam ... magnitudinem 
animi ... iustitiam.
Ibid, ad orrtnes denique virtutes magnum hominem et excelsum.
Cf. pro Mur., 61-67,74. 
pro Sest. xxvii.60-xxix.63. 
pro Sest. xxviii.61. 
pro Sest. xxix.62.
Cf. Tusc. i.30.74; v.1.4; v.11.32.
de Leg. 1iii.40; Brut. 118.
iii. 2.7. ... M. Catonem ... multis circumfusum Stoicorum libris.
iv. 22. studios issimum philosophiae.
Ibid, iustissimum virum optimum iudicem3 religiosissimum testem.
Ep. civ.30. nemo mutatum Catonem totiens mutata re publica vidit3 
eundem se in orrmi statu praestitit.
N.H. praef. 9. te felicem3 M. Porci3 a quo rem improbam petere nemo 
audet.
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integrity, Quintilian1 23refers to Cato as an example in many contexts on
the assumption that his life and principles are clearly known to his
2readers. And there are many other writers who mention Cato with 
unstinting praise. It is evident that for school pupils Cato was cast 
in the role of a national hero. His exalted position in history and 
literature at the same time encouraged a regard for Stoic character and 
values, which Cato himself so strongly exemplified.
STOICISM AND HORACE
Horace did not adhere to any particular philosophical system.
To him has been attributed a degree of Epicureanism, which is largely
due to his temperament, a moderately hedonistic way of life and his
3
repeated recommendation to make the most of the present moment.
However, Horace himself does not profess to be a follower of 
Epicureanism.4 5 But it is not the purpose of this discussion to consider 
Horace's Epicurean tendencies. Rather, it is essential to determine 
Horace's attitude to Stoic thought and to identify Stoic elements in his 
work, as these would have been explained in the gvammaticus' teaching. 
And Horace's treatment of Stoicism is substantial. In a varied approach 
he satirises the Stoic absolute ideal of the sage, covers five of the 
six Stoic paradoxes, refers to Chrysippus.^  criticises the contemporary
iii.5.8 and 11; iii.8.37 and 49; vi.3.112; viii.2.9; ix.4.75;
x.5.13; xi.1.69; xii.7.4.
2 Cf. Val. Max. ii.8.1; ii.10.8; viii.7.2.
Luc. i.128; ix.23.
Velleius Paterculus, ii.45.5; ii.47.5.
Tac. Ann. iii.28; iii.76.
App. Bell. civ. ii.98.406.
Also there are the full references in Greek by Plutarch and Dio 
Cassius.
3 Cf. Epode xiii.3-4; Ode i.7.29; Ode i.11.8 (the famous carpe diem); 
Ode i.11.11; Ode iii.8.37; Ode iii.29.42; Ode iv.19-20; Epistles 
i.4.12.
4 On only one occasion is Epicurus mentioned, and then flippantly. Cf. 
Epistles i.4. 15-16.
5 Sat. i.3.127; ii.3.44,287; Epistles i.2.4.
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1 2Stoic Crispinus, mentions the Stoic Stertinius, upholds in separate
instances a very considerable range of Stoic values, presents a Stoic
3concept of the cosmos in the Odes and cites Stoic logic.
By the way Horace refers to Stoic paradoxes it can be assumed 
that his Roman readers were, at least in a general way, aware of such 
maxims; in fact it is generally accepted that an awareness of these 
paradoxes was the way in which Romans mostly learned of Stoicism. Also, 
in Horace's time Stoic philosophers were giving lectures, which were so 
popular and well attended that Horace could humorously comment on the 
fact that the doorman at the lecture room was listened to when he passed
4on snippets of the lecture.
Later in his life Horace developed a clearly expressed respect 
for the study of philosophy. When writing in his middle years he was 
prepared to commend it as a pursuit in preference to poetry;'’ at 
another time he earnestly urges his young friend Lollius not to neglect 
philosophical study.^ There is a transitional attitude to Stoicism on 
the part of Horace. In his earlier work, especially in the Satires, he 
is more critical of Stoicism than in his later writing. Such a 
development in attitude is indicated by d'Alton' who maintained that it 
was ’possible to detect a nascent sympathy with its (i.e. Stoicism's) 
doctrines', even apparent in the Satires. The Stoic content in Horace 
and his attitude to Stoicism might be considered in an attempted 
categorical arrangement:
1 Sat. i.1.120; i.3.139; i.4.14; ii.7.145.
2 Sat. ii.3.33,296; Epistles i.12.20.
3 Epistles ii.1.45.
4 Sat. ii.7.45.
 ^ Epistles ii.2.141. Nimirum sapere est abiectis utile nugis3 
et tempestivum pueris concedere ludum, 
ac non verba sequi fidibus modulanda Ijatinis3 
sed verae numerosque modosque ediseere vitae.
Epistles i.1.96. Inter ouncta leges et percontabere doctos3 
qua ratione queas traducere leniter aetfum.
J.F. d'Alton, Horace and his Age, p.94.7
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To live in accord with nature
This maxim was a fundamental Stoic principle; it is quoted by 
Horace when he is upholding the pleasant simplicity of country life.^
The Stoic view of ’living in accord with nature' included a number of 
requirements, which are consistent with Horace's own philosophy of life:
a disregard for external material goods and a non-acquisitive attitude
2 3 4were desirable, to aim for equanimity and to live frugally.
The possession of virtue is sufficient for happiness
Epistle i.16 is Horace's commentary on the second Stoic 
paradox.^ The poet's discussion is direct and not satirical. Horace 
reiterates the Stoic principle that the person who lives recte is 
beatus. He deplores the hypocrisy of the man who only appears virtuous. 
This epistle has a strongly Stoic tone throughout. The culminating 
lines emphatically express the Stoic attitude that death by suicide^* is 
acceptable.
Epistles i.10.12. Vivere naturae si convenienter oportet.
2
Epistles i.18.99. num pavor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes. 
Epistles i.6.1. Eil admirari prope res est una.
(Cf. Stoic principle regarding indifference to worldly possessions
-döudcpopa )
Also, Odes iii.1.25; iii.16, and generally throughout his work.
3
Epistles i.11.30. ... animus si te non deficit aequus.
Cf. the Stoic concept of dudöeua.
 ^ Epistles i.10.
 ^ otl auTapxris n apeiri rcpos euöauuovuav. Cic. Par. 2.
 ^ 11.79-80. Ipse deuss sirrrul atque volam3 me solvet_, opinor3
hoc sentit 'moriar1 mors ultima linea rerum est.
The divine reference, deus, is strongly in keeping with Stoic thought.
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All sins are equal
The third Stoic paradox^ is satirised by Horace in Satire i.3.
Although the tone of this satire is not vehement, for Horace this Stoic
tenet is completely impractical. He states firmly that such an argument
2is completely unrealistic, and points out that philosophical reasoning
can in no way justify the circumstance that the petty pilfering of
cabbages from a neighbour's garden is as severe a crime as stealing
3
objects that are sacred. The rational procedure, according to Horace,
4
is to punish each offence suitably.
Only the wise man is sane
The fourth Stoic paradox* 23 4 is more than once upheld by Horace. 
It is the basis of his long carefully evolved dialogue between himself 
and Damasippus in Satire ii.3. Also, with no satirical intent he makes 
reference to this paradox twice in the Epistles.  ^ In the long dialogue 
satire with Damasippus Horace makes use of the Stoic paradox to 
criticise man's foolish irrational values. He cites at length the Stoic
Cf. Cic. Par. Aequalia esse peecata et recte facta 
o n  baa xa ayapxnyaxa nai xot xaxopOwyaxa.
Also de Fin. recte facta omnia aequalia omnia peccata paria esse.
2
quis paria esse fere placuit peccata3 laborant 
cum ventum ad verum est: sensus moresque repugnant
atque ipsa Utilitas 3 iusti prope mater et aequi.
3 Sat. i.3.115-117.
4 Sat. i.3.76-79. Denique quatenus excidi penitus vitium irae 
cetera item nequeunt stultis haerentia3 cur non 
ponderibus modulisque suis ratio utiturs ac res 
ut quaeque est3 ita suppliciis delicta coercet?
3 otl Ttas acppwv yadvcxaL.  
ornnem stultum insanire.
 ^ Epistles i.1.41. Virtus est vitium fugere et sapientia prima 
stultitia caruisse.
i.6.15. insani sapiens nomen ferat aequus iniqui3 
ultra quam satis est Virtutem si petat ipsam.
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Stertinius who has been lecturing on this paradox. Various kinds or
phases of madness are discussed: avarice (11.82-157) is deplored; and
even though Stertinius is presenting the case, the strong forceful tone
of the argument clearly reflects Horace's personal condemnation of
greed. Ambition is to be associated with insanity; ambition can lead
2to violent crime, and the criminal is also a maniac. Immoderation and
self-indulgence (11.225-280) indicate insanity; the spendthrift is a 
3madman,' and useless whims to enjoy luxury are absolutely foolish. 
Irrational fear of the gods or superstition (11.281-295) is also an 
instance of insanity. In contrast to his treatment of the third 
paradox, where actual .Stoic thinking is satirised, now Horace supports a 
Stoic maxim and uses it to point out the follies of mankind.
Only the wise man is free
Horace is in agreement with the thought of the fifth Stoic
4paradox. In answer to the question 'Who is free?' he answers 
emphatically that it is the wise man. Horace commends the wise man's 
self-sufficiency and his independence from external matters, ambition, 
passions.^ And the wise man's freedom from fear is in keeping with the 
teaching of Chrysippus.* 346 This paradox is the theme of Satire ii.8; it
11.48-40. Quem mala stultitia et quemcumque inscitia veri 
caecum agit insanum Chrysippi porticus est gvex 
autumat.
^11.221-223. ... qui sceleratus
et furiosus erit; quem cepit vitrea fama3 
hunc circumtcnuit gaudens Bellona cruentis.
3
Vincet enim stultos ratio insanire nepotes.
4
Cic. Par. Stoicorum o i l  y o v o s  6 aocpos eAeudepos Mau xag acppwv SouAos*
Solum sapientem esse liberum3 et ornnem stultim servum.
Sat. ii.8.83-87. Quisnam igitur liber? sapiens3 sibi qui imperiosus3 
quem neque pauperies neque mors neque vincula terrent3 
responsare cupidinibus3 contemnere honores 
fortis3 et in se ipso totus3 teres atque rotundus3 
extemi ne quid valeat per leve morari3 
in quem manca ruit semper Fortuna.
Stob. Floril. 21. aAyeü v y e v  t ov  adcpov yp (3aaavu£ea$au 
6^  ye yap e vöuödvau  i p  (J>ux?)
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is similar in style to the third, where now the Stoic philosopher 
Crispinus has the role previously given to Stertinius. In both satires 
human frailty is criticised and Horace represents himself as the person 
who should apply the lessons; the Stoic message is conveyed in a light­
hearted dialogue form, but with a certain basic seriousness.
The wise man alone is rich
Horace is inclined in Satire i.3 to satirise the sixth Stoic
1 2 paradox, that taught the wise man was rich and a king. On the other
hand, often he is in agreement with the attitude that worldly
3possessions matter little. Stoic thought is prominent in Epistle i.10, 
where Horace points out that the man is king who lives in 'accord with
4nature', and that the person who lives humbly and modestly may rise
3superior to kings/ Stoic thinking is also reflected in his comment on 
wealth, when he facetiously and ironically refers to attitudes which 
place material possessions before everything else — even wisdom and 
kingship.^
Cic. Par. Stoicorum oxu uovos 6 oocpos tiAouctlos 
Solum sapientem esse divitem.
Sat. i.3.124. Si dives3 qui sapiens est,
et sutor bonus et solus formosus et est rex, 
cur optas quod habes? 'non nosti quid pater, ' inquit 
’CJirusippus dicat: sapiens crepidas sibi numquam
nec soleas fecit; sutor tarnen est sapiens. ' qui?
Epistles i.16.73-78; Epistles i.18.101-110; Epistles i.10.44-48;
Epistles i.10.20.
Epistles i.10.8. ... vivo et regno ...
i.10.12. Vivere naturae, si convenienter oportet.
Epistles i.10.32. ... fuga magna: licet sub paupere tecto
reges et regum vita praecurrere amicos.
Sat. ii.3.97. ... sapiensne? etiam, et rex
et quidquid volet hoc, veluti virtute paratum 
speravit magnae laudi fore.
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Stoic idea of participation in public life
To Horace, of course, active and responsible participation in 
public life had no appeal. He did not look for expression and fulfil­
ment by holding public office. So his tone is jocular when he talks 
about himself becoming very active and involved in the hurly-burly of 
public life.1 23 But it is interesting to note that in this comment Horace 
is drawing from Stoic language and thought, for the Stoics invariably 
upheld the individual’s responsibility to take part in public affairs.
Horace directly translates Stoic terms, when he uses agilis for
2rcpaxTUMOs, and oivilibus for koXltlmoCs , in stating that it was 
consistent with true virtue to direct one's energies in this way.
Reference to the sorites question in Stoic logic
3Horace refers to the sorites or ’heap’ puzzle of Stoic logic, 
when he is discussing the rational basis for assessing a poet's worth 
and is questioning the Roman tradition of honouring writers by their 
degree of antiquity. The significant point for the purpose of the 
present study is that Horace’s reference to the sorites puzzle is so 
incidental, that the reader's knowledge of this aspect of Stoic logic is 
clearly assumed; it is apparent that the educated reading public were 
quite aware of this Stoic question.
As well as making elaborated comments on Stoic thought, Horace 
often makes passing references to Stoicism, such as his allusion to the
Epistles i.1.16-19. nunc agilis fio et mersor oivilibus undis 
virtutis verae iustos rigidusque satelles;
2 See comment on these lines by H.R. Fairclough, Loeb edition.
3 .Epistles ii. 1.45. utor permissocaudaeque pilos ut equinae unum 
paulatim vello et demo unum3 demo etiam3 
dum cadat elusus ratione ruentis acervi.
The question posed by the Stoics is how many grains make a heap. At 
what stage can it be logically determined by adding a series of 
single grains that a ’heap’ is formed?
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1 2Stoic dialectic of Stertinius and to the work of Panaetius. His
3references to Jupiter as an all-pervading divine force is also 
consistent with the Stoic concept.
The conclusions to be drawn are that Horace had at least a 
broad and general awareness of Stoic philosophy; also from his ready 
references and assumptions it is evident that many of his readers had a 
comparable knowledge; although his attitude to Stoicism ranges from the 
satirical to the positive Roman pupils would have learned
something of Stoicism from their reading and from the grammaticus ' 
teaching of Horace’s work.
A STOIC ELEMENT IN TERENCE?
Of the principal authors included in the curriculum Terence is 
the only one in whom Stoicism is not really evident. But comedy is 
hardly a suitable vehicle for philosophical thought. Also, Terence 
whose plays appeared between 165 and 160 B.C. wrote at a time when 
Stoicism was only beginning to appear in Rome. Terence who enjoyed the 
patronage of the Scipionic circle was surely aware of Stoicism, but his 
works do not reveal its influence.
However, Stoic thought has been attributed to the famous
words of Chremes in the Eeauton Timorumenos — homo sum: humani nil a me
4
alienum puto. The line can be interpreted as expressing the Stoic 
concern for the general welfare of mankind and the Stoic concept of 
world citizenship.^
* Epistles i.12.20. ... an Stertinium deliret acumen
Odes i.29.13-14. ... nobilis
libros Panaetij ...
3
Odes i.12.13. quid prius dicam solitis parentis 
laudibus, qui res hominum ac deorum3 
qui mare et terras variisque mundum 
temperat horis?
Also, Odes iii.4.44 foil.
4 i.77.
5 See Pohlenz, op. cit., Vol. I, p.152.
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STOICISM AND CICERO
It is evident that from the latter part of the first century
B.C. until the time of Quintilian Cicero’s educational influence
developed strongly together with his literary and historical stature.
Quintilian, as the outstanding educationist of the first century A.D.,
is unstinting in his praise and in acknowledging his substantial debt to
2Cicero, who is cited on a very great number of occasions. Also, as 
well as being the leading educational thinkers of their respective 
periods they reveal a certain affinity in their thoeries, especially in 
relation to an educational, philosophical basis for rhetoric. 
Quintilian’s regular references to Cicero justify the argument that 
Cicero was an important author in educational curricula.
Cicero himself, according to statements in his philosophical
treatises, wrote with an educational mission in his treatment of Greek
philosophy. His design was to present comprehensively in Latin for his
3fellow Romans all the philosophical systems/ to interpret Greek
4philosophy critically, and to contribute to the education of the 
young.^ In his representations of Greek philosophy he introduced and 
developed a particular philosophical vocabulary in Latin, which became
Cornelius Severus, friend of Ovid, dealt with Cicero's death in an 
historical epic (Sen. Suas. 6.26); Velleius Paterculus commends 
Cicero on three separate occasions (i.2.66; i. 17.3; i.2.34).
Seneca quotes praise from Cremutus Cordus (Sen. Suas. 6.23) and from 
Aufidius Bassus (Ibid.).
Although in the Augustan Age it was not likely that the reading of 
Cicero, the Republican, was encouraged, there is the story from 
Plutarch (Cic. 49.2) that Augustus' grandson tried to conceal from 
the emperor the fact that he was reading Cicero.
2 Cf. Index in the Loeb edition of Quintilian, where references to 
Cicero occupy seven columns.
3 de Div. ii.2.4. Adhuo haec erant; ad reliqua alacri tendebamus 
animo sic parati> uts nisi quae causa gravior obstitissetnullum 
philosophiae locum esse pateremur, qui non Latinis litteris 
illustratus pateret.
4 de Fin. i.2.6. Sed tuemur ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamuss 
eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus?
 ^ de Div. ii.2.4. Quod enim munus rei publicae afferre maius meliusve 
possumus3 quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem.
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firmly established as language for ethics, science and logic. It is 
said that he was the principal person to provide 'Romans with words for 
fantasia, synkatathesos, epoche, catalepsis as well as atomon, ameves 
and kenon.'^  And his substantial contribution to Latin vocabulary meant 
that the words he introduced were used beyond the areas of philosophy.
For the practical purposes of Roman education, however, it is
probable that Cicero's philosophical treatises necessarily yielded a
2position in educational curricula to his speeches. Yet it is evident 
that the content and educational influence of his philosophical works 
prevailed strongly in a number of ways in Roman education, consequently 
giving considerable significance to his very substantial treatment of 
Stoicism.
Cicero, and later Quintilian, were the protagonists of a
tradition in Roman education that the study of philosophy was essential
for rhetorical training. The accomplished orator needed to be well
3grounded in philosophy. The use of preparatory exercises,
progymnasmata, at an early stage in a pupil's education exemplifies this
tradition; the pupil through these exercises was introduced to issues
4on a broader scale, that were really part of philosophical study. The 
considerable number of Stoic grammatici who are identified in the 
following chapter had at their disposal in Cicero's works a fairly full 
exposition in Latin of Stoic ethics and theology. In using this 
resource Stoic grammatici could read and pass on a Latin terminology for 
Stoic philosophy, if they were so inclined.
J. Ferguson, 'Cicero's Contribution to Philosophy', Studies in 
Cicero, p.109.
2 Quintilian's very considerable references to Cicero for the most part 
mention his speeches.
3 Marrou, op. cit. , p.290. Car le rheteur ne d.edaigne pas les idees 
generales_, les problbmes moraux et humains; son enseignement en est 
tout impregne: la doctrine de l1 23invention fait le plus grand cas des
precieux lieux communs, de ces grands developpements passe-partout 
sur le juste et l’injusteyle bonheurla vie, la mort ... si utiles a 
l'orateur parcequ His mettent en jeu des donnees fondamentales.
4 Ibid.
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It is difficult to determine which of Cicero's works a teacher
might choose to study with his students. Quintilian's repeated
references to Cicero's speeches would suggest that they were treated in
schools, although rhetorical style of the first century A.D. differed
from that of Cicero’s time. Gwynn^ argues that De Inventione was
popular as a school text. And apart from Cicero's strictly
philosophical works a teacher might use De Republica and De Legibus to
impart something of political science. Of all Cicero's treatises on
philosophy the Paradoxa Stoicorum, although only a slight work, has a
particular interest for the classroom. Cicero treats these
philosophical paradoxes in an oratorical style. They are really model
TtpoyuyvcfapaTa, and he is putting them into an acceptable popular form as 
2'commonplaces'. Cicero himself describes them as 'exercises', pointing
out that he is transposing into oratorical discourse that which is
3argued in the philosophical schools. The significant point in regard 
to Roman education is that in these 'exercises' Cicero is incorporating 
an association between philosophy and rhetoric; from a practical view­
point the Paradoxa Stoicorum provides for the teacher model exercises 
that could be used with pupils at the secondary level.
Cicero's treatises, particularly important as they are written 
in Latin, were undoubtedly read by Stoics for their discussion of 
Stoicism; also they surely influenced the language and thought of later 
Stoic writers. It is probable, also, that Cicero had some influence on 
the Stoic content of Horace, discussed earlier in this chapter.
Cicero's treatment of the Stoic paradoxes may have contributed something 
to Horace's substantial comment on these arguments.
As it is established that Cicero comprises part of the 
educational curriculum and, also, was read for his educational thought, 
it is important to look at the Stoic content in Cicero's works. This
op. cit., p .100.
Par. Stoic. 3. ego tibi ilia ipsa quae vix in gymnasiis et in otio 
Stoici probant ludens conieci in communes locos.
Par. Stoic. 3. et degustabis genus exercitationum earum quibus uti 
consuevi, cum ea quae dicuntur in scholis öctlmws ad nostrum hoc 
Oratorium transfero dicendi genus.
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Stoic thought is expounded and elaborated at such length throughout a 
variety of his works that it would be a formidable task to give an 
exhaustive explanation of Cicero's presentation of Stoicism. Rather, 
the following discussion in this study is the survey of Cicero's treat­
ment of Stoicism, so that some idea may be gained of the Stoic thought 
obtained by students from reading Cicero.
CICERO'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION
Cicero's philosophical position was with the New Academy, as 
guided by Philo of Larissa and then by Antiochus of Ascalon. Cicero 
especially supported the policy of Antiochus, who tried to re-establish 
the spirit of Plato's 'original' Academy and who at the same time 
introduced eclectic elements from other philosophical schools. The 
eclectic, non-dogmatic nature of the New Academy was very much in 
keeping with Cicero's temperament. Because of Antiochus' eclecticism 
the school was prepared to adopt and uphold the Stoic belief of 
knowledge based on sense-perception; and to maintain the Peripatetic 
principle that virtue was the greatest good (but not the only good) . 
Antiochus and Cicero, asserted that the Academic, Peripatetic and Stoic 
schools had much in common and that the differences between them were 
exaggerated. Such differences led to much pointless, pedantic 
quarrel1ing.
In Cicero's treatises there is frequently an overlapping of 
elements from various philosophical schools. And often he supports 
Stoic and Peripatetic principles, at the same time questioning the 
teaching of the Academy. For instance, in Book V of De Finibus he comes 
round to supporting the Stoic argument for self-sufficiency rather than 
the tenets of his former teacher Antiochus. Cicero is more often than 
not in sympathy with the principles of Stoicism, although at times he 
may be firmly critical. In fact, of the four principal schools of 
philosophy discussed by Cicero it is only the Epicurean system that he 
finds unacceptable. Although he frequently acknowledges the worth and 
character of Epicurus himself, the school's tenets are very much 
contrary to his own thinking and to traditional Roman values.
no
With Cicero Stoicism is discussed as much as any other 
philosophical school. However, it is important to note that, of the 
three divisions of Stoic philosophy — ethics, physics and logic-Cicero 
pays most attention to Stoic ethics and, with regard to physical 
science, concentrates on matters relating to Stoic cosmology. He is not 
really concerned with Stoic dialectic, although he undoubtedly had long 
discussions on this subject with Diodotus, the Stoic dialectician who 
for thirty years lived in his house; at times he makes only passing 
references to the ’sorites’ issue in Stoic logic. In view of the 
particular emphases placed by Cicero on various aspects of Stoicism it 
is appropriate to set out Cicero’s treatment of Stoic ethics:
Stoic virtue
Cato in De Finibus points out that moral worth is the only
good;^ this is a fundamental Stoic principle regarded as synonymous
with living a life in accordance with nature. The man who lives
virtuously has an awareness of the natural course of events, selects
guiding principles that are in accord with nature and rejects the 
2opposite. In this way a wise man is free from frustration, restriction
3and want. His life is harmonious and fortunate. Nature also
represents order or reason. Therefore to live in accord with nature is
4rational and morally right; virtue is synonymous with reason. Cicero 
through his works often refers to the basic Stoic principle — naturae 
convenienter vivere\ and this becomes terminology used by Horace and 
later writers. It would appear that Cicero was instrumental in passing 
on this Stoic teaching, although he himself was not in full agreement
de Fin. iii.3.10.
de Fin. ii.11.34. Stoicis consentire naturae3 quod esse volunt e 
virtute3 id est honeste vivere3 quod ita interpretantur3 vivere cum 
intelligentia earum rerum quae natura evenirent 3 eligentem ea quae 
essent secundum naturam reicientemque contrario. Also, cf. de Fin. 
iii.4.12.
de Fin. iii.7.26. ... necessario sequitur omnes sapientes semper
feliciter, absolute 3 fortunate vivere nulla re impediri3 nulla 
prohiberi3 nulla egere.
Acad. i.10.38. hie (i.e. Zeno) omnes in ratione ponebat.
Ill
with its basic argument.1 Within the concept of Stoic virtue there are 
subsumed four cardinal virtues which Cicero sets out from the Stoic 
viewpoint. These are wisdom (prudentia/ypovr\GLg) , temperance 
{temperantia/owp p o a u v n ), courage {fortitudo/dvöpeua) and justice 
{iustit f a / ö L M a u o o u v n ) :
Wisdom
Cicero states a Stoic principle when he points out that a man
who aspires to wisdom is acting in accord with nature. Wisdom,
according to the Stoics, is based on the fundamental principles of 
2nature. Also, there is 'overlap' between wisdom and other qualities
upheld by the Stoics. The possessor of wisdom is brave, calm,
3rational, not susceptible to distress; wisdom also embraces justice 
and magnanimity.^ Wisdom is irreconcilable with anger;^ the wise man 
in his self-control is invariably independent of angry feelings.^
Temperance
In the De Officiis the Stoic concept of temperance is given
g
as the control of reason over appetite or appetites, premeditated
Cicero fairly presents Stoic reasoning on this matter although he is 
inclined to support the Peripatetics who, in contrast, could allow 
that some bodily and external things were 'good'.
2
de Fin. iii.7.23. Cum autem omnia a principiis naturae proficis- 
cantur, ab iisdem neoesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam.
3
Tuso. iii.7.15. At nemo sapiens nisi fortis: non cadet ergo in
sapientiam aegritudo.
4
de Fin. iii.8.25. Sapientia enim et animi magnitudinem complectitur 
et iustitiam et ut omnia quae homini accidant infra se esse iudicet, 
quod idem ceteris artibus non contingit.
5
Tusc. iii.9.19. Sin autem caderet in sapientiam aegritudo, caderet, 
etiam iracundia: qua quoniam vacat, aegritudine etiam vacabit.




i.28.10. Ita fit ut ratio praesit, adpetitus obtemperet.
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conduct1 (rather than thoughtless precipitateness) and the ordering of 
one’s life. In the Stoic pattern of virtues, temperance, like other 
qualities upheld by the Stoics, includes and is equated with a number of 
virtues. Temperance can mean frugality, which implies moderation and 
self-restraint."1 Frugality itself includes other Stoic cardinal 
virtues, fortitude, justice and prudence.'’ Temperance gives 'beauty' to 
morality of conduct and speech.*’ Also, temperance in a person means 
that he would refrain from hurting anyone either physically or verbally.
Bravery
The Stoic definition of bravery embodied a number of facets, 
which are referred to by Cicero. Such a wide-ranging, comprehensive set 
of concepts for bravery was especially distinctive in Stoicism. Braveryg
was regarded as r ' y « / - » • /o self-sufficiency or self-reliance. The
9brave man is not susceptible to distress. A very distinctive Stoic
1 Ibid. Omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate et neglegentia nec 
vero agere quicquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere.
See above, p.88, where this aspect of Stoic thought is discussed.
2
Ibid. ... ut ne quid temere ac fortuito, inconsiderate 
neglegenterque.
3
Tusc. iii.8. orrmes (virtutes) inter se nexae et iugatae sunt.
 ^ Tusc. iii.8.18. Qui sit frugi igitur vel si, mavis, moderatus et 
temperans, cum necesse est esse constantem.
5 Tusc. iii.8.17. ... frugi appellari solet, eo tres virtutes,
fortitudinem, iustitiam, prudentiam frugalitas complexa est.
6 de Fin. ii.14.47. Cuius similitudine perspecta in formarum specie ac 
dignitate, transitum est ad honestatem dictorum atque factorum.
 ^ de Fin. ii.14.47. ... et non audet cuiquam aut dicto protervo aut
facto nocere, vereturque quidquam aut facere aut eloqui quod parum 
virile videntur.
g
Tusc. iii.7.14. Qui fortis est, idem est fide>is ... qui autem est 
fidens, is profecto non extimescit.




requirement meant that the brave man should be free from anger.
Bravery is the application of rational judgment in encountering
misfortune, or the maintenance of a steady judgment in meeting and
2repulsing vicissitudes which may seem disastrous. Courage stems from
3reason, which regards misfortune as unimportant and endurable. 
Chrysippus is quoted in defining bravery as a form of knowledge that is 
consistent with the supreme law of having no fear and enables us to 
tolerate adversity.^ Cato presents the brave man as a person who does 
not fear death, and draws on the Stoic concept of pain as not being an 
evil to substantiate this description.^ The brave man, according to 
Cato, is confident, has faith in his past and future, has self-esteem 
and believes that no ill can befall the wise man.^
Justice
Cicero throughout his works drew substantially from Stoicism 
for his concepts and definitions of iustitia. The Stoics were very much 
concerned with social relations, and consequently justice was regarded 
as extremely important for the healthy functioning of society.* 47 The
Tusc. iv.23.52. Non igitur desiderat fortitudo advocatam iracundiam, 
cf. especially the arguments of the Stoic Sphaerus.
 ^ Tusc. iv.24.53. vel conservatio stabilis iudicii in eis rebus quae 
formidolosae videntur.
de Fin. ii.14.47. Eadem ratio ... omnia humana non tolerabilia solum 
sed etiam levia ducens3 altum quiddam et excelsum, nihil timens3 
nemini cadens3 semper invictum.
4 Tusc. iv.24.53. Fortitudo est3 inquit3 scientia rerum perferendarum 
vel adfectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo summae legi parens sine 
timore.
 ^ de Fin. iii.8.29. ... quern fortem virum dicimus effici posse3 nisi
constitutum sit non esse malum dolorem.
 ^ Ibid, is ... certe et confidere sibi debet ac suae vitae at actae et 
consequenti et bene de sese iudicare3 statuens nihil posse mali 
incidere sapienti.
7 de Off. i.7.20. ... qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi
communitas continetur3 cuius partes duae sunt: iustitia in qua
virtutis splendor est maximus3 ex qua viri boni nominantur3 et huic 
coniuncta beneficentia quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem 
appellari licet.
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Stoics believed that justice and its social systematisation in law had 
its basis in nature.^ Cato in De Finibus presents Chrysippus' argument 
that the person who upholds the code of law that exists between the
individual and the human race is just; he who does not do so is
2unjust. Since man has a moral responsibility of justice to his fellow
man, it is appropriate for him to take part in public life, remarks Cato
3who is voicing Cicero's own opinions on public life.' The theory of
Panaetius that man's most important and responsible activity should be
for the welfare of society is supported by Cicero. The concept of
justice, as held by Antiochus and by the Stoics, is pre-eminent. The
claims of justice are so strong that they are given precedence over the
4pursuit of knowledge.
The Stoic association of iustitia and pietas is firmly 
supported by Cicero. It is a concept valued by other Roman writers,'’ 
who appreciated this association as being consistent with traditional 
Roman principles. The connection between iustitia and pietas emphasises 
the Stoic thought that the individual has a responsibility to gods, 
family, country, society. The sense of Roman morality embodied in 
pietas is supported by and equated with Stoic iustitia. Also, the 
identification of pietas and iustitia is in accord with the force of 
nature. In De Finibus Cicero adopts the Stoic description of iustitia 
and upholds its connection with pietas in his discussion and support of
* de Leg. i.13.6. ... natura esse ius.
2
de Fin. iii.20.67. quoniamque ea natura esset hominis ut ei cum 
genere humano quasi civile ius intercederet, qui id conservaret eum 
iusturn, qui migraret iniustum fore.
3
Ibid. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum 
esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae ut sapiens velit gerere 
et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivats uxorem 
adiungere et velle ex ea liberos.
4 de Off. i.155.
 ^ See above pp.89,90.
 ^ de Fin. iii.22.73. Atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam3 ad tuendas 
amicitias et reliquas cavitates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio 
potest tradere; nec vero pietas adversus deos nec quanta iis gratia 
debeatur sine explicatione natiArae intellegi potest.
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the philosophy of the Academy."^ In the Sorrmiivrt Scipionis the Stoic
2equation between justice and divine force is emphasised. In the
Somnium Scipionis, which is strongly Stoic in a metaphysical sense, the
identification of iustitia and pietas is substantiated by an argument
that people who live by just, pious values are rewarded with a later
3life in the astral universe.
4Justice contributes to other virtues. Correspondingly only a 
brave and wise man can preserve justice.^ In considering other virtues 
in relation to justice Cicero uses the arguments of Middle Stoicism, as 
propounded by Panaetius: the virtue of wisdom should be subordinate to
justice.^ Pure speculation should be subordinate to the practical 
application of philosophy to aid mankind. Of the four cardinal virtues 
the principle of ’justice’ with its implications for society has the 
greatest practical importance. Consequently Cicero’s elaboration on law 
{ius) is consistent with both Antiochean and Panaetian views, where law 
and justice can also be traced back to nature. Cicero draws on the 
Stoic view in expounding the arguments of Antiochus regarding justice 
and its development from the original impulses of parental affection to
de Fin. v.23.65. ... iustitia dicitur3 cui sunt adiunctae pietas3
bonitas3 liberalitas 3 benignitas3 comitas3 quaeque sunt generis 
eiusdem.
2 de Rep. vi.13.13. nihil est enim illi principi deo3 qui orrmem mundum 
regit3 quod quidem in terris fiat3 acceptius quam concilia coetusque 
hominum iure sociati3 quae civitas appellantur; harum rectores et 
conservator es hinc profecti hue revertantur.
3
de Rep. vi.16. iustitiam coli et pietatem ... ea vita via est in 
caelum et in hunc coetum eorum3 qui iam vixerunt et corpore laxati 
ilium incolunt locum quern vides . .. orbeum lacteum ...
de Fin. v.13.66. iustitia ut ipsa fundet se usu in ceteras virtutes3 
sic illas expetet.
 ^ Ibid. Servari enim iustitia nisi a forti viro3 nisi a sapiente non 
potest.
 ^ de Off. i.157; de Rep. iii.15.24.
de Leg. ii.1.2. ... itaque3 ut tu paulo ante de lege et de iure 
disserens ad naturam referebas omnia sic in his ipsis rebus3 quae ad 
requietem animi delectationemque quaeruntur3 yiatura dominatur.
7
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a solidarity of society.^ Also, in man’s nature at birth there is an
2innate element of civic and rational feeling, which is consistent with 
justice.^
CICERO'S DISCUSSION OF THE STOIC 
ANALYSIS OF 'DISORDERS OF THE SOUL'
Cicero acknowledges the thoroughness and discernment of the
Stoics who took great pains to analyse and describe 'disorders of the
4 . 5soul'. He is happy to follow the line taken by the Stoics. He gives
a clear Stoic definition for each of these disorders, explaining also
that intemperantia, the opposite of moderation as described above, is
the source of these disorders.^
7The 'disorders of the soul' are listed in Diogenes Laertius;









11. A. K. Hunt, The Humanism of Cicero, p.95.
2 Cf. Greek term uoAutlhov.
3
de Fin. v.23.66. Nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit ut habeat 
quiddam ingenitum quasi civile atque populäre3 quod Graeci tioAltlmov 
vocant, quidquid agit quaeque virtus3 id a communitate et ea quam 
expo s uj cari täte ac societate humana non abhorrebit3 vicissimque 
iustitia3 ut ipsa fundet se usu in ceteras virtutes3 sic M a s  
expetet.
4
Tusc. iv.5.9. Q m a  Chrysippus et Stoici3 cum de animi 
perturbationibus disputant3 magnam partem in his partiendis et 
definiendis occupati sunt.
Tusc. v.5.2. utamur tarnen in his perturbationibus describendis 
Stoicorum definitionibus et partionibus qui mihi videntur in hac 
quaestione versari acutissime.



















p n v u s odium (hatred)
P L O O  $ inimicitia (enmity)
ondvus indigentia (greed)
L y e p o s desiderium (longing)
Also, the 'disorders’ can be classified in a number of subdivisions. 
Aegritudo (distress) includes invidentia, aemulatio, obtrectatio, 
misericordia, angor, luctus, maeror, aenovna, dolor, lamentatio, 
sollicitudo, molestia, adfliotatio, desperatio. Metus (fear) includes 
pigritia, pudor, terror, timor, pavor, exanimatio, conturbatio, formido. 
Voluptas (pleasure) includes malevolentia, delectatio, iactatio. Libido 
(lust) encompasses fra, excandescentia, odium, inimioitia, discordia, 
indigentia, desideriiMV. Such systematic, comprehensive classification 
exemplifies the working method of the Stoics. Although Stoicism was 
largely based on thought developed before the establishment of the 
school, its thorough elaborate schemes in organising ethics, physics and 
dialectic became the basis for the school's success and wide spread 
acceptance.
1 Tuso. iv.7.16 foil.
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CICERO'S USE OF STOIC ARGUMENTS 
RELATING TO PAIN AND DEATH
Modification of Stoic thought is used by Antiochus throughout
the first four books of the Tusculan Disputationsj1 these books are
concerned with fear of death (Book I), pain (Book II), emotions as
disorders of the soul (Books III and IV). Cicero argues in support of
2the Stoic view that the wise man should not fear death. Also premature
3death is not necessarily abhorrent. Cato in De Senectute supports a 
rational, resigned attitude to death. Cato's attitude is fatalistic: 
in accordance with nature's design each stage of a person's life is
4planned, including also the final stage of death.
Cicero in Book I of the Tusoulans presents two alternative 
views on death and the soul. One view is that the soul perishes on 
death, which was the original, orthodox belief of the Stoics.^ The 
alternative view is that the soul is immortal; this was the teaching of 
the Academico-Peripatetics and some of the Middle Stoics of Cicero's 
time. Indeed, it is possible that Cicero's views on immortality may 
have come from Posidonius and Middle Stoicism, rather than from 
Antiochus/1 Because of the eclecticism of Middle Stoicism Posidonius 
was able to fit into his scheme the Academic doctrine of immortality,
Cf. Hunt, op. cit. , p.104 foil.
Tusc. i.38.91. Itaque non deterret sapientem mors ... quo minus in 
orrme tempus rei publicae suisque oonsulat.
Tusc. i.39.93. Pellantur ergo istae ineptiae paene anilesante 
tempus mori miserum esse.
de Sen. ii.5. ... in hoc surnus sapientes, quod naturam optimam ducem
tamquam deum sequimur eique paremus.
de Sen. xix.71. quid est autem tarn secundum naturam quam senibus 
emori?
Cleanthes, in Nemes Nat. Horn., p.33, and Tert. de Ann.c.5: ouöev
aowyctxov auurcaoxeo awyaxu ouöe cxawyaxu) owya otAAa awya awyaxo* 
a u y m a x e o  6e n (J^ XP aooyaxo v o a o u v u  xau x ey v o y e v ^  xau to awya xfj 
4>uxrr ayoxovoyevns youv epuftpov y i v c x a i ,  xau cpoßooyevns wxpov* owya 
apa n 4exn.
Also, cf. Chrysippus, in Nemes, p.34.
See E. Zeller, op. cit., notes, pp.210,211.
Cf. Hunt, op. cit., p.106.
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upon which he no doubt elaborated substantially.
In Book II of the Tusculans the Stoics are criticised for
setting up syllogisms to prove that pain is not an evil. However, it is
interesting to note that Cicero draws upon Stoic reasoning to support
the view given by Antiochus that pain can be endured; although his main
purpose is to demolish the Stoics' argument that pain is an evil.*
2Posidonius and the later Stoics maintained that the soul comprises two 
parts'^  — to AoYLOTuxdv and to aAoyov.^ The reasoning of the wise man 
enables him to govern the 'lower part' of his nature and to endure such 
a vicissitude as pain.^
SUICIDE
The case for suicide is argued by Cato in De Finibus. When a 
person lives in circumstances which are in accord with nature, it is 
appropriate for him to be alive. However, when most of his 
circumstances are not in accord with nature, suicide is justifiable.^
The Stoics firmly supported suicide as a solution to circumstances which
Tusc. ii.12.29. Concludunt ratiunculas Stoici cur non sit malum, 
quasi de verbo, non de re laboretur.
Tusc. ii.18.42. Cf. Cicero's reaction: Sitne igitur malum dolore
nunc Stoici viderint, qui contortulis quibusdam et minutis 
conclusiunculis nec ad sensus permanantibus effici volunt non esse 
malum dolorem.
See Hunt, op. cit. , p.109.
Tusc. ii.20.47. Est enim animus in partes tributus duas, quorum 
altera rationis est particeps, altera expers.
The aAoyov may be further divided into to EKL^uynTLxdv and to 
duuoeuöEs.
Tusc. ii.22.51. is igitur sive ea ratio, quae erit in eo perfecta 
atque absoluta, sic M i  parti imperabit inferiori, ut iustus parens 
probis filiis.
de Fin. iii.18.60. In quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam 
sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura 
contrario aut fore videntur, huius officium est e vita exce dere.
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may be intolerable or beyond one's control.^ Although Cicero presents
the Stoic attitude to suicide, the school itself had set out much more
2elaborate and detailed premises relating to this issue.
STOIC COSMOLOGY IN CICERO
In the De Natura Deorum where discussion is between Balbus for 
the Stoics, Cotta for the Academy and Velleius for the Epicureans the 
arguments of Balbus are those that are most positively supported. But 
the issue is not that Stoic cosmic interpretation provides a single 
coherent explanation. The theology of Stoicism is very much in agree­
ment with that of the Academy. The close association of the two schools 
in regard to theology is emphasised by the fact that Epicurean arguments 
are directed against Stoic-Platonic theology rather than against each
school singly. In the De Natura Deorum the Stoic theory considered by
3Cicero is that of Posidonius and Middle Stoicism." The theology of 
eclectic Middle Stoicism had much in common with the Academico- 
Peripatetic theological system taught by Antiochus. In the Academica 
appears a Stoic description of the universe and heavenly bodies. This 
Stoic description provided by Cicero is consistent with and possibly
4derived from the Timaeus. The only real difference between the Stoic 
and Antiochean viewpoints is that Antiochus' theology denies that the 
gods' control over man and the world is as extensive and as strong as 
the Stoics maintain. At times Cicero in De Natura Deorum, De 
Divinatione and De Fato criticises the emphasis given by the Stoics to 
divine providence; such criticism is in keeping with the views of 
Antiochus and the Academico-Peripatetic tradition. But the very 
important point is that Cicero himself accepts the fundamentals of 
Posidonius' Stoic cosmology,^ which is presented in Book II of De Natura
 ^ D.L. vii.130. euAoyws r e  (paauv e^ct^exv e a u x o v  xcu 3lou xov aocpov.
Also, cf. M. Aurel, v.29. eav 6e un enbxpeTiwot, xoxe xax xoO 
ouxojs uevxoL, ws yndev xaxov Tidaxwv.
2 See E. Zeller, op. cit. , pp.334-340.
3 Hunt, op. cit., p.125.
 ^ Cf. Timaeus, 40a.
 ^ Hunt, op. cit., p.137.
_
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Deorum. In the Sormium Scipionis he presents the Stoic belief, also 
expressed by many Roman writers generally, that the supreme god rules 
the universe and that his presence is all-pervading.
2It is acknowledged that Cicero made a strong contribution to
theological thought in antiquity. And clearly much of Cicero's theology
is based on and incorporates Stoicism. Cicero was instrumental in
3organising for Romans theological thought in Latin,' and in so doing he 
substantially used, and consequently passed on to Romans, the system of 
Stoic theology.
DIVINATION
It is in keeping with the Stoic concept of an ordered universe 
governed by divine force that the Stoics would be in a position to 
support divination. Cicero sets out comprehensively and at length the 
Stoics' reasoning for the validity of divination in De Divinatione I; 
although, of course he presents his refutation in Book II. The basic 
Stoic syllogism* 234 to substantiate divination states that 'If there are 
gods, there is divination; but there are gods, therefore there is 
divination.' Chrysippus was drawn on for support of divination; he had 
pointed out that every phenomenon occurred in accordance with the laws
de Rep. vi.13. nihil est enim illi prbicipi deo3 qui orrmem rmmdum 
regit3 quod quidem in terris fiat3 acoeptius quam concilia coetusque 
hominum iure sociati3 quae civitates appellantur.
de Rep. vi.15. ... deus is3 cuius hoc templum est orrme3 quod
conspicis . . .
de Rep. vi.24. movet ... hunc mundum ille princeps deus.
2 See Mayor's edition of De Natura DeoriMV, vol. iii, p.xviii. The 
comment is made regarding Book II, which is largely Stoic in content, 
that it is 'perhaps the most important contribution to theological 
thought which has come down to us from classical antiquity'.
3 However, it might be noted that other Roman writers who were 
concerned with theology were Varro (Antiquitates divinae); Appius 
Claudius Fulcher, P. Nigidius Figulus.
4 de Div. ii. 17.41. Si di sunt3 est divinatio; sunt autem di3 est 
ergo divinatio.
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of nature and never by chance.'*' Also, the Stoics used the argument of a
bond between mankind and gods, whose function it is to love mankind.* 2 34
Consequently the Stoic definition of divination, as given by Chrysippus,
is the power to see, understand and explain premonitory signs given to 
3men by gods. And even the choice of the sacrificial victim is directed
4by the sentiment and divine power which pervade the entire universe. 
Cicero's exposition in Book I gives the case for divination through the 
words of his brother Quintus. This explanation, completely based on 
arguments from early Stoicism and from Posidonius, is a coherent state­
ment outlining the Stoic case on divination for Roman readers.
CICERO'S TREATMENT OF THE STOIC CONCEPTS 
OF FATE AND FREE WILL
The concepts of fate and free will in Cicero are to be 
considered against the background of Posidonius' Middle Stoicism, which 
strongly influenced the Stoic-Platonic system upheld by Cicero. As 
mentioned, Stoics themselves were caught up in an anomaly between fate 
and free will. Chrysippus' basic argument on fate is that every 
occurrence stems from a cause or causes; therefore everything occurs in 
accordance with fate.5 On the other hand, Chrysippus also points out 
that certain occurrences or actions are not connected with eternal
de Div. ii.28.61. Quorum omnium causas si a Chrysippo quaeramipse 
M e  divinationis auctor numquam ilia dioet faota fortuito 
naturalemque rationem omnium reddet: 'Nihil enim fieri sine eausa
potest ...'
2
de Dzv. ii.49.101. Si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus quae 
futura sintj aut non diligunt3 hominesaut quid eventurum sit 
ignorant ...
3
de Div. ii.63.130. Chrysippus quidem divinationem definit his 
verbis: 'vim cognosoentem et videntem et explicantem signa3 quae a
dis nominibus portendantur ... ’
4
de Fato ii.15.35. ... ad hostiam deligendum ducem esse vim quandam
sentientem atque divinam quae toto confusa mundo sit.
5 de Fato ix.21. Quod si ita est, omnia quae fiunt causis fiunt3 
antegressis; id si ita est3 omnia fato fiunt; efficitur igitur fato 
fieri quaecumque fiant.
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causation, but are independent of fate.^ So Chrysippus somewhat
enigmatically wishes to compromise and to allow for both situations,
2although he is more inclined to support the argument for fate.
Chrysippus probably oversimplifies when he argues that fate prevails
when it is not possible to change the outcome of antecedent causes, and
that free will can function when preceding causes do not prevent us from
altering a particular result. In accordance with these alternatives,
3circumstances can be respectively simple or complex. Although Cicero 
sets out the Stoic arguments for fate and free will, he himself in 
keeping with the teaching of the Academy does not attribute great 
importance to providential control; he gives support to the idea of 
free will. Cicero does not question the existence of the gods but 
rather the arguments relating to divine intervention as put forward by 
the Stoics. Cicero is not prepared to acknowledge the force of Tipovoua, 
which is so fundamental and prominent in the Stoic system. He argues 
that there may be a certain interdependence and causality throughout
4nature, but regards the Stoic attitude as too absolute and exaggerated.
Cicero gives considerable attention throughout his works to 
the question of Stoic determinism; this theory is analysed in sequence 
in De Natura Deorum, De Divinatione and De Fato. The outline of the 
Stoic Platonic system in Book II of De Natura Deorum and the argument 
for divination in Book I of De Divinatione lead up to the treatment of 
providential fate.
Cicero's philosophical writing provided a field of study in 
Latin for later authors, philosophers, educationists, rhetores,
 ^ de Fato xvi. 38. ratio ipsa coget et ex aetemitate quaedam esse vera 
et ea non esse nexa causis aetemis et a fati necessitate esse libera.
2
de Fato xvii.39. Chrysippus tarnen arbiter honorarius medium ferire 
voluissej sed applicat se ad eos potius qui necessitate motus animos 
liberatos volunt dum autem verbis utitur suis delabitur in eas 
difficultates ut necessitatem fata confirmet invitus.
3





gvarmaticz, students. And Cicero's substantial treatment of Stoicism, 
especially in ethics and cosmology, provided an opportunity for Romans 
to learn in their own language something of this philosophical school. 
Consequently it is probable that the Stoic content in Cicero was studied 
by the Stoics of the Empire and by early Christian theologians;
Cicero's educational contribution was considerable, and it was a 
contribution that included a significant Stoic content.
The principal authors taught in Roman schools have now been 
considered from the point of view of their Stoic content; yet it is not 
claimed that this Stoic content has been analysed in regard to every 
possible aspect or detail. Rather, the purpose of the discussion is to 
demonstrate that the Stoic content in the authors read is substantial, 
and would have necessarily been explained to students by their teachers.
The situation that can be established with respect to the 
first century A.D. is that pupils in schools learned much of Stoicism, 
for the most part from the standard curriculum of authors comprising in 
particular Virgil, Horace, Sallust, Cicero — as well as from such Stoic 
authors as Lucan, Persius, Seneca, Celsus. The educational situation 
during the first century A.D. is consistent with the strong position of 
Stoicism in Roman society, in philosophical thought and in Latin 
literature. And it is a justifiable claim that prior to the appearance 
of Christianity, the position and influence of Stoicism in first century 
Rome as a comprehensive philosophical and ideological force was unique 
in Greek and Roman civilisation.
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CHAPTER V
STOICISM AND INDIVIDUAL GRAMMATICI
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss 
particular grammatici, who were themselves Stoic, and also to determine 
the extent of Stoic influences on certain other grammatici. For such a 
treatment it is necessary to refer again to Crates of Mallos, who is 
firmly regarded as being responsible for establishing the grammaticus f 
tradition and methods in Rome, and whose influence was so extensive and 
prolonged.^ The method and content of Crates' teaching have already 
been discussed from the Stoic viewpoint in Chapters II and III; it is 
significant now to indicate that later writers and grammarians 
incorporated much of Crates' teaching in this work. Also, authors who 
were not Stoic chose to draw from Crates; included among these were 
Varro and Quintilian.
Varro in De Lingua Latina presents arguments on Stoic theories
of anomaly that were previously expounded by Crates and his followers.
2He is cited in relation to the use of certain restricted case forms;
and Crates' school is mentioned in a discussion on particular
3singular and plural forms. However, Varro does not hesitate to
4criticise Crates for his shortcomings. Crates' support of anomaly in 
grammar is later referred to by Aulus Gellius,^ when he is restating
 ^ Suet, de gramm. 2. ... ac nostris exemplo fuit ad imitandum.
2 viii.66-71.
 ^ ix.63.
 ^ ix.l. ... Insignis eorum est error qui malunt quae nesciunt docere 
quam discern quae ignorant: in quo fuit Crates, nobilis grammaticus
5 N.A. ii.25.1-11.
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some of the arguments set out by Varro1 relating to usage in a
comparison with rules of analogy. Crates is also cited by Martianus
2Capella in the De grammatica of his Disciplinae.
3
The Pergamene school of Kpaxnxeuou was strong and vigorous: 
Ptolemaeus of Ascalon wrote a treatise xfjs Kpaxnxeuou a c p e a e w s ;
Zenodotus of Mallos earnestly championed Crates' system. Panaetius was 
his pupil,^ as were Tauriskos, Herodikos, Hermeias (6 Kpaxnxetos), 
Artemon of Pergamon, Asclepiades of Myrlea. His teachings on the Stoic 
interpretation of Homeric allegory were taken up by Heraclitus and 
Demo.^ His cosmological arguments were followed by Posidonius, and were 
consequently used by Strabo, Plutarch and Geminus.^
7Crates' methods, according to Suetonius, were directly 
adopted by Roman scholars, who in the tradition of his Stoic exegesis 
wrote detailed criticism of Latin poetry not very widely known to Romans 
of the time. They gave public readings together with commentaries and 
were responsible for giving early Roman literature a degree of
g
recognition and standing. Octavius Lampadio appears to have been the 
first of these grammatici. He treated Naevius' Punicum Bellum in this 
way, dividing the single volume into seven books. Also, it would appear
l. 1. vii . 68.
2 iii.289 foil.; 324 foil., as mentioned by H. Mette, Parateresis 
Untersuchungen zur Sprachtheorie des Krates von Pergamon, p.2.
3 Cf. W. Kroll, Pauly-Wissowa, xi.2, p.1634.
4 Strab. xiv.676. See Chapter I.
 ^ W. Kroll, op. cit. , pp.1640-1641.
6 Ibid.
7
de gramm. 2. Hactenus tarnen imztati3 ut carmina parum adhuc 
divolgata vel defunctorum amicorum vel si quorum aliorum probassent 
diligentius retractarent ac legendo commentandoque etiam ceteris nota 
facerent.
The teaching steps indicated by the terms diligentius rectractarent, 
legendo and commentando are in keeping with the pattern that was 
established for textual exegesis.
g
Ibid, ut C. Octavius Lampadio Uaevii 'Punicum Bellum' quod uno 
volumine et continenti scriptura exposition divisit in septem libros.
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that Lampadio prepared a commentary on the Annales of Ennius, as
1 . 2 suggested by Fronto and Aulus Gellius.
Then Quintus Vargunteius following the procedure of 
retractare, legere and commentare also treated Ennius, giving his
3readings on particular days to large audiences. Laelius Archelaus and
4Vettius Philocomus are mentioned by Suetonius as grammatici who treated 
Lucilius in the Cratean tradition. Archelaus is probably the same 
grammaticus as mentioned by Charisius^ who describes him as a leading 
scholar who wrote a work on poetry: De vitiis virtutibusque poematorum.
Vettius Philocomus, like Archelaus, lived in the second half 
of the second century B.C. They were friends and contemporaries of 
Lucilius. Vettius, as well as treating his satires in the conventional 
manner of the grammaticus, was himself censured by Lucilius^ for using 
alien words of Tuscan, Sabine and Praenestine origin. Vettius has been 
suggested as the identity derided, but perhaps not seriously, in a
7fragment of Lucilius. And, Archelaus and Vettius have been described 
as being helpful to Lucilius by listening to recitations of his works;
g
also, they wrote commentaries on them after his death.
Fronto, 20.
N.A. xviii.5.11.
Suet, de gramm. 2. ut postea Q. Vargunteius Annales Ennii3 quos 
oertis diebus in magna frequentia pronuntiabat.
Ibid, ut Laelius Archelaus Vettiusque Philocomus Lucilii saturas 
familiaris sui3 quas legisse se apud Archelaum Pompeius Lenaeus3 apud 
Philocomum Valerius Cato praedicant.
G.L. i.3.33. Q. Laelius ex principibus grammaticis librum suum 
inscripsit3 'De vitiis virtutibusque poematorum'.
Quint, i.5.56. 'Taceo de Tuscis et Sabinis et Praenestinis quoque; 
nam ut eorum sermone utentem Vettium Lucilius insectatur ... '
Frag. 1141, E.H. Warmington, Remains of Old Latin, iii, p.371. ...
tarn impurus fuisset.
Cf. Warmington, Introduction, p.xvii. Reference to Charisius, ap. 
G.L. , i.141,33K.
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Lenaeus Pompeius, a grammatious of the first half of the first
century B.C., was a pupil of Archelaus1 and consequently was taught in
accordance with Crates' methods. Lenaeus was a freedman of Pompey, and
on the death of his patron and his sons conducted a school near the 
2temple of Tellus. It is difficult to determine to what extent Lenaeus 
was actually influenced by Stoicism; on the other hand, his 
predecessors, Lampadio, Vargunteius, Vettius and Archelaus, in imitating 
Crates (as stated by Suetonius) undoubtedly learned Stoic arguments as 
well as a teaching methodology. Lenaeus moved outside his field of 
teaching and studying literature; he wrote a satire vehemently 3
criticising Sallust for saying that Pompey had a shameless character. 
Also, he wrote on botany and medicine; and his work is at times used by 
Pliny.^
Publius Valerius Cato was a contemporary of Lenaeus. He was 
taught by Vettius who, as mentioned, implemented the methods of Crates 
in his teaching.^ Valerius Cato was prominent as both a grammatious and 
a poet. As a teacher and grammarian he had many distinguished pupils.^ 
As the leader of the neoteroi, or young Latin poets who were influenced 
by the personal and individual Alexandrian school, he had as his 
followers such renowned personalities as Catullus, Calvus, liirius, 
Bibaculus and Ticida. Cato's adherence to the emotionally expressive 
and at times erotic style of this school of poets hardly suggests the 
slightest interest in Stoic values. And it would appear that the three
See note 4, p .127.
Suet, de grarnm. 15. ... defuncto eo filiisque eius sohola se
sustentavit; docuitque in Carinis ad Telluris 3 in qua regione 
Pompeiorum domus fuerat, ...
Ibid. ... ut Sallustium historicum, quod eum oris probi3 animo 
invereoundo soripsisset3 aoerbissima satura laoeraverit3 ...
Plin. N.H. xv.5-7; xx-xxvii.
See note 4, p .127.
Suet, de gramm. 11. Docuit muitos et nobilesj visusque est 
peridoneus praeoeptor, maxime ad poetioam tendentibus^ ut quidem 
apparere vel his versioulis potest:
Cato grammatious 3 Latina Siren3 
Qui solus legit ao facit poetas.
129
works for which he is known, Indignatio, Dictynna and Lydia (strongly 
erotic in content), are very much apart from Stoicism.'*"
On the other hand, a very interesting reference from Furius
2Bibaculus associates Cato with two leading Stoic grammarians:
En cor Zenodoti, en iecur Cratetis .
These words describe Cato as embodying in his heart and soul the spirit 
of Crates and Zenodotus of Mallos. Unfortunately the content of Cato's 
grammatical writings is unknown; Bibaculus' description then is most 
enigmatic, and a clear interpretation seems to defy analysis. Does the 
reference indicate that Cato upheld the grammatical teachings of Crates 
and Zenodotus? This is feasible for the anomalist Stoic school held 
sway in Rome in the first half of the first century B.C. Or, does it 
mean that he was a fine teacher in the pedagogic tradition of Crates and 
Zenodotus? A third explanation might be that the line is an expression 
of irony on the part of Bibaculus who is indulging in friendly satire. 
The surest conclusion is that such emphatic reference to Crates and 
Zenodotus firmly underlines the fact that their teachings were widely 
known and that their work and thought enjoyed a high standing in Rome at 
the time.
L. Aelius Stilo was the leading grammatious of His time. He 
3was a Stoic and consequently a champion of the anomalist system of 
grammar. His influence was strong and far-reaching, as emphatically
4stated by Suetonius. It is interesting that as well as being a teacher 
and an acknowledged scholar of grammar and literature, Aelius wrote 
speeches for Roman politicians, some of whose names Cicero^ mentions as
Cf. Hehal, Pauly-Wissowa, VII A2, pp.2348-2350.
Suet, de gramm. 11.
Cic., Brut. 206. Stoicus esse voluit.
Suet, de gramm. 3. Instruxerunt auxeruntque ab omni parte 
grammaticam L. Aelius Lanuvinus generque Aelii Ser. Clodius3 uterque 
eques Ro. multique ac varii et in doctrina et in re p. usus.
Cic., Brut. 169. scriptitavit orationes multis.
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Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos, Quintus Caepio, Quintus Pompeius Rufus and 
C. Aurelius Cotta.^
2 3Aelius numbered among his pupils Varro and Cicero who highly 
commends his scholarship. His standing is substantiated by the fact 
that both his contemporaries and later writers refer favourably to his 
works. Varro mentions his Interpretatio Carminum Saliorum and at the 
same time describes Aelius as an outstanding scholar of Latin
4literature. Aulus Gellius reiterates Varro's statement that Aelius is 
the most learned scholar of his time* 23478 and later refers to him as being 
an authority on Plautus;^* his interest in Plautus is also indicated by 
Quintilian.7 Aelius' Stoic interest was embodied in his work on 
dialectic entitled Commentarium de protoquiis or Ttepu d^Lwydrwv which is
g
mentioned by Aulus Gellius/
Varro drew very much on the thought and work of his teacher
Aelius, to whom he often refers. Varro's presentation of the arguments
on the Stoic system of anomaly is particularly influenced by Aelius, who
9is often cited on word derivation.' And later, Quintilian chooses to 
quote Aelius' etymology.^9 Aelius represents a peak in the development
Cic., Brut. 206.
2 Aul. Gell., N.A. xvi-2. L. Aetii3 docti hominis3 qui magister 
Varronis fuit.
3 Brut. 207. ... cum essem apud Aelium adulescens eumque audire
perstudiose solerem.
4
1.1. vii.2. Aetii hominis in primo in litteris Latinis exercitati 
interpretationem Carminum Saliorum videbis . ..
N.A. i.18.1. ... dootissimum tunc civitatis hominem ... L. Aelium
N.A. iii.3.1. ... Plauti comoedias curiose atque contente
tectitarunt3 non indicibus Aetii ...
7 x.i.99.
8 N.A. xvi.8.2.
9 1.1. v.18,21,25,66,101; vii.2; viii.81.
10 i.6.36.
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of Stoic grammar in Rome. From the middle of the first century B.C. the 
strong position of the anomalist school gradually yields to the force of 
the Alexandrian analogists. Yet it is important to note that Aelius' 
influence still survives beyond his own time.
Servius Clodius was the son-in-law of Aelius Stilo^ of whom he
was a close follower; it is recorded that he even stole one of Aelius'
works before it was published and because of the ensuing disgrace he was
2forced to leave the city. Although Clodius' poor character meant that
the possession of Stoic values on his part is unimaginable, being so
much under the influence of Aelius he was undoubtedly a supporter of
Stoic grammar. Like Aelius he was also interested in Plautus, as
3 4suggested by Cicero and Aulus Gellius. Cicero also refers to his
scholarship.^ Just as Aelius had studied etymology and was cited on a
number of occasions by Varro, Clodius was also acknowledged as an
authority and was cited accordingly.^  And his Commentario on word
7derivation was later consulted and quoted by Aulus Gellius.
Gavius Bassus was a gramriaticus who lived during the 
Ciceronian period and probably during the post - Republican years into theg
early part of the Augustan age. His interest in and method of
9analysing word formation indicates a pronounced Stoic influence. Also, 
the Stoic arguments of Posidonius are considered to have been 
incorporated in his work De Dis. ^  Bassus' interest in word explanation
* Suet, de gvcorrm. 3.
2 Ibid.
3 Cic., ad Fam. ix.16. Servius ... facile diceret 'hie versus Plauti 
non est hie est'.
4 iii.3.1.








and etymology is embodied in his De Origine Verborwn et Vocabularum.
2Quintilian refers to Bassus' etymology, and Aulus Gellius mentions his
3explanations on a number of occasions.
Lucius Crassicius was a successful grammaticus who taught a
4number of pupils from distinguished families, and also established a 
high reputation as a scholar through his commentary on Cinna's Zmyma.'* 
Crassicius was strongly interested in philosophy, the study of which led 
him to give up his vocation as a grammaticus. ^  He joined the 
philosophical school conducted in the Augustan period by Q. Sextius and 
his son.
The school of Q. Sextius drew mainly from Stoicism and 
Neopythagoreanism, and consequently was eclectic in its principles. 
Sextius' purpose was to set up an original Roman philosophical school. 
Much of Stoic ethics was incorporated in his teachings; for instance, 
the Stoic idea that only the wise man is free and sane is conveyed in 
his argument that the challenge in life is the acquisition of wisdom
7through victory over insanity. Also, he taught the Stoic principle
g
that the power of the good man is comparable with the power of Jupiter. 
Surely Crassicius while still a grammaticus was for a period of time 
under the influence of Sextius, and without doubt imparted something of 
his teaching to his own pupils.
A. Gell. N.A. iii.19.1. velut eo die quo ego affui, legebatur Gavii 
Bassi)3 eruditi viri liber 'de Origine Verborum et Vocabularum'.
2 i.6.36.
3 N.A. iii.9.1,8; 18.3; ii.4; iii.19; l.i.3; v.7.
4 Suet, de gramm. 18. Sed cum edoceret iam multos ac nobiles ...
3 Ibid, deinde in pergula docuit3 donee commentario 'Zmyrnae' edito 
adeo inclaruit3 ut haec de eo scriberentur:
Uni Crassicio se credere 'Zmyrna' probavit.





Sen. Ep. lxxiii.12. 
bonum virum.
i
Solebat Sextius dicere Iovem.^non posse quam
Cf. Sen. Ep. xli.4.
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Theon of Alexandria is an interesting personality to consider 
in this chapter. He is primarily known for his widely used work Ttepc 
Tipoyuyvaayaiwv, and consequently is regarded as a writer very much 
concerned with rhetorical education. He is also important as a Stoic 
and educationist whose work in various ways is relevant to that of the 
grammaticus.
Theon lived during the first century A.D. The precise period 
of his life is uncertain, but it would appear that he was a contemporary 
of Quintilian who refers to him on occasions.^ In keeping with Stoic 
educational theory Theon's concept of education was broader than direct 
vocational preparation. He was a supporter of the iynuxAlos itauöeux, 
and deplored the fact that this educational curriculum was losing force/ 
He had a broad yet unified view of education, in keeping with the 
educational rationale argued by Hermagoras of Temnos in the second 
century R.C. and then by Cicero and Quintilian: the educated orator
required a background of education that covered a range of subjects 
studied in some depth. A study of the liberal arts was the basis of 
such an education. Theon upheld the firmly Stoic argument that the 
orator should be well educated and be a viv bonus dicendi peritus.
Theon's own work embodies a range of subjects which exemplify 
his educational views. He was interested in grammar and philology, 
writing a treatise on syntax, Zninyaxa uepu auvia^ews. His 
progymnasmata also reflected a strong grammatical interest; his treat­
ment of the sections concerned with xPei^ a > UÖ$os and öbrfynya suggests a
4purely grammatical discussion. Although he himself preferred a direct 
oratorical style as consistent with his Stoicism, he wrote on and 
supported appropriate use of the three principal styles:* 2345 the grande
iii.6.48. Fecerunt alii totidem status_, sed alios. An sit? Quid
sit? Quale sit? Quantum sit? ut Caeoilius et Theon.
ix.3.76. Theo Stoicus mpuoov existimat3 quod sit e membris non
dissimilibus.
2 Stegemann, Pauly-Wissowa, VA2, p.2039.
3 v. Arnim, op. cit. , ii.6.181.
4 Stegemann, op. cit., p.2038.
Cf. G. Reichel, Quaest. prog., passim-, also mentioned by Stegemann.
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1 • 3(Demosthenes), the medium (Isocrates) and the tenue (Xenophon).
Other works on rhetoric written by Theon were ’PnTopuxau UTiofteaeLS and 
TiepL. texvwv pniopLxtov ßLßXua y’.^  Theon's interest in dialectic is 
apparent in his tiepl TipoyuyvaayaTwv. His concern with opoo and öuacpopau 
relates back to Stoic dialectic; his precise definition and treatment 
of close, subtle distinctions are a dialectic approach.
As it is the purpose of this chapter simply to discuss Stoic 
teachers or teachers influenced by Stoicism, it is appropriate to defer 
comment on progymnasmata and Theon's work in this regard to the 
following chapter; in that chapter will be treated Stoicism and the 
teaching of rhetoric. For the present it is important to point out that 
he was a Stoic educationist of standing, whose work was used by and 
influenced both Greek and Roman teachers. Theon appears to have been 
one of the few Greek writers whose work was translated into Latin.^ And 
his standing became so high^ that later rhetoricians referred to him 
more frequently than to Quintilian or to Hermagoras.
L. Annaeus Cornutus was a Stoic grarmaticus and a contemporary 
of Seneca; he had as his pupils Lucan and Persius, who came to his 
school at the age of sixteen.^ He wrote a text on grammar, De
g
Enuntiatione vel Orthographia, as well as a book on rhetoric, De
9 10Fvgurzs Sententiarum.' Cornutus also wrote on Stoic philosophy, but
 ^ 'Yndyvnya els Anyoo^evnv.
2
'YTioyvnya els ’ iooxparnv .
3 'YTioyvnya els Hevocpajvia.
 ^ Cf. Reichel, op. ait., 30; 23.
 ^ This translation was probably done after the first century A.D., and 
especially used by rhetores latini minores in their comparative 
studies. Cf. St. Glöckner, 'Quaest. rhet.', Brest, philot. , 1901 — 
mentioned by Stegemann.
 ^ Stegemann, op. ait., p.2053.





Aul. Gell. A’.A. ix.10.5.
v. Arnim, Pauly-Wissowa, 1.2, p.2225.
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he lias been primarily regarded as a grammarian and educationist.
Cornutus was particularly concerned with Stoic allegorical
interpretation; for instance, he argued that the God Hercules was to be
2equated with Reason and was a ruling power in the world. As a
grammarian Cornutus endeavoured to interpret Hercules' character
completely in this light, although he could not accept Cleanthes'
3explanation of the twelve labours. It is interesting that three 
hundred years after the introduction of Crates' methods to Rome Cornutus 
was a grammaticus who strongly represented this Stoic exegetical 
tradition.
Following this review of personalities it may be useful to 
suggest some synthesis of this information. It is apparent that the 
tradition and teaching content introduced by Crates were maintained in 
the second century B.C. by Lampadio, Vargunteius, Archelaus and 
Philocemus; and Cratean methods are later apparent in the work of 
Cornutus during the first century A.D. Through their stated interests 
in literature and through their public readings there was during the 
second century B.C. a series of granvnatici who were particularly 
concerned with literary appreciation and analysis in the Stoic 
exegetical manner of Crates. Their interest appears to be more literary 
than philological. The fact that a significant number of grammatici 
with Stoic leanings can be placed in the second century B.C. is 
consistent with the strongly Stoic spirit of that age.
In comparison with the strong literary emphasis of Stoic 
grammatici of the second century B.C. Aelius Stilo, Servius Clodius and 
Gavius Bassus during the first century B.C. were especially champions of 
Stoic philology. They vigorously researched and strongly upheld Stoic 
anomalist grammar. Perhaps this interest prevailed because of the 
developing linguistic richness of Latin literature and because of the
1 M. Pohlenz, op. cit. , Vol. II, p.143. Zu den Stoikern oder überhaupt
den Philosophen rechnet er sich aber nicht; er ist Jugendbildner3
Grammatiker.
2  ^  ^ \Plut. de Is. 44. Hercules is to TtAnxxbxov mccl, öloiopctumov TivcOya.
Zeller, op. cit., p.368.3
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conflict in Rome at that time between anomalist and analogist systems of 
grammar.
The grarmatici referred to from the first century A.D., 
Cornutus, Crassicius and Theon cannot be readily categorised as pursuing 
common fields of interest as did groups of grarmatici from previous 
centuries; this circumstance in itself reflects the expansive, varied 
interests of Stoics of the Empire and was anticipated by the varied 
studies of Posidonius. It might be concluded that the tradition of the 
Stoic grarmaticus prevailed strongly in Rome from the time of Crates 
with certain shifts of emphasis; such variations reflect the attested 
adaptability and developmental changes of Stoicism.
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CHAPTER VI
STOICISM AND THE TEACHING OF RHETORIC
The pupil proceeded from the school of the grammaticus to that 
of the rhetor possibly at the age of about fifteen, although the precise 
age is difficult to determine. Also, the functions of the grammaticus 
and rhetor were not clearly divided, the grammaticus especially teaching 
his pupils something of rhetoric.* In general, higher education 
culminated in the training provided in the rhetorical schools; it was 
an education pursued by a large number of students, while comparatively 
a smaller proportion went on to studies in philosophy. Education for 
oratory had a very high standing evidenced by the fact that the income
2of the rhetor was four times as much as that earned by the grammaticus. 
It is clear that since the time of Isocrates rhetorical education, 
although at times subject to and contested by various strong forces, was 
upheld as the goal of the Greco-Roman educational programme.
A study of rhetorical education is a substantial field to
3research and set out comprehensively. It is not appropriate in this 
chapter to describe the reasons for the high standing of oratory and to 
discuss every aspect of rhetorical training in the ancient world, 
although such discussion is all-important to a full or general study of 
Greco-Roman education. For the requirements of this thesis it is
See above Chapter IV. Cf. Quint, ii.1.3-6.
Marrou, op. cit. , p.380. Cf. Juv. vii.186-187.
Useful studies are D.L. Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education;
S.F. Bonner, Roman Declamation’, A. Gwynn, Roman Education from 
Cicero to Quintilian’, A.D. Leeman, Orationis Ratio’, H.-I. Marrou,
Histoire de l1education dans lfantiquite, pp.268-282,380-384; Wilkins, 
Roman Education; H. von Arnim, Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa’, W. 
Kroll, 'Rhetorik', Pauly-Wissowa, Supplement Vol. VII, pp.1039-1137.
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essential to divide the topic of Stoicism as it relates to rhetoric into 
two separate sections. In the first section the Stoic concept of their 
rhetoric is to be defined, the Stoic plain style described, and Stoic 
orators and rhetores are to be identified. The second section treats 
the Stoic elements and influences that became established in the general 
pattern of rhetorical teaching; such aspects, for example, may come 
from Stoic dialectic, from Stoic ethical questions as subjects for 
deaecs and chriae exercises, in npoyuyvdauctxa, from principles of Stoic 
'correctness' as exemplified in the avoidance of solecisms and 
barbarisms. The relatively straightforward comment on Stoic rhetoric 
will serve as a basis for and be followed by the analysis of Stoic 
elements in rhetorical teaching.
I. STOIC RHETORIC
Rhetoric was regarded by the Stoics as one of two parts of
logic, the other part being dialectic. The simple distinguishing
definitions were that rhetoric was the science of speaking well using
plain narrative, and that dialectic was the science of correctly
discussing subjects by question and answer.^ For the Stoics rhetoric
and dialectic were so closely associated that the distinction between
the two was arbitrary and could be reduced to continuous speech in
2comparison to dialogue.
The Stoics drew very much on the work of Aristotle who had
given a philosophical basis to rhetoric, although the Stoics were not
prepared to accept fully the fundamental methods in rhetoric which meant
the manipulation of human emotion. The association of rhetoric with
dialectic, where rhetoric was called avxuaxpocpog xri ÖLaAexxuxri, was
3originally Aristotelian. The Stoics also agreed with Aristotle in 
attributing three divisions to rhetoric: deliberative, forensic and
 ^ D.L. vii.42, xpv te pnxopyxnv ETiyaxdunv o5oav xoü eft Aeycuv nepu xwv 
ev öue^ döa) Adywv xau xpv SuaAexxLxnv too 6p%üg öbaAcyeodau nepi xujv 
iv epwxnaeu xau duoxpuaeu Aoywv.
2 Cf. von Arnim, op. cit. , p.78.
 ^ Cf. Zeller, op. cit., p.70; Kroll, op. cit., p.1081.
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encomiastic.^ And generally a very large number of elements in Stoic 
rhetoric had their origins in Aristotle’s scheme.
The early Stoics' positive interest in rhetoric is indicated
by the fact that Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus each wrote a techne on 
2rhetoric. Perhaps such handbooks could be useful to the person who
participated in public life; such usefulness is in keeping with the
Stoic principle that the individual should be conscious of his social
3responsibility and could be politically active. Rhetoric could also be 
a useful tool to defend the school against the attacks of other 
philosophical systems and criticism in general. In any case, Stoic 
rhetoric was put to practical use by Romans in the second half of the
4second century B.C.
The capacity of the Stoics for practical implementation and to 
adapt to circumstances possibly casts doubt on the argument^ that they 
were not concerned with actual use of their rhetoric and that they were 
simply conforming with the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, who wrote in 
terms of ideal citizens for an ideal world.
The Stoics very coherently incorporated rhetoric into their 
scheme, and they framed a definition and approach to rhetoric 
completely consistent with their teaching. In their comprehensive and 
thorough range of knowledge, rhetoric was the particular eTtuaxnyri xoö eft 
Aeyeuv.^ In accordance with Stoic dogmatism rhetoric was one of the
D.L. vii.42. moil xyv yev pnxopLMnv auxnv eftvau Aeyouou xpLyeprj* to  
yev yap auxns eftvau ouyßouAeuxl m o v, to  6e 6 LMavlmov, to 6e 
eyMwytaoTLMdv.
2 D.L. vii.4; vii.202.
Cic. de Fin. iv.7. ... scripsit artem rhetorioam Cleanthes3
Chrysippus etiam ...
3
Zeller, op. eit., p.320 foil.
4 See pp.145-151.
 ^ von Arnim, op. cit. , p.80.
Chrysippus, von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, i.292-294.
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dpETcn!.^ As Stoic values or virtues were absolute, only the wise man
2could be a true orator or rhetor. It is interesting that Quintilian,
although in no way a Stoic himself, upholds Cato's definition that
3ideally orator est vir bonus dicendi peritus. The Stoic concept that 
true rhetoric is synonymous with wisdom, and that the true orator is 
virtuous,goes back to the sophist ideal that rhetorical ability is
4integral to aocpux. It was naturally appropriate that the Stoics 
considered speaking well meant speaking the truth,^ and the prime 
function of the orator was to inform or instruct,^ and not as Cicero and 
Quintilian maintained 'to instruct, give pleasure and to stir emotions.'
7For Zeno rhetoric was to be sensu tincta, and it was a Stoic principle 
that correctness of speech should be synonymous with correctness of 
thought.^
The Stoics gave close attention to the dialectical aspects of 
rhetorical proof and in the atmosphere of scientific research and 
exactness of the third and second centuries B.C. strongly established an 
unembellished, pragmatic rhetoric that was widely used. Stoic rhetoric 
was in keeping with the doctrine of omddcLa which did not permit 
emotional appeal in oratory. Yet, in acknowledging the development and 
wide use of Stoic rhetoric it is important to keep in mind that 
emotional, persuasive rhetoric generally held sway. The Sophist
Cic. de Or. i.83. atque ipsam eloquentiam, quod ex bene dicendi 
soientia constaret3 unam quondam esse virtutem3 et qui unam virtutem 
haberet3 eum virtutes ornnes habere3 atque esse sapientem.
2 Cic. de Or. i.83. oratorem autem3 nisi qui sapiens esset.
Varro. Sat. Longe fug. ii(2), solus rex3 solus rhetor.
 ^ Quint, xii.1.1.
4 H. von Arnim, Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa, p.79.
5 Prolegg. ad Hermog. Rhet. Gr. vii.8,W. ol Etwlhol 6e xo e\5 Aeyeuv 
cAeyov xo dAri^ rj Aeyeuv.
6 Cf. Cic. de opt. gen. orat. 4; Brut. 185,198.
Quint, iii.5.16. ... debeat orator3 ut doceat3 moveat3 deleotet.
 ^ Quint, iv.2.117.
g
Quint, xii.10.5. ... recte sentire dicere.
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tradition, then, which was concerned with enchanting the soul 
(^ uyaytoyda) was to prevail.
The Stoics substantiated a division in rhetoric that was
initially introduced by Socrates, who emphasised that the teaching of
thought and rhetorical expression were separate.1 2*45 Aristotle proposed to
establish for rhetoric a dialectical foundation. Argument by proof is
the essential process, and the effective orator is to be skilled in2enthymemes and the use of examples. For Aristotle the proofs are 
indeed the only artistic aspects of rhetoric, while the rest of oratory 
is embellishment. There is a balance in his views on rhetoric; in the 
first book he outlines dialectical method (nept toO rcpdyyaxos) , and in 
the second (npos xdv öuxaoxdv) he gives due weight to a careful 
consideration of human character and emotions. Also, he acknowledges 
that language might be a means of conveying the orator's emotions and 
feelings to his audience (npos tov dxpoaxnv) .
4This division of language is laid down by Theophrastus who 
refers to the Aoyos npos xd updyyaxa as an uncoloured presentation of 
facts and the Aoyos npos xous dxpoioyevoos which is artistic, affective 
language. The division suggested by Socrates and then upheld by 
Aristotle and Theophrastus was the basis for the Stoic doctrine that 
rhetoric was to be pragmatic and to be the precise representation of 
thought. The Aoyos xpos xoc Tipdyyaxa of Theophrastus is embodied in the 
definition of correct language given by Diogenes Laertius'1 — ouvxoyda 6d 
eoxL Ad£us aura xd dvayxaua nepuexouoa Tipos 6nAuouv too npayyaxos. 
Language that was closely identified with matter was established as a
1 G.L. Hendrickson, 'The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Character of 
Style', American Journal of Philology , Vol. xxvi, 3, 1905, p.249.
2 Aristotle, Rhetorica I, 1355a, 3-14.
5 1554a, 13.
4 Ammonius,  In Aristotelis De Interpretation Com. (ed. Berol, 1887), 
pp.65,31. Auxhs ydp o u o n s  xhs  toO Aoyou aydaew s»  x ad a  dowpLoev 6 
cpuAooocpos ö e d c p p a a x o s , x h s  xe npos  xous  a x p o w y d v o u s , o£s  x a i  on y ad v eu  
xu ,  xau i n s  xpos  xa Ttpayyaxa,  unep wv 6 Adywv u eh a au  Ttpoxd-dexau xous  
dx potoydvous» xepu yev xpv ay d a u v  auxoh  xpv Tipos xous  a x p o a x d s  
x a x a y d v o v x a i  TiotnxLxfi xao p nxopuxh .
5 vii.59.
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Stoic principle; the tradition was maintained till Augustine^" who 
argued that communication should be secundum id quod significat, a 
requirement that can be equated with Theophrastus' Aoyog upog xa 
Tipayyara.
The Stoics in stressing facts as the basis for argument 
developed a correspondingly appropriate style that was primarily
concerned with utility. The Stoic style, according to Diogenes
2 , 3Laertius, embodied five principal qualities: cAArivuoydg, which
requires the use of correct grammar and the avoidance of vulgar
colloquialisms; lucidity which enables ready understanding; economy of
language; appropriateness; and a certain distinctiveness. The early
4Stoics also made an issue of the avoidance of barbarisms and solecisms; 
their teaching on such faults of language was taken up generally by 
grammatici and rhetores, and particular emphasis was placed on avoiding 
them by Quintilian.^
It is not easy to describe the historical development of Stoic 
rhetoric from the early Stoics to the time of Cicero. Yet, with Cicero 
there is a mass of information that testifies to the established use of 
a Stoic style in Rome from the time of the Scipionic circle; to the 
strong Stoic influences on Hermagoras, who was the most significant 
figure in rhetoric since Aristotle; and to the close relationship 
between Stoicism and the plain style of rhetoric. The Stoic style of 
rhetoric as described by Diogenes is incorporated in the plain style of 
rhetoric so frequently referred to by Cicero and Quintilian. There were 
three styles of rhetoric in Rome, first mentioned in the Auctor ad
1 de Dial. 7.
2 vii.59. cAAnvcoydg ... aacpnveua ... ouvxoyda ... itpcTtov ... 
xaiaaxeun.
3 I.e. Latinitas for Roman writers. Cf. Auctor ad Herennium, iv.12.17. 
Latinitas est quae sermonem purum conservat> ab orrrni vitio remotum. 
Vitia in sermone quo minus is Latinus sit duo possunt esse 
soloecismus et barbarismus.
Ibid. 6 6c ßapßapcoydg ex xwv xaxuwv Ae£cg cotl Ttapa to e-dog iwv 
eu6oxLyouvTU)V 'EAAnvcov, ooAocxuayog 6e coil Adyog axaiaAAnAajg 
auvTexayyevog.
 ^ See above, Chapter III, pp.69-71.
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Herennium1 as the gravis, the mediocris and the extenuata. The ’grand'
style was an exuberant, embellished rhetoric; the 'middle' style might
be described as a 'somewhat impassioned specimen of argumentation',
while the 'simple' style used an everyday, conversational speech. The
Stoic style can be closely related to and identified with the last-
mentioned plain or simple style. The zealous efforts of the Stoics with
2regard to rhetoric were responsible for the way in which the plain 
style developed and was established in Rome as one of the three styles. 
The plain style is often referred to by Cicero who in describing 
generally the functions of the three styles points out that at times it 
is appropriate to use this pragmatic, objective approach. At various 
times the orator may effectively use any of the three styles; and 
although he himself is mainly an exponent of the full style, there is a
3place for all three styles in oratory. However, Cicero himself 
deplores oratory which is absolutely meagre and dialectical in the Stoic
4manner. In the Orator Cicero provides a description of the plain style, 
accurately setting out its Stoic qualities also not altogether 
inconsistent with the Attic style which was in evidence in the first 
century B.C. Such a style was restrained^ and used everyday language.^
7It was to be pure Latin, simple and clear. It should also be fitting
g
and appropriate. In short, the qualities upheld are similar to those
9principles laid down by Theophrastus and Diogenes Laertius.
iv.8.11. foil.
Quint, iii.1.14. atque hinc (i.e. after Isocrates) vet studiosius 
philosophi quam rhetores, praecipueque Stoicorum ao Peripateticorum 
principes.
de Or. iii.177. Itaque turn graves swnus; turn subtiles, tum medium 
quiddam tenemus: sic institutam nostram sententiam sequitur
orationis genus, ... Cf. also de Or. iii.212.
Cic. Brut. 118. 
reperiantur.
idem (i.e. the Stoics) ad dicendum inopes
Or. 76.
Or. 76. Summissus est et humilis, coyisuetudinem imitans.
Or. 79. Sermo purus erit et Latinus, dilucide planeque dicetur ... 
Ibid. ... quid deceat circumspicietur.
Ibid. Unum aberit quod quartum numerat Theophrastus in orationis 
laudibus.
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The three rhetorical styles were associated with the three
functions of the orator. These three functions were 'to instruct, give
pleasure and sway emotions'. Both Cicero and Quintilian agree fully
with these aims, although the terms used are not always identical, but
rather synonymous.1 2*5 The plain style was appropriate for instructing,
2the grand style for moving, and the middle style for charming. As the 
plain style was the type of rhetoric supported and developed by the 
Stoics, it was appropriate that this style should make considerable use 
of Stoic dialectical methods of reasoning.
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE PLAIN 
STYLE AND STOIC DIALECTIC
There is strong evidence from the use of certain terms that
the plain style was closely associated with dialectic. The basic terms
are subtilis and disputare; and there are many instances in Cicero,
Quintilian and St. Augustine where these words are used to indicate a
dialectic approach. On one occasion virtually the same words appear
3together — subtiliter disputandi ad docendum" — to express the idea of 
dialectic argument.
Quintilian-1 identifies subtilitas with dialectic when he 
maintains dialectica ... vires ipsa subtilitate consumet, and St. 
Augustine's^ definition is unequivocal: subtiliter disserere hoc est
1 Cic. Or. 69. Probare necessitatis est3 delectare suavitatis flectere 
victoriae.
Quint, iii.5.16. ... debeat orator, ut doceat, moveat3 delectet.
Cic. Brut. 185. ut doceatur is apud quern dicetur ut delectetur3 ut 
moveatur vehementius.
2 Cic. Or. 69. Sed quot officia oratoris tot sunt genera dicendi: 
subtile in probando3 modicum in delectando3 vehemens in flectendo.
Quint, xii.59. Quorum, tarnen ea fere ratio est3 ut primum docendi 
(i.e. L o y v d v ), secundum (i.e. öcöpdv), tertium illud (i.e. d v d n p o v ), 
utrocumque est nomine, delectandi sives ut alii dicunt3 conciliandi 
praestare videatuv officium.
 ^ Cic. Brut. 89.
 ^ xii.2.13.
5 Contra Cresconium Donatistam 14.17.
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dialectiae. Sübtilis also is a term which means the plain style in 
oratory; Cicero^ refers to the plain style as subtile in probando and 
Quintilian presents a definition of this style as the unum subtile3 
quod lgxvov vocant ... prinrum officium (ratio) docendi ... in docendo 
autem acumen.
3
Disputare is associated with the Stoics and has the meaning
4of ’to prove by dialectic'. Quintilian describes dialectic as 
disputatrix virtus and Cicero'’ refers to the disputandi ratio et 
loquendi dialecticorum. There is a very close connection between 
disputare, subtilis, dialectice and the plain style;^ such a style 
clearly drew from Stoic principles and Stoic dialectic contributed to 
its effective use.
USE OF THE STOIC RHETORICAL STYLE BY 
PARTICULAR ROMAN ORATORS
There is firm evidence to indicate that in Rome the Stoic
rhetorical style regularly had a significant number of adherents.
Cicero often refers collectively to those orators who employed the plain,
7dry, unembellished style; more often than not he deplores close 
adherence to such a style and very often emphasises its shortcomings as 
he sees them. The fact that the users of the Stoic style are referred 
to as a particular body of people or orators, clearly proves that there
Cic. Or. 69.
2 xii.58-59. Cf. also Itaque illo subtili praecipue ratio narrandi 
probandique consistet . ..
3 Cic. Brut. 118. omnes fere Stoici prudentissimi in disserendo sunty 
et id arte faciunt suntque architecti paene verborum; eidem traducti 
a disputando ad dicendum inopes reperiuntur.
4 ii.21.73.
5 Or. 113.
 ^ Cf. Quint, ii.21.13, where dialectic is defined as oratio concisa.
 ^ Or. v.20. — quod ipsum alii aspera} tristi3 horrida oratione neque 
perfecta atque conclusa consecuti sunt.
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were a considerable number active in Cicero's own lifetime, and no
doubt many orators who were regarded as Atticists were also Stoics. At
the time when Tacitus wrote his Dialogus in about 85 A.D., there was a
class of orators who used the same style; Tacitus describes this style
as concise and succinct, employing processes of argument and as
dialectical. At the very end of the first century Quintilian indicates
that at that time there was a considerable number of orators who
regarded the function of rhetoric as to instruct, although the majority
3aimed at winning over their audience by emotional appeal. Such 
references from Cicero, Tacitus and Quintilian testify to the style used 
by an established class of orator.
The first instance of the use of the Stoic rhetorical style in 
Rome is the manner of speech of Diogenes of Babylon who with Critolaus, 
the Peripatetic, and Carneades, the Academic, was the Stoic member of 
the embassy of Greek philosophers that visited Rome in 155 B.C. The 
modesta ... et sobria> manner of Diogenes' speech was suited to his use 
of dialectic; Diogenes according to Cicero^ was concerned with testing 
the truth of an argument, and distinguishing truth from error; his 
style then was the genus subtile as it came to be termed in Latin, 
although he himself of course spoke in Greek and used an interpreter.
It is difficult to determine the influence exerted in Rome by the three
Brut. 118. Quam hoc idem in nostris contingere intellego quod in 
Graecis, ut ornnes fere Stoici prudentissimi in disserendo sint et id 
arte faciant sintque architecti paene verborum, ...
2
Dialogus. 31. Sunt apud quos adstrictum et collection et singula 
statim argumenta concludens dicendi genus plus fidei meretur: apud
hos dedisse operam dialecticae proficiet.
3 Quint, v. Proem. Fuerunt et clari quidem auctores, quibus solum 
videretur oratoris officium docere; ... plures uero (i.e. opponents 
of the 'instructional' style), qui nec ab illis sine dubio partibus 
rationem orandi summoverent, hoc tarnen proprium atque praecipuum 
crederent opus, sua confirmare et quae ex adverso proponerentur 
refutare.
4 A. Gell, vi.14.
 ^ de Or. ii. 157. ... videsne Diogenem eum fuisse, quidiceret artem se
tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa diiudicandi, quam verbo 
Graeco 6i,aAe>rruxnv appellaret.
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philosophers, although their immediate impact was very forceful.
Diogenes was an authority on Stoic rhetorical style and the definition 
of eAAnvuayos and concise speech set out in Diogenes Laertius' life of 
Zeno is taken from him. Although it is difficult to assess the direct 
influence of Diogenes of Babylon in Rome, his pupil Panaetius was the 
central figure of Roman middle Stoicism and was no doubt responsible for 
introducing to Rome much of Diogenes' teaching. From the time of the 
Scipionic circle until the period of the Atticists, who were opponents 
of Cicero, there was a series of orators who in varying degrees, but 
positively, used a style in keeping with principles set down by Diogenes 
of Babylon. Just as the teachings of Crates were furthered in Rome by 
Panaetius, it would appear that Diogenes' principles were indirectly 
taught in the same way.
C. Laelius was one Roman Stoic who was both a student of 
2Diogenes and Panaetius, although his style was less strongly Stoic than
some of the people who appeared after him. It is indicated that he used
3a plain style that could be described as quiet and elegant. On the 
other hand, Spurius Memmius, a fellow member of the Scipionic circle
4used a strongly Stoic, unembellished style. C. Fannius, son-in-law of 
Laelius, was a Stoic and had been a student of Panaetius.'’ Cicero 
suggests that he was not really eloquent, but would have spoken in a 
finished, restrained way.^ Publius Scaevola possessed Stoic qualities
7in speaking with wisdom and in being strong in argument.
* Cic. de Or. 155. itaque ... eos3 dum Romae essent3 ita se et ab 
aliis frequenter auditos.
Cf. A. Gell, iv.14. ... magno conventu hominum dissertaverunt.
2 Cic. de Fin. ii.8.24. ille (Laelius) qui Diogenem Stoioum
adulescens} post autem pxnaetium auaiverat.
3 Cic. de Or. iii.7.28. lenitatem Laelius habuit.
 ^ Cic. Brut. 94. Sp. nihilo omatior3 sed tarnen astrictior; fuit enim 
doctus ex disoiplina Stoicorum.
 ^ Brut. 101. is tarnen instituto Laeli Panaetium audiverat.
 ^ Ibid. Eius orrmis in dicendo facultas historia ipsius non ineleganter 
scripta perspici potest3 quae neque nimis est in fans neque perfecte 
diserta.
 ^ Brut. 108. P. Scaevola valde prudenter et acute.
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Publius Rutilius was a Stoic orator, who lived until the early
part of the first century B.C. He was a learned jurist and had been a
student of Panaetius.^ His oratory was markedly Stoic in style; it was
2serious, bare and even sombre. It conformed to Stoic requirements in
3being systematic, incisive and plain. Although Cicero maintains that 
Rutilius' type of oratory is not really effective for winning over a 
popular audience, he acknowledges Rutilius' qualities as an orator and 
that the Stoic style of oratory had some significant standing in Roman 
public life.^
Quintus Aelius Tubero was a Stoic and contemporary of Rutilius; 
his language was blunt to the point of being harsh and uncultivated, and 
virtually prevented him from advancing his career in public life.'* 
However, he ultimately attained the consulship in 118 B.C. He was 
devoted to the study of philosophy, and his own life was an embodiment 
of Stoic values.^* He was honoured by Panaetius, Posidonius and Hecato,
7all of whom addressed treatises to him.
Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the jurist and pontifex maximus, 
epitomised Stoic rhetorical principles in various ways. He was 
especially strong in exact, dialectical argument as was necessary for
g
his function as a jurisconsult; accordingly his style had a brevity
Cic. Brut. 114. ... multa praeclara de iure ... Panaeti auditor3
prope perfectus in Stoicis.
2 Cic, Brut. 113,114. tristi et severo genere dicendi ... orationes 
ieiunae.
3
Ibid, quorum peracutum et artis plenum orationis genus scis tarnen 
esse exile neo satis populari3 assensioni accommodation.
4 Cic. Brut. 116. ... ne haec quidern in civitate genera hac oratoria
laude caruerunt.
 ^ Cic. Brut. 117. ... durus3 incultus, horridus; itaque honoribus
maiorum respondere non potuit.
6 Cic. de Or. iii.23.87; Brut. 117.
 ^ Cic. de Fin. iv.9.23; de Off. iii.15.63.
g
Cic. Brut. 145. ... peracutus ... ad excogitandum quid in iure aut
in aequo verum aut esset aut non esset ...
149
and aptness for the matter under consideration.1 He had a particular
talent for nullifying an opponent’s strategies of embellishment and
flamboyant representation. In the Brutus Cicero compares and contrasts
Scaevola and Crassus, where Crassus of course is the type of orator
taken by Cicero as a model for himself. Scaevola pleaded the case of
his fellow Stoic P. Rutilius Rufus in 92 B.C., when the equites
prosecuted Rutilius for the steps taken by him to restrict the
activities of the publicani in declaring certain contracts invalid.
Scaevola's defence of Rutilius was expressed in a style that was
3 4straightforward, plain and unembellished," yet elegant.
Servius Sulpicius Rufus, a contemporary of Cicero, and consul
in 51 B.C., was an expert in the use of dialectic;"’ he concentrated on
civil law and is highly respected and commended by Cicero for a number
of qualities.^ Sulpicius Rufus’ style is not clearly described, but he
is represented as differing from Cicero, just as Scaevola's style
differed from Crassus'. He was a student of L. Lucilius Balbus, who was
7a firm Stoic and a teacher of dialectic. However, it is not certain 
whether Sulpicius himself was a Stoic.
g
The style of Cato, it would appear, had a certain duality.
As a dedicated Stoic he might use a plain style embodying dialectical
Ibid. ... turn verbis erat ad remi cum surma brevitate mirabiliter 
aptus.
Cic. Brut. 146. in augendo, in ornando3 in refellendo magis 
existimator metuendus quam admirandus orator.
Cic. de Or. i.53.229. dixit causam illam quadam ex parte Q. Mucius} 
more suos nullo adparatu3 pure et dilucide.
Cic. Brut. 148. Scaevola parcorum elegantissimus.
Cic. Brut. 153. Hie enim attulit hanc artem omnium artium maximam 
quasi lucem ad ea quae confuse ab aliis aut respondebantur aut 
agebantur.
Cic. Brut. 153. As well as a knowledge of dialectic Sulpicius had 
loquendi elegantia and litterarum scientia.
Cic. Brut. 154. Cumque discendi causa duobus peritissimis operam 
dedisset, L. Lucilio Balbo et C. Aquilio Gallo.
See above, Chapter IV, pp.94-98, for the standing of Cato as a 
Stoic in Latin literature.
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methods.^ And in his speeches he often spoke on such Stoic qualities as
2self-control, virtue and courage. On the other hand, he was quite
3capable of using oratorio, omamenta if he considered the occasion 
appropriate. Consequently he did not always restrict his oratory to a 
plain style; and his oratory and eloquence are highly commended by 
Cicero.
4 5Gaius Sicinius and Titus Accius are described by Cicero as 
being trained in the principles developed by Hermagoras, the strongly 
influential rhetorician of the second century B.C. Sicinius and Accius 
used an oratory very much in keeping with the Stoic style; for 
Hermagoras himself although not a philosopher adapted much of Stoic 
rhetoric in his theories and teaching. The style of Sicinius and Accius 
was meagre, carefully developed in accordance with the inventio of the 
speech and painstaking.
Aelius Stilo, a professed Stoic, has a somewhat enigmatic role 
in regard to rhetoric. He himself was not an orator, but as mentioned^ 
he prepared speeches for others to deliver. Cicero has firm praise for
7Aelius, probably as a grammaticus, but refers to these speeches in a
g
somewhat derogatory manner. It is very likely that they were written 
in the Stoic plain style, although there is no absolute evidence to 
confirm this.
* Cic. Par. Pro. 2. Cato perfectus ... Stoicus3 in ea est haeresi3 
quae nullum sequitur florem orationis neque dilatat argumentum; sed 
minutis interrogatiunculis3 quasi punctis3 quod proposuit efficit.
2 Cic. Par. Pro. 3. Cato dumtaxat de magnitudine animi3 de morte3 de 





 ^ See Chapter V.
7
Ibid. Scribebat tarnen orationes3 quas alii dicerent3 ut Q. Metello 
... f.3 ut Q. Pompeio Rufo3 quamquam is etiam ipse scripsit eas3 
quibus pro se est usus sed non sine Aelio.
g
Brut. 205. ... vir egregius ... eruditissimus et Graecis litteris et
Latinis.
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We have now looked at the concept and content of Stoic 
rhetoric; and also its association with the 'plain' style of oratory. 
In addition, a number of people, who were either Stoics or who 
incorporated Stoic rhetorical elements in their own oratory, have been 
identified. It is now appropriate to comment on the various ways Stoic 
rhetoric was taught.
THE TEACHING OF STOIC RHETORIC
It is possible to relate Stoic rhetoric to teaching processes 
principally in three ways. For the rhetor Latinus may teach something 
of the plain style; a philosophical school may teach its own respective 
style of rhetoric; and an aspiring orator may wish to receive training 
in dialectic to develop effectiveness in argument.
Whereas the teaching of the grccmmaticus followed a relatively
established pattern in his treatment of the methodice and historice, the
methods of the rhetor involved wider variation. Suetonius* even claims
that each teacher trained his pupils differently; such variation might
include composition of narratives, explanation of fine speeches,
translation from Greek models, speeches praising or condemning
2individual people. Apart from such differences in methods it would be
important for the rhetor to teach more than one oratorical style. Both
Cicero and Quintilian emphasise the need for an orator to use, as
3required, either the grand, middle or plain style. This means that the 
competent rhetor should equip his students to use each style to some 
effect. Training in use of the plain style would, either consciously or 
unconsciously, draw from Stoic teaching, for as argued above the plain 
style is virtually equivalent to Stoic rhetoric. The rhetor who 
provided a comprehensive training programme would teach something of 
Stoic rhetorical plain style.
Suet, de rhet. 1. Sed ratio docendi nec una omnibus, nec singulis 
eadem semper fuits quando vario modo quisque discipulos exercuerunt.
2 Ibid.
3 Quint, xi.1.4 quoting Cic. de Or. iii.55.20. non omni causae neque 
auditori neque personae neque tempori congruere orationis unum genus.
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Stoic rhetoric was naturally taught by the sect itself. Many 
Roman Stoics who used oratory would have been influenced and trained by 
Stoics within the philosophical school. It is evident that Stoic 
orators would have learned their particular rhetoric from Stoic 
philosophical teachers, rather than from rhetorical schools; and no 
doubt this was especially the case with those orators mentioned above 
who lived in the strongly Stoic spirit of the latter half of the second 
century B.C. Also, in the time of Quintilian the philosophical schools 
and Stoicism, in particular, were making a contribution to oratory 
beyond that provided by the rhetores. * In Rome there was always a type 
of orator trained by the philosopher, although the significant majority 
had been taught in the rhetorical schools. However, the ideal 
championed by Cicero and Quintilian that the very proficient and best 
orator should be fully trained in rhetoric with the background of a 
philosophical education was pursued by very few.
Those orators who wished to develop their skill in precise and
exact argument could benefit from training in dialectic, a study which
became the domain of the Stoics. Although Cicero and Quintilian
questioned the dialectical method when used as the predominant technique
in rhetoric, they both acknowledged its value with certain audiences and
2when the occasion required close argumentation. The rhetor may have
taught something of dialectic, but, if so, his teaching appears to have
been very slight, for there is no evidence of such teaching in the
rhetorical schools. However, there were teachers, termed dialectici,
who concentrated on the teaching of dialectic. Cicero was taught
3dialectic by Diodotus, who lived in Cicero's home. Another teacher of
Quint, x.1.35. A philosophorum vero lectione ut essent multa nobis 
petenda3 vitio faction est oratorum3 qui quidem illis optima sui 
operis parte cesserunt.
Quint, xii.21.25. Stoici3 sicut copiam nitoremque eloquentiae fere 
praeceptoribus suis defwisse concedant necesse est3 ita nullos aut 
probare acrius aut concludere subtilius contendunt.
Cf. Quint, v.14.28. Namque in illis (i.e. dialectical type 
arguments) docti et inter doctos verum quaerentes minutius et 
scrupulosius scrutantur omnia.
Brut. 309. A quo (i.e. Diodotus) cum in aliis rebus turn 
studiosissime in dialectica exercebar.
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dialectic was L. Lucilius Balbus,1 who as mentioned was a teacher of S.
Sulpicius Rufus. There was a tradition maintained in varying degrees by
student orators to call in the assistance of logicians or dialecticians
2to teach them the theory of argument. It was an aspect of education 
which may not have been pursued by students generally, but was useful to 
the conscientious orator who wished to strengthen his techniques in 
logic and argument. Dialectic as one of the liberal arts subjects and 
its significance in the educational programme is discussed in Chapter VII.
The preceding discussion in this chapter has been concerned 
with Stoic rhetoric and its comparatively direct use by certain Roman 
orators. The comment has been straightforward, although it is important 
to keep in mind that, notwithstanding the clearly evident use of Stoic 
rhetoric in Rome, most orators used the grand or middle style of 
rhetoric. However, there were Stoic elements in oratorical techniques 
outside the actual domain of Stoic rhetoric. Such Stoic influences, 
requiring somewhat more subtle analysis, can be identified in the 
various types of progymnasmata, or rhetorical exercises given to 
students, as well as in such aspects of oratory as the inventio and 
status techniques. The second section of this chapter is concerned with 
analysing these Stoic influences.
II. STOIC INFLUENCES IN ORATORICAL TECHNIQUES
The key figure in the development and teaching of rhetoric
after Aristotle was Hermagoras of Temnos, who in the middle of the
second century B.C. put forward his ideas on oratorical technique.
3Hermagoras' theories were very much based on Stoic principles, although 
he himself was not a philosopher. The Auotor ad Herennium and Cicero, 
especially in de Inventions, included much of Hermagoras' thought in
Cf. Arnold, op. cit. , p.385.
Quint, ii.4.41. His fere veteres facultatem dicendi exercuerunt 
as sumpta tarnen a dialectieis argumentandi ratione.
Cf. H.M. Hubbell, Introduction to Loeb edition of Cicero, De 
Inventione, p.ix; von Arnim, op. cit., p.92; cf. Striller, De 
Stoicorum Studiis Rhetoricis, p.18 foil.; Radermacher, Pauly-Wissowa, 
Vol. 8, I, p.694; W. Kroll, op. cit., p.1090; G.L. Hendrickson, op. 
cit. , p .258.
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their teaching. And rhetores and grammatici in their teaching of
various progymnasmata followed procedures evolved from the methods of
Hermagoras. Through Hermagoras Stoic rhetoric exerted an indirect
influence on the teaching of Roman oratory. The strength of Hermagoras’
position is clearly indicated by the fact that he was the leader of a
particular school whose members were termed H e r m a g o r e i and according
to Quintilian it is evident that followers of Hermagoras were active
2after his life time.
Hermagoras' doctrine of invention was based on dialectical
aspects of rhetorical proof, inaugurated originally by Aristotle and
then minutely systematised, elaborated and formulated by the Stoic 
3logicians.' The attempts by Hermagoras to apply to aspects of rhetoric 
analytical arguments and proofs reflect the importance given to 
scientific method and the strong position of Stoicism in the latter part 
of the second century B.C. Hermagoras divided tioAltukoc cnxnyaxot into 
deaets and uitodeaecs.^ Oeoecs were general philosophical questions, 
which were discussed as a form of progymnasmata in the rhetorical 
schools; the treatment of a 'thesis' was basically an abstract 
argument, where a subject was considered without particular references 
to people or occasions.^ 'Yuo^eaeus (or causae) related to particular 
people and circumstances; questions were to be resolved whether the 
action under consideration was just or not, honourable or harmful.^
 ^ Quint, vii.4.4. Hanc partem Hermagorei Max’ dvxuAn(Kv*
2 Quint, iii.1.16. Fecit deinde velut propriam Hermagoras viam3 quam
plurimi sunt secuti.
3 G.L. Hendrickson, op. cit., p.258.
4 Cic. de Inv. i.6.8. ... qui oratoris materiam in causam (i.e.
UTio^eacLs) et in quaestionem (i.e. Oeaets) dividet.
 ^ Cic. Or. xiv.46. haec igitur quaestio a propriis personis et
temporibus ad universi generis orationem traducta appellatur deaus.
The phrase tioAlxlhcx Cnrnyaxa can be regarded as being of Stoic 
origin. Chrysippus was concerned with thirty-nine Cnxnyaxa or 
subjects for investigation (D.L. vii.198). HoAlxlhci could have a 
strongly Stoic significance; it may mean relating to the cosmos or 
universe, or may have a generally comprehensive meaning of 'popular'. 
IIoALXLHa Cnxnyaxa means, then, 'universal questions to be 
investigated'. Cf. G. Thiele, Hermagoras, p.25 foil.
 ^ von Arnim, op. cit., p.93.
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There had been some treatment of philosophical 'theses' a
considerable time before Hermagoras. Aristotle had defined the
'thesis',* and had mentioned that nearly all dialectical problems were 
2termed deoeus. Yet Hermagoras was the person who established their use
in rhetorical schools from the second century B.C. In so doing, in a
practical way he was anticipating the educational ideal propounded by
Cicero and later by Quintilian that the accomplished orator should have
training in and an awareness of philosophy. There are a considerable
number of specific examples of decrees in Cicero and Quintilian, and some
of these are actually related to Hermagoras. The subjects of these
'theses' are drawn from various philosophical schools; yet Stoic
'theses' are suggested as often as examples from other systems. It is
apparent that through this kind of exercise the student of rhetoric
learned something of Stoic thought. Questions asked by the Stoics were
3
implicit in such 'theses' as: 'Is the world governed by providence?'
4'Should the wise man be active in politics?' 'Can a man be completely
wise?'3 'Is virtue itself the goal?'3 'Does justice exist in nature or
7 8is it a convention?' 'Is virtue inherent or learned?' And 'theses'
taken directly from Hermagoras, which were also issues taken up by the
9
Stoics, included: 'Can the senses be trusted?' 'What is the shape of
the world?' 'How large is the sun?'
* Topica i.ll. öeous earuv U7idAr)(|>Ls Ttapdöo^os iwv yvoopupcov xuvos Kara 
(puAoaocptav xuva.
2 Bonner, op. cit. , p.2.
3 Quint, iii.5.6; v.7.35; vii.2.2; xii.2.21.
 ^ Cic. Top. 21.82; de Or. iii.29.112. Cf. Quint, iii.5.6.
5 Cic. Part. Or. 18.64.
3 Quint. iii.5.12.
 ^ Cic. Part. Or. xviii.62.
g
Part Or. xviii.64; Top. xxi.82.
9 Cic. de Inv. i.6.8.
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It has been suggested^ that the rhetorical 'thesis' is based
on the Stoic concept of TiepdaxciGus. Hermagoras framed his ddoeus or
general questions on the itepuGxaaus which indicates everyday, human
situations. He used a nepdoxaGcs concept to translate the concrete,
particular uTtodeoeus into deaeos. An example of the hypothesis-thesis
issue is whether Orestes should be punished for killing Clytemnestra,
argued as a general question regarding the killing of a mother by a 
2son. Unfortunately Hermagoras has not provided rules or formulae for
the practical treatment of $doeus. It is likely that a teaching
technique of Hermagoras was for pupils to formulate a 'thesis' from the
4'hypothesis' and then to discuss the general issue.
From the 'thesis' developed the suasoria, which could refer 
to a certain historical event or character.^ The suasoria and 
oontroversia, which was a declamatory exercise concerned with a 
particular legal issue, became established as progymnasmata; although 
the 'thesis' itself was still retained as a school exercise.^ It is 
interesting that Cato figures strongly in examples of suasoriae. And, 
as late as Martianus Capella there was a suasoria involving him:
7
Deliberat Cato an se debeat ne victorem aspiciat Caesarem trucidare. 
Implicit in this suasoria is the Stoic issue whether suicide can be an 
acceptable measure — as mentioned, a matter about which the Stoics had 
clearly developed arguments. Suasoriae were usually based on subjects 
taken from Greek and Roman history; they were exercises which gave 
training in deliberative oratory, where an audience or individual may 
need to be convinced about alternative types of action. The suasoria 
has a rhetorical background in the Aoyos xpoxpexxLxds and Aoyos
 ^ Kroll, op. cit. , p.1095; cf. D.L. vii.109 for reference to xadnxovxa
TTcpuaxctaews.
2 See Quint, x.1.6 foil, for the general legal significance.
 ^ Cic. de Or. ii.19.78; de Or. iii.28.110.
 ^ Kroll, op. cit., p.1096.
 ^ See Quint, iii.10.5 foil.
 ^ See Bonner, op. cit., p.6 foil.
7 Halm, Rhetores Latini minores, p.456.1.30.
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aTioxpenTLKos of Aristotle who repeatedly mentions these procedures in
his treatment of deliberative oratory;1 in fact, Aristotle and
Theophrastus wrote books on Sdaeus, which were used for a combined
2rhetorical and philosophical training.
The controversia, being concerned with the legal point at
issue, was an exercise for forensic oratory; it corresponded closely to
the utioSegls of Hermagoras. Very often problems of moral philosophy
were involved in controversiae, and naturally such problems could
include questions taken up by the Stoics. Two such questions are, ’Is
3an oath given under duress inviolable?' and 'Is a person liable to be
4accused of ingratitude, if he does not return a favour?' A Stoic 
question is suggested in the Controversial^* of Seneca when Cestius asks 
an dii immortales rerum humanarum cur am agant, which is elaborated upon 
by Albucius as a philosophical problem.
Chriae were moral essays where a pupil was required to write 
on some moral or philosophical problem. It might be noted that 
exercises in writing were regarded as essential exercises for oratory, 
and basically preliminary to rhetorical training.^ Such essays could 
relate to the teachings of the Stoics, as well as to the teachings of 
all philosophical schools. And a subject suggested by Quintilian refers
7to the Stoic Crates of Mallos. Chriae were taught in the usual manner 
of progymnasmata where the teacher provided the general scheme which was
g
to be the basis for the pupil's effort.
1 Rhetorica I, passim. Cf. Bonner, op. cit. , p.ll.
2 Theon, Progymn. c.2. Cf. Bonner, op. cit., p.5.
3 Cic. de Off. iii.107. Cf. Bonner, op. cit., p.7.
4 Cf. Seneca, de Ben., passim; cf. Bonner, op. cit., p.7.
 ^ i.3.8. Cf. Bonner, op. cit., p.8.
 ^ Quint, i.8.2.
 ^ i. 8.5. Crates, cum indoctum puerum vidissetpaedagogum eius 
percussit.
g
Quint, i.8.3. Sententiae quoque et chriae et ethologiae subiectis 
dictorum rationibus apud grammaticos scribantur, quia initium ex 
lectione ducunt.
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Sententiae were maxims or aphorisms, that were often subjects
for rhetorical treatment. Sententiae could be taken from various
philosophical systems; and Stoic thought is often apparent in such
sententiae. Some examples are: 'He is to be considered free who is not
a slave to any vice';* 'all rules for noble living should be based on
virtue, because virtue alone is within its own control, while everything
2else is subject to fortune'. It would appear that sententiae were
largely a Roman innovation in rhetoric, for they were not used at all by
3the Greeks according to Quintilian, who nevertheless recommends their 
occasional use in oratory and mentions the fact that Cicero also made 
use of them.
It is very important in considering Roman rhetoric and
especially forensic oratory, to pay attention to theories of status or
oidaebs. Hermagoras was responsible for elaborating upon basic types of
case, which he carefully systematised and defined. The otcxols was the
position or frame of reference of a case, set up as a result of the
respective statements of prosecutor and defendant. Archedemus,
rhetorician of the generation following Aristotle, had done work on
o tc j ol s , classifying two bases for a case, the status coniecturalis and 
. . 4status finitivus. But it was Hermagoras who, in using the methods and 
terminology of Stoic dialectic and the Stoic approach to classification 
and division,^ formulated the pattern of status to be upheld by Cicero 
and Quintilian and incorporated in Roman forensic oratory. Hermagoras 
maintained that there were four types of status.^  The constitutio 
coniecturalis (Gioxotoyos) posed the question whether the defendant in 
pleading innocence committed the crime or not. The constitutio
Auct. ad Her. iv.17.24. Sententia est oratio sumpta de vita quae aut 
quid sit aut quid esse oporteat in vita breviter ostendit hoc facto.
2 Ibid.
3 xii.10.48. Ceterum hoc quod vulgo sententias vocamus3 quod veteribus 
praecipueque Graecis in usu non fuit apud Ciceronem enim invenio.
 ^ Cf. Quint, iii.6.31 foil.
5 Pohlenz, op. cit., Vol. I, p.184.
 ^ See Cic. de Inv. i.10-19. Constitutio was a term used for otcxols, 
which was later replaced by status.
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definitive2 (opos) needed to be determined, if the defendant pleaded 
guilty, in regard to the precise nature of the crime. The constitutio 
iuridicialis or status generalis (uoudins) determined whether the 
defendant in committing the crime was justified in doing so. The status 
translativus (yexdAryKs) was a axdats particularly attributed to 
Hermagoras; it concerned the question whether the court by which he was 
summoned was competent to deal with the crime which the defendant 
admitted to committing. In accordance with the Stoic pattern there were 
further subdivisions of axdaeus. The Ttocoxns was virtually classified 
into status or quaestiones legales (axaoeus voyuxad).^ These were cases 
concerning the letter of the law in contrast to the spirit of the law, 
i.e. ex scripto et sententia (xaxd pnxov xau öudvouav); cases involving 
ambiguitas or ötycpußoAucx about which the Stoics were very much concerned 
in their logic; cases concerning aspects of the same law which were 
termed contrariae leges or dvxLVcuda. And then auAAoyuayos would be 
used for cases where careful reasoning was required if there was not 
full provision made by the law; the Stoic contribution to legal 
syllogism was considerable where Stoic dialectic was applied to Roman 
forensic oratory.
Syllogism was actually part of the dialectician's teaching.
Yet the rhetor might teach in his school those elements of dialectic 
that were particularly useful for proving or refuting arguments. Such 
elements were principally auAAoyuayos, evduynyaxa and euitxeepnyaxa, 
although these terms are closely identifiable with each other. It is 
appropriate to comment upon these aspects of dialectic as integral to 
the general teaching of the rhetor, while a fuller statement on 
dialectic is to be made in the following chapter. The rhetorical 
significance of the following discussion is emphasised by the fact that 
the evftuynyaxa and exuxecpnyaxa were actually rhetorical forms of the 
syllogism.
Cf. Bonner, op. cit., p.14. 
2 Cf. D.L. vii.62 foil.
3 I.e. Chapter VII, 'Stoicism and the Teaching of the Liberal Arts".
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It is possible to discuss at length syllogism and its function 
in dialectic, for much has been written on syllogistic proofs. But the 
basic procedure rests on the acceptance of a major premise, a minor 
premise and then the statement of the conclusion. A very simple 
example^ is:
If it is day, it is light. 
But it is day.




And, of course, there were considerable variations involving negative
2forms and the juxtaposition of true and false premises. Quintilian
points out that the orator might sometimes, although perhaps rarely,
3need to use a syllogistic proof. Cicero also pointed out the useful­
ness of the syllogism.^ Cicero writes in terms of five steps for 
syllogistic proof, where
(a) the major premise is given;
(b) elaboration and explanation of the major premise, with certain 
reasons, are provided;
(c) the minor premise is given;
(d) elaboration of and reasons for the minor premise are set out;
(e) a conclusion is reached.
It is very possible that the rhetorical adaptation of the syllogism was 
the work of Hermagoras.  ^ It is interesting that the syllogistic example 
given by Cicero is the proof of a Stoic argument that the universe is 
administered by design.^ Cicero goes on to give an actual example of
D.L. vii.76. " c c  ny ep a  c o i l, cpuis c oil* n ydpa  6 i tor u ’ <pu>s apa 
e o x L . "  Ahyya yev yap eaxu to "zL nye'pa e o t l, cpws eaib." TtpoaAn^S to 
" n y e p a  6c eaitv." euLcpopa 6e to "(pws a p a  e o t l."
See especially Benson Mates, Stoic Logic.
i.10.38. Nam et syllogismo, si res poscet3 utetur et certe 
enthymemate3 qui rhetoricus est Syllogismus.
de Im). i.34 foil.
See Note, H. Hubbell, p.104 Loeb edition De Inventione. 
de Inv. i.34.59. Consilio igitur rrnmdus administratur.
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syllogistic reasoning for forensic oratory to prove that 'Epaminondas in 
contributing to the safety of the state could not have failed to obey 
the laws.’1 And it has been shown that Cicero used the form of 
syllogistic argument recommended in his De Inventione in Pro Archia, 
18-19; Pro Caecina, 41-43; Pro Murena, 3-5; Pro Quinetio, 48-50; Pro 
Rabirio, 29-30; Pro Tullio, 41,42.2 34*
Epicheireme was the technical term given in rhetoric to this 
five-fold syllogistic argument. Enthymeme referred to the
rhetorical syllogism where only the major premise is probable; or
perhaps where one term is omitted. An enthymeme was really an
3 4incomplete syllogism. An example of the enthymeme is in Pro Ligario,
where a proposition is given together with a reason — 'At that point the
justice of the cause was doubtful since there was something to be said
on both sides;' then a proof is directly given without any other
premise — 'But now we can only regard that cause as superior, which even
the gods supported.' According to Quintilian^ the most effective type
of enthymeme seems to be where a reason is subjoined to a dissimilar
proposition, as in Demosthenes:^ 'Why should you go free in this
particular instance, although the man who committed this crime
previously was exonerated?
... For if you are condemned, no one else will propose anything of 
the kind ' (i.e. to be exonerated). Although the epicheireme was 
closely related to the enthymeme, the epicheireme appears to be a more 
precise development of argument. In fact the epicheireme has been 
defined as the syllogism,7 although the latter is based on facts while 
the epicheireme rests on statements. The form of the epicheireme and
1 de Inv. i.38.69.
2 Preiswerk, De inventione orationum Cioeronianarum (Basel, 1905), 
p.101; cf. Hubbell, op. oit. , p.114.
3 Quint, v.14.1. Ita est iVle imperfectus Syllogismus.
4 vi.19.
v.14. Optimum autem videtur enthymematis genus3 cum propositio 
dissimili vet contrario, ratio subiungitur.
 ^ In Androt. 7; In Aristocr. 99.
7 Quint, v.14.14. Epicheirema autem nutto differt a syllogismis.
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its close association with the syllogism strongly suggests that it 
developed under Stoic influence. More than one authority1 2*4has indicated 
this, but it is difficult to substantiate, especially in view of our 
incomplete knowledge of Hermagoras' contribution to ratiocinative 
forensic oratory. For my part, the close reasoning of the epicheireme 
is consistent with Stoic dialectic and this method of argument was no 
doubt supported and possibly fostered by the Stoics. On the other hand, 
it is difficult to imagine Stoic support for the enthymeme; they 
probably would have felt that such incomplete syllogisms were 
unacceptable for conclusive proof or refutation.
The form of rhetoric variously described as epideictic,
2encomiastic or demonstrative, included a pronounced philosophical
content, which can be evaluated from the Stoic viewpoint. Such oratory
was regarded as a form of display (culSclmilkov, demonstrativum) and was
concerned with firm praise of an individual person (eyMwyuaoxLMo'v) , or
conversely could be vituperative. The Stoics observed a division of
3oratory, which provided for the encomiastic; although they themselves
were not originally responsible for the traditional classification of
forensic, deliberative and epideictic oratory. Cicero often refers to
epideictic oratory, although naturally such rhetoric was not as
4 » ,important as forensic oratory. Yet the eyMcouuov was clearly an 
exercise included in itpoyuyvctoyaxa. And at times it was an important 
form of oratory, where a person's character needed to be assessed in a 
legal hearing; also, it was the appropriate style for particular 
occasions, funeral orations, etc. Cicero himself wrote an encomium on 
Cato,^ no doubt including many of the principles which he postulates in
1 Cf. Kroll, Pauly-Wissowa, Suppl. VII, p.1083; Prantl, Geschichte 
der Logik I, p.524; H. Caplan, Note p.107, Loeb edition; cf. Ad 
Herennium.
2 See Quint, iii.4.12-16 for comment on various terms for this type of 
oratory.
D.L. vii.42. moil xnv yev pnropLMnv auinv e£vau Acyouau xpyyeprj' t o  
yev yap auxhs e£vay a uy ßo uA eu xL Mo v , xo 6e ÖLMavundv, xo 6e
cyMojy uaox lkov .
4 Cic. de Or. ii.84.341.
Marrou, op. cit., p.273.
Top. xxiv.94.6
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De Inventione, De Oratore and in the Topica and which are completely 
consistent with Stoic values.
Honour (honestas or honestum) was an overriding consideration
of epideictic oratory,^ although a person’s life could be referred to in
all its aspects. Honour, as set out by this kind of oratory, involved a
range of qualities or apexau, which can be subsumed under the one
embracing quality, virtue. Cicero in De Inventione defines virtue for
the purpose of epideictic oratory in the Stoic manner — a habit of mind
2in harmony with reason and the order of nature. Cicero goes on to
'sub-categorise' virtue in accordance with definitions that are strongly
Stoic, but not always exclusive to that school of philosophy; virtue
3has four parts — wisdom, justice, courage, temperance. Each of these
4qualities is described and subdivided further, and are very much 
consistent with principles of Stoic teaching. Theon, the Stoic 
progymnasmatist, lists a large number of possible attributes to be set 
out in encomiastic oratory.^ In a comprehensive description the 
qualities of virtue he postulates are quite similar to those set out by 
Cicero. Theon puts forward wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, piety, 
a noble spirit and magnanimity as the desirable traits of character on 
which to base an encomium. It is clear that philosophy through the 
rhetoricians had a strong influence on the content of epideictic 
oratory, as indicated both by writers in antiquity and, also, by more 
than one scholar.^
It is evident, then, that Stoic ethical values are similar to 
those set down for epideictic oratory by rhetoricians; although it
* Cic. de Inv. ii.51.156. in demonstrative honestatem.
Top. xxiv.92. Laudationis (i.e. encomiastic speech) finis honestas.
2 de Inv. ii.52.59. Dean virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque 
rationi oonsentaneus.
3 Ibid. See above, Chapter IV, p.110 foil., for previous comment on 
Cicero's consideration of Stoic virtues.
 ^ de Inv. ii.53.160 foil.
Marrou, op. cit. , p.273 foil.; cf. Ehet. Gr. II, 109 (Theon).
Kroll, Pauly-Wissowa, Suppl. VII, p.1100.6
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would not be a justifiable claim that Stoic values were the only ones 
consciously included. The positive qualities of character upheld were 
not the preserve of only one philosophical school. But there is another 
important aspect to consider: in their suggestions for encomiastic
oratory Roman rhetoricians were setting out qualities of character that 
were understood and appreciated by contemporary Romans. It is certain 
that their students would have been in sympathy with and to a 
significant extent aspired to them as worthwhile values upheld by 
responsible, conscientious members of their society. The requirements 
of character emphasised in encomiastic oratory conclusively show that 
Stoic values were with strong Roman moral principles.
STOICISM AND DECLAMATION
In regard to Stoicism and the topic of rhetoric there is one
significant question that should be considered: Why during the first
century A.D. was declamation with its rather flamboyant artifices so
enthusiastically pursued, while at the same time Roman Stoicism also
enjoyed a high point of popularity? For the principles of both were
diametrically opposed. Declamation by the first century A.D. had
become an exercise, in which professors of rhetoric might take part to
gain publicity for their schools;^ where pupils themselves might be
2required to perform before their parents; where in social situations
successful men of standing would vie with each other in rhetorical 
3competition. The subjects for declamation in due course became 
extravagant and exaggerated, and quite sensational in regard to such 
issues as tyrannicide, rape and incest. The topics of declamation under 
the Empire are in marked contrast to the kind of declamation that 
interested Cicero who declaimed especially on philosophical questions in
4the company of friends. It is clear that Stoic rhetoric was very much 
apart from declamation as it came to be practised. For the purpose of
* Cf. Sen. Contr. vii. Praef. 1; Contr. iii. Praef. 16.
2 Cf. Persius iii.45; Quint, ii.7.1; x.10.21.
Cf. Bonner, op. cit. , p.40.
Cf. Tusc. iii.34.81; cf. Bonner, op. cit., p.30.4
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Stoic rhetoric was to reason strongly and present convincingly logical 
arguments while the intention of the declaimer was to please and win 
over his audience.* However, it is to be kept in mind that the Stoic 
contributions to oratory generally, as outlined throughout the second 
section of this chapter, still apply to techniques used in declamation.
Declamation was the type of training in oratory experienced by
pupils of the first century; and with all its faults in regard to
extravagance and artificiality it was upheld as effective by 
2Quintilian, who is ever aware of pragmatic usefulness in education.
Yet it must be noted that Quintilian, in being sensitive to the extreme
3treatment of declamation, does put in a plea for realism.
It was really due to the circumstances of the time that there
was no opportunity to use oratory in regard to momentous political
4issues; imperial rule had emasculated oratory. The political turmoil 
of the last century of the Republic inspired great oratory with Cicero 
as the outstanding protagonist. Peace and oppression under the Empire 
did not provide any such opportunities.
It is probable that, although declamation and Stoic philosophy 
are completely different pursuits, the reasons for the popularity of 
both exist in the social conditions of the time. Declamation for many 
Romans could be an intellectual game that also provided self-expression; 
as a pastime it could be a catharsis and compromise for those who might 
in a different age have gained fulfilment in political and public life. 
On the other hand, Stoicism under the Empire had a strongly religio- 
ethical emphasis that as much as at any other time in the history of the 
sect provided a guide to life in the social conditions of the age.
While declamation provided an outlet or release, Stoicism gave the 
individual spiritual support. It is interesting that Stoicism with its
Sen. Contr. ix.6.12, rrrulta autem dioo non quia mihi plaoent sed quia 
audientibus placitura sunt.
2 . . .  .x.5.4. Aliter enim atque enitescit velut pabulo laetiore facundia et
adsidua contentionum asperitate fatigata renovatur.
3 Ibid.
4
Tac. Dial. 38. ipsam quoque eloquentiam sicut omnia depacaverat.
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large number of adherents was independent of the way in which 
declamation developed. Also, Stoics who took part in the quiet day-to- 
day activities of imperial civil courts undoubtedly found appropriate 
use for their particular Stoic oratory. Although the first century was 
especially the age of declamation, there were, as mentioned, adherents 
of Stoic rhetoric during this period. So it is a reasonable conclusion 




STOICISM AND THE TEACHING 
OF THE LIBERAL ARTS
The general school curriculum that was termed the eyxumAlos 
Tiat6eLa or for Roman education the 'liberal arts' included a range of 
subjects that traditionally for the most part were grammar (literature 
and language), rhetoric, dialectic, astronomy, geometry, mathematics and 
music. Grammar and rhetoric have already been covered in previous 
chapters; so it is the aim in this chapter to treat Stoicism and the 
other subjects of the general educational programme. For such purposes 
it is important to comment upon the definition of the liberal arts (or 
eyhUhAlos nal6edot) ; to indicate briefly its historical development; to 
determine its importance for philosophy and for Stoicism in particular; 
to determine the attitudes of Romans to this curriculum; to decide to 
what extent Romans studied the subjects of the curriculum apart from 
literature and rhetoric; to assess the significance of the large number 
of handbooks in these subjects; to discuss the Stoics' use of these 
subjects and the Stoic contribution especially to dialectic, astronomy 
and geometry — with due regard to those studies which depended strongly 
on ra eyHUxAta yaSdyaia, namely geography, geodesy and meteorology.
THE £yhuhAlo£ rcauöeua, OR LIBERAL ARTS,
AS THE IDEAL SECONDARY CURRICULUM
It is difficult to determine precisely when the eyxuxALOS 
TtaLÖEca was implemented in Greek education as the desirable general 
curriculum. The earliest reference to it is in the life of Aristippus, 
as described by Diogenes Laertius; and the import of such a reference 
must be considered with reservation, for the biographer was not a 
contemporary of Aristippus. Diogenes quotes Aristippus as maintaining
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that those who went through the ordinary curriculum but did not
continue on to philosophy could be compared to Penelope's suitors, and
accordingly the efforts made were really futile. It was an educational2programme supported by both Plato and Isocrates, who felt that the
school curriculum should comprise mathematical as well as literary
studies. By the third century B.C. the education of Archesilaus clearly
embodied the eyxuxAcos Tiauöeca; the fact that the names of both the
teachers and the respective subjects are given suggests a pattern of
education experienced at the time by a number of students. Grammar was
taught by Eugamus,3 mathematics by Autolycus,4 geometry by Hipponicus,
6 7dialectic probably by the Eretrian school, music by Xanthus; andg
Archesilaus chose to study philosophy in preference to rhetoric,gMarrou cites a palimpsest of the late first century B.C. or early first 
century A.D. written by a Stoic with Cynic leanings who comprehensively 
indicates the subjects of the eyxdxAuos xciuöcua.  Later, Seneca writes 
on liberalia studia in a letter to Lucilius,^ where he upholds the 
value of philosophy at the expense of liberal studies. Seneca comments 
upon grammar, music, mathematics, geometry, astronomy. Quintilian,^ 
like Cicero before him, strongly argues for the subjects of the
D.L. ii.79. xous twv eyxuxAboov xacöeuydxwv yexaaxdvxas, cpuAoaocpuag 
6e axoAcbcp^cvxas oyouous eAeyev eivai xoug xhs nnvcAdxns yvnaxfipCL•




D.L. iv.33. ... xau xhs ScaAexxuxhs clxcxo xau xwv




St. Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, p.216.
^ Ep. lxxxviii.
* i.x.6. nunc de ceteris artibus, quibus instituendos, priusquam
rhetori tradantur3 pueros existimo3 stvictim subiungam3 ut efficiatur 
orbis ille doctrinae, quern Graeci cyxuxAuov xatdeuav vocant.
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eyxuxAuos uauöeLa, giving firm reasons for the study of each. Saint 
Augustine was responsible for passing on to the mediaeval world this 
basic educational curriculum together with philosophy.-^ The curriculum 
taught in antiquity was the basis for the later trivium of grammar, 
rhetoric, logic and quadrivium comprising mathematics, geometry, 
astronomy and music.
The eyxuxAuos TiauöeLa was a broad ideal educational programme
that was long-lasting and dated from about the fourth century B.C.
Although the respective subjects were taught by specialists, pupils in
2undertaking these studies concurrently would be receiving a general,
non-specialised education; this was a situation comparable to that in
present-day secondary schools. However, the school curriculum of
antiquity was in no way institutional. Pupils usually went to different
schools conducted by particular teachers, although it was quite possible
3that a teacher would provide education in more than one subject. While 
the eyxuxAuos uotoöeua theoretically represented a balanced curriculum, 
in actual fact pupils did not give equal attention to each subject. 
Pupils did not necessarily study every subject of the educational 
programme; in both Hellenistic and Roman society very firm priority was 
given to the grammatico-literary studies and to rhetoric.
Although the eyxdxAuos Ttauöeba was synonymous with the artes 
liberales Greek and Roman attitudes regarding mathematical studies or 
the subjects of the quadrivium varied considerably. The Romans in no 
way matched the Greeks' interest in and contribution to mathematical 
studies. Cicero indicates that Romans were little concerned with music
4and mathematics. Horace like Cicero reduced the significance of
Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, p.211.
Quint, i.10.2. Nam iisdem fere annis aliarum quoque disciplinarum 
studia ingredienda sunt.
Cf. M.L. Clarke, Higher Education in the Ancient World; it is 
pointed out that geometres might teach geometry, arithmetic, 
astronomy and music. Diodotus, tutor of Cicero, had a knowledge of 
music, as well as being a teacher of geometry and dialectic.
4 Tusc. i.3-5.
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mathematics to the practical needs of calculation."^ Whereas the Greeks
maintained a long-lasting interest in pure science, it was an exception
2for a Roman to be interested in mathematical theory. The great 
importance placed on a literary and rhetorical education overshadowed 
the position of scientific subjects; and this was even more marked in 
Roman education than in Greek.
HANDBOOKS ON SUBJECTS OF THE gymUxAlos wuSa'a
In acknowledging this situation there is to be kept in mind 
the widespread popularity of handbooks (x^ x^ ai,, artes) . These manuals 
were written on a vast range of subjects; there were textbooks entitled 
ars grammatica, ars rhetorical ars geometrica, ars musical The wide 
prevalence of these handbooks which often had mathematical sciences as 
their subjects suggests that a significant number of Romans wished to 
learn something of these disciplines. Although they did not hold a 
strong position in the school curriculum, they were still studied by 
some who were interested. Such handbooks, of course, did not contain 
original thought and were often compiled by authors barely competent in 
the respective subjects.'* And Roman editors were happy to adopt 
directly Greek types of compendia. Just as the Greek idyvn became ars 
in Latin, the Greek ecaaycoyn or ucpdynaus became introductio (elementary 
treatise); to differentiate from the more technical nature of the rdyvn 
the Greek handbook was often termed cyxclplölov, and the corresponding 
Latin term was manuale. ^
The existence of such textbooks, concerned both with the 
literary as well as the mathematical subjects of the eyxuxAuos TtauScLa,
* Hor., Ars Poet., 323 foil.
2 Cf. Gwynn, op. cit., p.90. References given are: de Off. i.19;
Brut. 175; de Sen. 49; ad Att. xiv.12.3.
3 Cf. Gwynn, op. cit., p.89; ad Her. iv.17; Quint. i.Praef. 23;
5.54; ii.17.2; iii.1.1.
4 W. Stahl, Roman Science, p.74.
 ^ Stahl, op. cit., p.13.
 ^ Stahl, op. cit., p.12.
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poses the question what their educational function was apart from their 
interest for the general reader. Answers are suggested in the following 
comments which mention the range of subjects studied for certain 
vocations; the significance of the liberal arts for Cicero's and 
Quintilian's training of the accomplished orator; and importantly for 
this study, the significance of the liberal arts as TtpoTmuSeuyaia for 
philosophy.
THE LIBERAL ARTS AS VOCATIONAL upoTmubeuyaxa
Vitruvius outlines the liberal arts together with other
subjects as being essential for the training of an architect. The
subjects given are literature, geometry, arithmetic, music, astronomy
and also drawing, optics, history, medicine, law, philosophy. Vitruvius
terms his ideal curriculum the encyclios disciplina.^  Galen writing in
the second century A.D. outlines as important preparatory subjects for
doctors those that he himself studied, grammar, dialectic, philosophy,
2geometry and arithmetic. It would appear that broader education as 
embodied in the eyMUMkuos uacöeca was considered desirable for 
professional training. This principle is certainly reflected in the 
educational thought of Cicero and Quintilian, who upheld the importance 
of the liberal arts for the training of an orator.
Cicero is emphatic and unwavering in his view that an orator's
training should be based on a liberal education. And he very much
3regrets that the majority of orators lacked this. On the other hand, 
he does acknowledge that some had very considerably studied studia 
liberalissima, but only a few of these were to excel as orators.^




de Or. i.72. ... neminem esse in oratorum numero habendum3 qui non
sit omnibus eis artibus3 quae sunt libero dignae perpolitus.
de Or. i.73. tarnen facile declaratur3 utrum is3 qui dicat3 ...3 an 
ad dicendum omnibus ingenuis artibus instructus accesserit.
4 de Or. i.ll. ... ex omnibus eis3 qui in harum artium studiis 
liberalissimis sint doctrinisque versati3 minimam copiam poetarum et 
oratorum egregiorum exstitisse.
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Cicero goes beyond the range of the subjects of the liberal arts in
recommending really a very wide and almost encyclopaedic field of study.
On two occasions the particular subjects are mentioned, the lists being
pretty well consistent with the conventional curriculum; Cicero
suggests that poetry, mathematics, music and the sciences were
established as school subjects to educate the young culturally and
morally;* and he includes in the liberales doctrinae atque ingenuae
studied by Hippias of Elis geometry, music, literature and poetry,
2natural science together with ethics and political science. But Cicero
supported a curriculum of subjects that were not rigidly specialist. He
3thought that a liberal education should be all-embracing and inter­
disciplinary. Also he argued strongly that law^ * and history^ should be
6 7studied. Geography and human psychology were also desirable fields 
for study. In maintaining that the orator should take all knowledge as 
his province/ Cicero also emphasised that he should have a deep under­
standing of philosophy. The doctus orator should embody a combination 
of rhetorical excellence and a command of philosophy, an ideal urged 
strongly by Crassus especially throughout the third book of De Oratore. 
And the very significant principle in this regard is that the artes
d
liberales should be propaedeumata or^basis for a command of philosophy. 
This was a premise laid down particularly by the Academy and the Stoics; 
and accordingly very shortly will be discussed the Stoics' attitude to 










de Or. iii.58. ... artibus quae repertae sunt at puerorum mentes ad
humanitatem fingerentur atque virtutem.
de Or. iii.127.
de Or. iii.132.
de Or. i . 166 foil.




Cf. also the Stoic ideal expressed in the famous words of Terence, 




is also consistent with the educational spirit of the liberal arts, 
where the whole range of education was to be related to human values. 
It was in keeping with Cicero's own temperament and educational back­
ground to urge a synthesis of philosophy and rhetoric, also 
incorporating training in the liberal arts.^
Quintilian's views on the education of an orator are very
similar to those of Cicero whom he frequently mentions as his
outstanding authority on educational thought. Like Cicero, Quintilian
advocates the uniting of rhetoric and philosophy in the qualities of the 
2'ideal' orator. His aim that the ideal orator should be vir bonus 
3
dicendi peritus implies the embodiment of strong philosophic values;
4and this principle is in keeping with Stoic thought. However, it is 
important to note that he has pronounced reservations about philosophers
of his own time,^ although acknowledging the benefits of philosophical
6 7study. Quintilian places rhetoric on a higher level than philosophy,
and regrets that philosophy, at least in his time, has gained so much
ground at the expense of rhetorical education. Philosophy shouldg
subserve oratory; for it is the orator who makes the substantial
contribution to society, while the philosopher in spite of his theories
9is not really active in practical government or in the law courts. It
The historical background to Cicero's educational theory is somewhat 
complex, and related to the Sophist educational ideal. Such a 
discussion is not quite relevant to the present study. For a sound 
treatment see von Arnim, Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa, p.97 foil.
2 i.Pro. 13.
3 i.4-5.
4 As Quintilian was 
questionable that 
teaching^ o adopt 
cit., p .232.
independent in his philosophical outlook, it is 
he would be so strongly influenced by Stoic 
Stoic arguments in this regard. Cf. Gwynn, op.
 ^ i.Pro. 15.
i.Pro. 4 foil.




is natural that Quintilian himself did not profess adherence to any 
particular philosophical school; he preferred to give due importance to 
philosophy and its particular components as being necessary for 
rhetorical education. In fact, he expressly states that there is no 
need for an orator to give allegiance to any particular philosophical 
system. Quintilian’s educational theory was strongly placed in the 
tradition of Isocrates. Consistent with this tradition he supported the 
Ciceronian principle of the doctus orator. However, there is an 
important shift of emphasis where Quintilian, although very much 
derivative from Cicero on educational theory, does not give to 
philosophy the elevated position set up by the latter, who expresses his 
own beliefs through the words of Crassus: philosophy is more important
and is the source of oratorical fluency.* It is interesting that the 
views of Quintilian and Cicero on their prototype of the ’ideal’ orator 
are identical, but the premises for this development are different.
Quintilian regarded the liberal arts as directly essential for 
2the education of an orator; and of course he was in no way concerned
with their function as propaedeumata for philosophy. Quintilian's
comment on the value of music, geometry and dialectic is very positive.
Quintilian believed that the study of music offered many benefits; of
Latin writers he is the most emphatic and outspoken in extolling music.
It is clear that by his references to the position of music in antiquity
and particularly in Greek culture, he is arguing for its stronger
3appreciation in Roman society. He would very much like to remedy the
traditional situation where Romans regarded music of little educational 
4value. He firmly points out that a knowledge of music enables the 
grammaticus to explain better the metre and rhythm of poetry,* 23 4 is 
related to aspects of philosophy and to ideas on the harmony of the
de Or. iii.22.82. ilia ... potiora duxisse quae ad sapientiam 
spectarent atque ex his hanc dioendi copiam fluxisse.
2 i.10.6. ... de ceteris artibus, quibus instituendos ut efficiatur
orbis iZZe doctrinae3 quem Graeci eymumAlov Ttotuöeuav vocant.
3 i.10.9 foil.
4 Corn. Nep. Epam. i.2.
5 i.4.4.
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universe,"^ improves the tone and rhythm of the orator’s eloquence,
3gives an improved sense of gesture.
In regard to geometry Quintilian fully agrees with the
4educational ideas apparently held by a large number of people. The 
principle of transfer of training is embodied in the study of geometry, 
for it exercises the mind and develops quick perception.* 23 45678 The orator 
needs to know linear geometry, so that he can confidently deal with 
cases concerning boundaries and measurements/'* As geometvia was also a 
comprehensive term, that included arithmetic, Quintilian thinks it
7appropriate to refer to the orator’s need to be able to calculate. He 
is in firm agreement with the educational association between geometry 
and dialectic. Such an association, of course, was strongly emphasisedg
by the Stoics.
9Quintilian points out that dialectic uses syllogistic methods, 
and this is precisely the procedure used in geometry. The form of proof 
known as linear demonstration (ypanycxau cxTtoöeL^eus) is used in both 
geometry and dialectic/9 And Quintilian proceeds to give examples 
showing how geometrical principles may disprove invalid arguments. The 
mathematical subjects of the c y m u mAlos muöeux were clearly not regarded 
as independent of each other; geometry was basic to astronomy, for by 




4 i.10.34. In geometria partem fatentur esse utilem teneris aetatibus 








was supported by Quintilian as a subject for study, for it is important
for understanding the p o e t s a n d  it shows us that all things are ruled
2by order and destiny, which he claims may at times be a consideration 
of value to an orator. The ordered nature of the universe is 
fundamental to the Stoics' physical system, although Quintilian's 
suggestion that this knowledge may be useful to an orator is not 
altogether convincing. It is appropriate that in his educational 
programme the subjects of the eyhumXlos Ttaeöeda should be subordinate to 
the teaching of rhetoric; and consistent with this principle he urges, 
like Cicero before him, that the orator's knowledge of subject-matter 
should cover in general terms everything on which he may be asked to 
speak. ^
Of the liberal arts the subjects which dominated the school
curriculum were grammar, literature and rhetoric. It is generally 4agreed that pupils were not really well educated in the other subjects;
although, as mentioned, astronomy was studied as it related to
literature and through Aratus' Phaenomena.^  It is difficult to
establish to what extent Romans were educated in those subjects of the
eyMUMXbos Tiauöeua, apart from grammar, literature and rhetoric.
Cicero's Brutus, an informative text that comments on a long list of
orators from the second century to the first half of the first century
B.C., indicates very few who revealed a 'liberal education'. These are
6 7 8principally L. Crassus, Servius Sulpicius, L. Sisenna, L. Torquatus, 
possibly Sextus Pompeius who had a knowledge of geometry, law and Stoic
i.4.4.
2 i.10.46.
3 viii.Pro. 6; ii.21.20; ii.21.14; cf. de Or. i.6.20.
4 Cf. Marrou, Histoire, p.378, and Saint Augustin, p.224.
M.L. Clarke, Higher Education in the Ancient World, p.45 foil.





philosophy^ and, of course, Cicero himself. Following Cicero Romans
whose writings reveal a command of the liberal arts are Varro, Celsus,
Pliny, Vitruvius. And although Quintilian and Seneca are strongly
interested in educational thought and teaching, they themselves do not
evince a significant knowledge of mathematical sciences. The teaching
of these sciences was probably restricted to a limited number of
students whose interests were scientific, technical or philosophical and
2to those pupils following the grammatico-1iterary curriculum who
3possibly might study these as supplementary subjects.
THE LIBERAL ARTS AS TrpoTicu,6euyotxa 
FOR STOIC PHILOSOPHY
4
From the time of Chrysippus the Stoics had emphasised the
importance of the eyxuxAuos Tiotböeda as basic education for the aspiring
philosopher. On the other hand, Zeno'’ had earlier discounted the need
for this educational background; and this attitude was also held by the
Cynics, Sceptics and Epicureans.^ The confidence placed by the Stoics
in the value of the liberal arts was shared by the Academy and 
7Peripatetics. Yet with the Stoics as much as and probably more so than 
with other schools, the liberal arts became established as TcpoTiaydeuyaxa
g
for their philosophical teachings. In various ways Chrysippus set the 
direction for the later development of Stoicism. His influence is also 
reflected in the value placed on the liberal arts by later Stoics. The
1 Brut. 175.
2 Marrou, Histoire, p.378.
3
Quint, i.12.13. Ergo cum grammaticus totum ocoupare diem non possit 
nec debeat3 ne discentis animum taedio avertat3 quibus potius studiis 
haec temporum velut subsiciva donabimus.
D. L. vii.129 . E u x p n o x e u v  6e xau xct e y x u x A u a  y a d n y a x a  cpnouv 6 
XpuaunTtos.
5 D.L. vii.32.
 ^ Cf. Marrou, Histoire, p.244; Gwynn, op. cit. , p.87.




study of the liberal arts was in keeping with the eclectic and
encyclopaedic tradition furthered by Crates of Mallos, Panaetius and
Posidonius. Included in the wide range of works written by Chrysippus
1 2 3 4were books on poetry, dialectic, theorems/ grammar and a book on
5 6definitions relating to various sciences. As shown above, Crates was 
interested in a wide field of learning; he proceeded from his studies 
in anomalistic grammar and literary exegesis to astronomy and geography. 
Panaetius, the Stoic humanist, who was interested in human progress, 
theology, ethics and cosmic interpretation, studied and wrote on certain 
subjects of the liberal arts. These were poetry,^ grammar and 
philology,^ dialectic^ and astronomy.^ Of all Stoics he was the one 
most influenced by Plato and Aristotle; Panaetius' field of philosophy 
was that which firmly believed in the propaedeutic value of the
c Y m u m A l o s  T t o t u ö e u a .
Posidonius had firm ideas on the value of the liberal arts.
In contrast to the other arts, such as the manual, he stressed their 
'free' aspect for they led to the inculcation of virtue.^ Posidonius 
divided the 'arts' into four categories and the liberal arts were by far 
the most educationally valuable, and particularly for the development of 
virtue and consequently for philosophy. In writing on a wide range of 
subjects he researched a number of the disciplines covered by the 
liberal arts. Also his interest was firmly directed to those fields
1 D. L. vii.200. T i e p L  T O U  It COS Ö E L  T W V  It 0  L n y  Ct T WV a H O U C L V  ß ' .
2 D. L. vii.189- 201, passim.
3 D. L. vii.196. Adyou UTto^cTLMOL ^ewpnydxouv ß'.
4 D. L. vii.192-200, passim.
5 D. L. vii.199.
6 Chapter II, p.38 foil.
7 Pohlenz, Pauly-Wissowa, Vol. XVIII, 3, p.421.
8
Ibid. , p .428.
9
Ibid. , p.429; 
argument; cf
although he did not get too involved in pedantic 
. Cic. de Fin. iv.79.
10 Cic. de Hep. i. 15.
11 Sen. Ep. lxxxviii.21 foil.
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which were strongly located in the tradition of Plato, as much as that
of the Stoics. He wrote on geometry, mathematics, astronomy,
meteorology and geography as mathematical sciences, poetry;1 23* these
subjects are mentioned because they are relevant to the liberal arts.
Posidonius was also considerably concerned with most important areas of
philosophical study; he was strongly concerned with ethical issues,
cosmic interpretations, history, divination, fate, anthropology,
physics. Posidonius was not very much interested in rhetoric, although
he did write on Hermagoras* deoets with the purpose of refuting his 
2arguments. However, his approach was probably based on philosophical
rather than rhetorical premises. His interest in logic was directed to
classification, to categories, to fundamental principles of science
rather than to dialectical proofs as used in rhetoric. For instance, he
3maintained that the rules of logic were the rules of the world, that
4there were respectively the categories of words and things, that there
should be a differentiation between efficient cause and antecedent 
5cause.
Posidonius, more than any other leading Stoic, stressed the 
mathematical sciences as the basis of philosophy;7 for him 'mathematics 
is as indispensable to philosophy as the carpenter is to theg
mathematician'. It is natural that with less emphasis placed on 
rhetoric, and with his upholding of science,Posidonius found the liberal 
arts an appropriate curriculum for the education of a philosopher. 
However, Posidonius' influence was for the most part on philosophers and
1 See M. Laffranque, Poseidonius d'Apamee.
2 Plutarch, Pompey, lx.
3 L. Edelstein, 'The Philosophical System of Posidonius', American 
Journal of Philology, Vol. 57, 1936, p.318.
 ^ Edelstein, op. oit. , p.317.
 ^ Cf. Sen. Ep. lxxxviii.31, praecedens causa3 efficiens causa.
 ^ The Stoic geometer Geminus being a strong specialist is excepted.
7 Cf. Edelstein, op. cit. , note p.321.




scientists; the educational implications of his scheme were not felt in 
society generally.
Seneca's long epistle on liberal studies is interesting.
Seneca claims that the only worthwhile study is wisdom,1 or ethical
philosophy as a basis for virtue. Accordingly Seneca attempts to place
the liberal arts in perspective, and as they relate to his stated
premise. The liberal arts may be worthy of study if they are able to
set the direction of the soul towards virtue. And Seneca ventures to
state a proposition that wisdom might even be learned without liberal
2studies; the tone of his words is such that he is obviously presenting
a thought that is contrary to the established belief. He chooses to
comment explicitly on a number of subjects of the eyxuxALOS ncxuöeux in
his attempts to point out that their study does not lead necessarily to
virtue. However, the clear implication is that these subjects comprise
an established curriculum and are regarded traditionally as
nponauöcuuaxa. It is the case of one person expressing his critical
views on prevailing educational thought; such a prerogative, of course,
is exercised vehemently by citizens of all generations. While Seneca
3acknowledges that the liberal studies may be rudimenta,' they are not to 
be the culmination or opera of education. For they have certain short­
comings: the grammaticus, according to Seneca, in teaching language and
4literature does not necessarily teach virtue; the musician's teaching 
of harmony is well short of the ideal that it is important to reach the
Ep. lxxxviii.2. Hoc est sapientiaesublime, forte, magnanimum.
Ep. lxxxviii.32. Potest quidem etiam illud did: sine liberalibus
studiis veniri ad sapientiam posse.
However, as mentioned (see p.27), Seneca's attitudes can be enigmatic. 
The question arises whether the argument presented actually reflects 
his own thinking or is simply stated expediently here to exalt the 
importance of virtue for wisdom by playing down the traditional 
school curriculum.
Ep. lxxxviii.2.
Ep. lxxxviii. Seneca does not in this instance agree with the views 
of Crates who thought that literature and especially Homer could be 
the basis of teaching Stoic values. Cf. also the x/>daus or moral 
judgment made on the text by the grammaticus who through this had the 
opportunity to impart moral values.
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situation that one's soul should be in harmony;1 the mathematician or
geometer makes people more sensitive to quantity and to material
calculation, and makes them too concerned about the measurement of such
things as property; the astronomer simply imparts knowledge about a
fixed order, for the firmament is unchanging and it is pointless for the
3individual to be concerned about the established celestial scheme.
As the eyxuxAuos uauSeda was propaedeutic education for 
Stoicism and for philosophies of the Plato tradition, it is clear that 
serious students wishing to follow and become absorbed in certain 
philosophical teachings would have studied these subjects. Surely in 
Rome where there were so many Stoics there was some demand for studying 
the liberal arts as TtpouauöeuyaTa. This situation probably did not 
apply to school age pupils, but to older students who wished to take up 
philosophy. For secondary pupils, as mentioned, the eyxdxAuos nauöeua 
was regarded as the ideal secondary curriculum, which in actual fact was 
not comprehensively followed by pupils generally. Nevertheless, it is 
relevant and important to look at those subjects of the eyxuxALos 
mcöeux which not as yet have been covered and to which the Stoics 
contributed. Grammar, literature and rhetoric have already been 
discussed. It is now appropriate to consider dialectic and the 
mathematical sciences.
STOIC DIALECTIC
In discussing the teaching of dialectic it is important to 
indicate to what extent dialectic was studied, and then to comment 
briefly on the actual content of Stoic logic. Reference has already 
been made to Stoic dialectic, as it relates to rhetoric in general and
4to Stoic rhetoric in particular; the observations made are 




See Chapter VI, p.144 foil.4
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propositional logic rather than Aristotelian logic of categories was
preferred in Rome. References to logic made by Cicero and Quintilian
mostly relate to Stoic dialectic, which was the basis of syllogistic
proofs and the epicheireme used in rhetoric. Even in Cicero's Topica,
which he claims is inspired by the Topics of Aristotle Stoic logic is
prominently featured;^ yet the Stoics were not very much concerned with
2TOTtbxn, which implies the region of an argument. Following Chrysippus
there were a large number of handbooks written on Stoic dialectic,
usually entitled eLGaywyn öoaÄexiuxn; and there are firm indications
3that such handbooks enjoyed a wide circulation. There are seven or 
probably eight authors^ who set out the basics of Stoic logic, which 
suggests a substantial long-lasting interest. Also, the number of 
references to dialectic! by Cicero and Quintilian^ establishes the fact 
that there was a body of scholars who studied and taught Stoic dialectic. 
Those students who read Cicero and Quintilian were able to learn some­
thing of dialectic in a fragmented way, as it applied to the needs of
rhetoric. And although the De Inventione was denigrated by Cicero
6 7himself as a youthful immature effort it was widely read and 
significantly contained a number of Stoic elements. These elementsg
comprise Hermagoras' Stoic terminology and methods, syllogistic
Qargument' and Stoic ethical principles as relevant to character 
assessment in oratory.^ But it was necessary to study the works of the 
dialecticians for a coherent treatment of their discipline; Quintilian
See especially Topica, xii.53 foil.
2 Top. i.7. Itaque licet definire locum esse argumenti sedem.
3 Cf. Mates, op. cit. , p.8.
 ^ Mates, op. cit., p.69.
5 Cf. Cic. Part. Or. 139; Or. 113,114.
Quint, ii.4.41; vii.3.14.
 ^ de Or. i . 5.
7 See Gwynn, op. cit., p.100.
 ^ de Inv. i, passim,
q
de Inv. i, passim; xxxiv.58 foil.
10 de Inv. ii.52.157 foil.
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gives a clear indication how students learned something of dialectic, 
when he states that Cicero’s contemporaries called in the assistance of 
the logicians to teach them the theory of argument. Although dialectic 
was a subject of the e y x uxAlos TuxLÖeda, it may be argued that it was a 
specialist study pursued, naturally, by dialecticians and, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter, by those conscientious students of oratory who 
wished to develop their skill in dialectical argument.
Stoic logic was based on five basic types of syllogistic
arguments. It was maintained that by the Stoic system of propositional
logic every valid argument could be reduced to one of these basic 
1 2types. Although Greek authors have more clearly set out these five 
basic syllogisms, it is significant for the present study to look at the
3treatment given them by Cicero and, to a lesser extent, by Quintilian. 
Cicero defines the logicians' first syllogistic proof from the point of 
view of the conclusion which is based on an assumed first statement 
(i.e. major premise) and then a following true state (i.e. minor 
premise).^
The second syllogism indicates a negative conclusion when the
major premise is positive, yet the following minor premise is negative. 5
The third form also indicates a negative conclusion when the 
major premise is expressed as a negative alternative. The minor premise 
indicates one of the alternatives; this means that the conclusion 
excludes the other alternative.^
Cic. Topica, xiii.57. Ex eis modis conclusiones innumerabiles 
nascuntur^ in quo est tota fere ÖLaAexToxp.
Cf. D.L. vii.76 foil.; Sextus Empiricus fTupptoveuoL tmoTUiimocLS, 157.
See v.8.7. Quintilian, however, suggests only four forms of proof.
Cic. Top. xiii.54. Appellant autem dialectioi earn conclusionem 
argumenti3 in qua3 cum primum as sumpseris^ consequitur id quod 
annexum est primum conclusionis modum.
Ibid. Cf. the conventional example: If it is day, there is light.
There is no light,
Therefore it is not day.
Cf. It cannot be day and night at the same time.
It is day,




The fourth argument is based on a premise that presents
mutually exclusive possibilities. Only one is true, according to the
minor premise. So therefore the conclusion is that the other
1 2alternative is excluded. The fifth argument has the same major 
premise as the fourth. But the minor premise is expressed as a negative,
which leads to a conclusion that is given as a positive statement.
lx 3Cicero proceeds to >r\ c Afic/v„sixth and seventh form, opr • that
fe' X C (a* ^  J
these are \ by the dialecticians^*, the scheme of syllogistic
arguments. n<\(\ in going beyond five syllogisms Cicero is Mentioning 
syllogisms which are outside the standard, conventional schemata of the 
Stoic logicians.
Dialectic was fundamentally concerned with consequents,
4antecedents and contradictories. Diogenes Laertius elaborates on these 
aspects of dialectical proof more fully than Cicero: he refers to them
as the appropriate terms for syllogistic arguments. Cicero suggests 
Latin equivalents for Stoic dialectical terms.^ Consequens is used for 
to Anyovxov, antecedens for to nyouyevov and repugnans for to 
avxLxeuyevov. However, while Diogenes Laertius uses the appropriate 
terms as they naturally relate to syllogistic proofs and virtually 
assumes an understanding of them on the part of the reader, Cicero takes 
the trouble to define each of his terms. It appears that he needed to 
explain clearly terms that were not generally known.^ This is probably 
an instance of Cicero's policy of suggesting Latin equivalents for Greek 
philosophical terms.
 ^ Top. xiii.56. Cf. It is either day or night.
It is not day,
Therefore it is night.
2
Ibid. Cf. It is either day or night.
It is not night,
Therefore it is day.
3 Cic. Top. xiii.57. Deinde addunt coniunctionum negantiam sic: Non
et hoc et illud; hoc autern; non igituv illud. Hie modus est sextus. 
Septimus autern: Non et hoc et illud; non autern hoc; illud igitur.
4 vii.80.
 ^ Top. xii.53. Deinceps est locus dialecticovum proprius ex 
consequentibus et antecedentibus et repugnantibus.
6 Ibid.
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With regard to propositional logic the Stoics distinguished
between three implications in a statement, namely the / e «
significons; the significate; and 'that which exists'.^ The most
effective explanation is obtained from an example, as provided by 
2Seneca, who cites an instance that Cato is seen to be walking. The 
actual movement seen is the 'sign'. 'That wlnik is meant' is a statement 
(Aexxov) that Cato is walking; 'That whuA is meant' then is a certain 
affirmation about a body. 'That which exists' is the externally 
existing object or the actual physical phenomenon. Seneca points out 
that there is a great difference between what is meant (Aexxdv, 
significate) and what is being talked about (body).
The Stoics had much to say on these three aspects. Signs were
3divided into two kinds, commemorative and indicative. In the 
commemorative sense the sign may reveal something which has previously 
been observed in relation to it. Also, it may indicate something which 
is not apparent. For example, smoke may reveal fire, which is a
4commemorative sign. With respect to an indicative sign, bodily 
movement signifies the internal power or even the soul of the body.^
The Stoics believed that the s i g n t r u e  antecedent proposition in 
a true conditional and therefore reveals the consequent.^
The Aexxdv or significate was of very great importance. As 
well as being of fundamental importance to Stoic logic, the Aexxdv was 
the basis of Stoic grammar; the grammatical analysis and schemata of 
the Aexxdv were the foundation of the whole system of Stoic anomalist
7grammar that was taught by very many grammatici in antiquity.
 ^ Sextus, Math, viii.ll foil. oil duo xhs £xoas xpocx qdpevou ou£;uyebv 
aAAnAoos, xo xe armoavopevov xai xo anuadvov xai xo xuyxavov.
 ^ Eg. cxvii.13.
3 Sextus, Math, viii.245; cf. Mates, op. cit. , p.12.
4 Ibid. 153.
 ^ Ibid. 155; cf. Mates, op. cit., p.14.




The Xexxdv may be complete or defective.1 2*567 The complete form includes
2full interrogatives, full statements or judgments, and syllogisms. The
3defective Xexxdv is really a predicate. It was important then to 
distinguish between the subject (uxwaus) and predicate (xaxnydpnya) •
4The verb (pnya) indicates an isolated predicate. The functions of 
various parts of speech fit into the Stoic scheme of logic. A proper 
name (ovoya) is a sign, or even a physical object, that indicates a 
quality belonging to one particular person.'’ Class names (xpoanyopdau) 
indicate common qualities, e.g. man, horsed It is apparent that as the 
study of grammar was integral to both the work of the grammaticus and 
the dialectician, there could be some overlap of teaching; the student 
might learn grammar from the grammaticus ' teaching of the methodise and 
at a later age from the dialectician’s teaching of Stoic logic.
This comment on Stoic dialectic is not intended to be a full, 
comprehensive explanation; such an explanation would be redundant for 
there have been already carried out thoroughgoing investigations of
7Stoic logic. Rather, the intention has been to mention dialectic as a 
subject of the eyxuxXeos Tmuöeda and to discuss its significance in the 
general educational sense. In keeping with such an aim, it is 
appropriate to mention some of the 'popular' problems of Stoic logic; 
not because these problems were of really fundamental significance to 
this discipline, but rather because they were so widely known among 
people who were not Stoics themselves.
D. L. vii.63. xmv 6c Xexxföv xa yev Xeyouatv e£vac auxoxeXf) oi 
Exwlxol, xa 6’ eXXuTih.
2 Ibid.
 ^ D.L. vii.64.
 ^ D.L. vii.58.
5 D.L. vii.57.
6 D.L. vii.58.
7 Cf. B. Mates, op. cit.
W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, pp.113-176.
E. Zeller, op. cit., pp.92-124.
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The famous 'liar* problem (6 ^euöduevos) is mentioned by
Cicero and Aulus Gellius. Cicero1 *4 first obtains agreement that ’If you
say it is now light and tell the truth, then it is now light.' He then
proposes, without providing a solution: 'If you say you are lying and
2speak the truth, then you are lying.' Aulus Gellius states a
proposition implying the identical problem: 'When I am lying and say
that I am lying, am I not both lying and telling the truth?' The
3insoluble 'Nobody' argument was: 'If anyone is here, he is not in
Rhodes; but there is some one here, therefore there is not anyone in
4Rhodes.' The 'Veiled Men' problem was: 'It cannot be that if two is
few, three is not so likewise, nor that if two or three are few, four is 
not so; and so on up to ten.' Other arguments were the 'Concealed', 
'Sorites' and 'Horned Folk'.'’
In keeping with their dogmatic principles the Stoics believed 
that the wise man was the true dialectician. The value of logic was 
upheld for other philosophical fields, that is physics and ethics. Yet, 
as with so many Stoic fields of study, dialectic was taken up by 
educationists as being important for general education. For both Stoics 
and educationists there was an association between dialectic and 
geometry; it is now the intention to consider geometry as a subject of 
the cymumAlos TiotLÖcta, and its relationship to Stoicism.
GEOMETRY
It was not until the time of Posidonius and Geminus that the 
Stoics made a contribution to the development of geometry. However, 
from the time of Chrysippus the value of geometry for dialectic had been
1 Acad, ii.96.
 ^ N.A. xviii.2.10.
 ^ D.L. vii.82.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. See Chapter IV, p.103, for comment on the 'sorites' fallacy.
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stressed. Chrysippus himself did not further the development of
mathematics, yet to him is credited a comment on the Platonic Ideas with
which he compared locus theorems.* It is clear, then, that Chrysippus
had some interest in mathematics. Although the Romans limited their
interest in mathematical studies to practical, everyday needs,
2Quintilian argues in keeping with Stoic thought when he points out that
geometry closely resembles logic, for geometric problems are solved by
syllogistic methods. Yet it is difficult to substantiate whether many
Romans studied geometry, for the evidence is virtually non-existent.
However, from Cicero we do learn that dialectic and geometry together
3 4were pursued by Sextus Pompeius and by Diodotus.
In Proclus’ commentaries are included a considerable number of 
the geometrical arguments of the Stoics Posidonius and Geminus. Geminus 
was a student of Posidonius; he is often mentioned and his theories 
discussed on about twenty occasions in Proclus* authoritative work. In 
keeping with the Stoic schematic ideas of an ordered cosmos, Geminus' 
intention is to emphasise the whole logical structure of mathematics.3 4
It is from Geminus that Proclus takes various Stoic mathematical 
theories and also the mathematical arguments of Posidonius. The Stoic 
geometric-dialectic association is brought out in Proclus' reference to 
the Stoics' calling every simple statement an axiom, which even included 
hypotheses.^  In accordance with strict methods of Stoic subdivision 
Geminus carefully distinguished uno^caeis and otpyau (which comprise
Proclus. ii.395. An example of the solid locus theorem is: 'The
whole space between the parallel lines is the locus of parallelograms 
constructed on the same base.'
2 i.10.37. ilia propositarum quaestionum conclusio non fere tota 
constat syllogismis? Propter quod plures inveniasqui dialecticae 
similem quam qui rhetoricae fateantui1 2hanc artem.
3 Brut. 175.
4 For previous references to Diodotus see p.51.
Hultsch, Pauly-Wissowa, VII.I, p.1042. It is interesting that in 
antiquity the logicality of mathematics was questioned by the 
Epicureans and Sceptics. Ibid. , p.1041.
 ^ Proclus, Prologue 2.77.
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opob, at x n y a x a  and aCbwyaxa) from consequences (xa yexa xas apyds).
2Geminus made also a careful distinction between the auxnua and d^uwya. 
And he emphasised the Anyya as being very significant for the develop­
ment of a proof.'7’ Such a brief comment on Geminus' concern with 
geometric principles of proof demonstrates at least the interest of the 
Middle Stoics in mathematics, as it may be related to dialectic. As 
well as their concern with geometric methods, there was some Stoic 
interest in certain principles and issues in geometry.
Posidonius and Geminus both commented on the concept of
parallel lines. While Euclid defined parallel straight lines in the
same plane and when produced indefinitely in both directions as not4
meeting one another, Posidonius' definition was: 'parallel lines are
lines in a single plane which neither converge nor diverge but have all 
the perpendiculars equal that are drawn to one of them from points on 
the other.'  ^ And Geminus' definition was: 'of the lines which are
always equidistant from one another those straight lines which never 
make the interval between them less and which lie in the same plane are 
parallei.'^
Posidonius clearly defined seven kinds of quadrilaterals;^ in 
















57.19; 59.11; 76.1; 178.2; 179.12; 199-218.
178.
op. cit. , p.1021.
175.
176; trans. G.R. Morrow.
177; trans. G.R. Morrow.
171. Cf. the Munich codex which has diagrams in margin 
op. cit. , p .134).
square rhombus isosceles
trapezium trapezoid
oblong rhomboid scalene 
trapeziurn
190
Euclid had not unequivocally distinguished parallelograms from non­
parallelograms. The seven quadrilaterals identified and explained by 
Posidonius are the square, rhombus, rhomboid, isosceles trapezium, 
oblong, scalene trapezium, trapezoid.
Whereas Euclid did not precisely distinguish problems from
theorems,^ Posidonius and his followers emphasised the difference. He
maintained that the theorem should be set out as an affirmative 
2definition, e.g. 'In every triangle the sum of two of the sides is
greater than the third.' A problem should be set out in the 
3interrogative, e.g. 'Is it possible to construct a triangle on this 
straight line?'
4Posidonius championed the cause of geometry against the 
Epicurean Zeno of Sidon who argued that propositions coming after the 
principles cannot be demonstrated unless something not contained in the 
principles is granted. Posidonius wrote a whole book to disprove Zeno's 
claims.
Geminus' work on the classification of lines was a significant 
contribution to geometry.* 345 He divided lines in the first instance into 
composite and incomposite categories.^* A composite line is one that is 
broken and forms an angle. Incomposite lines may either form figures, 
or extend indefinitely. Such figures are the circular, elliptical and 
cissoidal; those that do not are the straight line, the section of an 
obtuse-angled cone and the conchoid. Incomposite lines also may be 
'simple' or 'mixed'. A 'simple' line may form a figure such as the 
circle, while others such as the straight line are unbounded.^ Geminus 




4 Proclus, 214 foil.
5 Hultsch, op. ait., p.1044.
 ^ Proclus, 111 foil.
7 Proclus, 111.
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and making equal angles with it are themselves equal;'*' homoemeric lines 
are the straight line, the circle and the cylindrical helix.
These references to the work in geometry undertaken by 
Posidonius and Geminus are simply examples of their theories and 
contributions. They are mentioned to indicate this particular Stoic 
interest in geometry. However, this mathematical research belongs more 
to the tradition of pure scientific study as upheld by the Greeks rather 
than to the 'liberal arts' curriculum of the Romans.
ARITHMETIC
In regard to the study of mathematical sciences arithmetic was 
not necessarily separated from geometry. However, as it was 
traditionally a particular subject of the c y m u hAlos nauöeua, it is 
appropriate to comment on arithmetic as such. Yet, for the Stoics 
arithmetic as a theoretical study had no interest at all. At the time 
of the early Stoics mathematics was only useful in regard to dialectic. 
During the third century B.C. there was no inclination to research 
arithmetic and algebra in the manner of Archimedes or Eratosthenes. And 
when the Stoics were interested in mathematical research they were to 
concentrate on geometry. Arithmetic had been a part of philosophical 
study principally before the Stoics. Its study had been furthered by 
the earliest Pythagoreans who were concerned with two aspects of 
arithmetic: the theory of numbers which was based on the relationship 
of numbers, and arithmology which representing a 'theology' of numbers 
was concerned with the mystical, magical properties of numbers. The 
Stoics' lack of interest in algebra and arithmetic was in keeping with 
trends in mathematical research after the third century B.C. The 
outstanding mathematicians from the second century B.C. were 
predominantly geometers, such as Hypsicles, Zenodorus, Nicomedes, 
Hipparchus, Theodosius of Bithynia. When we come to the Stoics, Geminus 
and Posidonius, they were also geometers, as was appropriate for 
prevailing mathematical interest at that time.
1 Proclus, 112.
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Both with Romans and Stoics arithmetic was a tool for 
calculation. The Romans were not interested in arithmetical or 
algebraic study; their references1 2*4 to arithmetic indicate an 
application limited to everyday commonplace needs. Arithmetical 
facility was less the concern of the 'liberal arts' or secondary 
curriculum in Rome; it was given more attention by the elementary 
school teacher.
The Stoics restricted arithmetic and algebra to applied uses;
they needed to use these branches of mathematics in making calculations
in astronomy, geography and geodesy. To substantiate their concept of
the universe the Stoics clearly needed to present firm mathematical
2bases for their physical sciences. Posidonius, for instance, had clear
notions on geographical measurement, and was in fact an authority on
'mathematical geography'. He calculated the length of the earth's
3meridian as 240,000 stades; and he determined that the width of each
4of the torrid zones as he indicated them was 8,000 stades. Posidonius' 
investigation of the size of the earth was apparently less based on 
geometrical argument than the methods of Eratosthenes, which according 
to Cleomedes'’ were more obscure. Posidonius’ method of calculation in 
the latter instance is not given, but mathematical geography generally 
drew on arithmetic, trigonometry and geometry to make its measurements. 
But this Stoic interest in mathematics was well detached from Romans' 
day to-day use of calculation. The only significant conclusion is that
The arithmetical simplicity is marked, e.g. the number of times 
finger counting is mentioned, Plaut. Mil. glor. 204; Quint. 
xi.3.117; Suet. Claud. 21; Juvenal x.245.
Also, for basic arithmetic, see Ovid, Fasti, iv.702; Horat. de Arte 
Poet. 325 foil.; Cic. N.D. ii.49; Cic. in Verrem iii.116; Pliny, 
N.H. xxxiii.133.
2 See Laffranque, op. cit., p.153 foil.
 ^ Cleomedes i. 10.50-52.
4 Strabo ii.5.43; ii.3.7.
 ^ Cleomedes i.10.52.
Mcxu n yev  tou  IIoaeLÖajvLou ecpoöos rccpu t oo  x a i a  ttiv yrjv ycye^oug  
Tocauxn n 6c t o ö  ’ E p a io a ö e v o u s  ycwue rpcxhs ecpdöou e x ° P e/vri» xac  
6oxouaa t l  aaacpeaiepov
arithmetic is not really to be considered in the general theme of 
Stoicism and Roman education.
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MUSIC
The Stoics believed that the wise man could with profit devote 
some attention to the study of music; and Quintilian'*' refers to the 
attitude of the Stoics to music in presenting his arguments for pupils
to learn it as a subject of the eyxdxALOs naudeua. Yet the Stoics’
2thinking on music was related to acadnoLS indicating apprehension by
sense organs, a theoretical view which was hardly relevant to the
subject of the school curriculum. Music was regarded as part of the
physics of sound. The Stoics were interested in the physics of sound,
which was naturally associated with one of the processes of the five
senses. They were concerned that the mind picture (cpaviaota) be based
on accurate sense perception. Such clear perception was consistent with
the Stoic view that Ao'yos, or reason, prevailed in the individual who
normally could fully rely on accurate apprehension through the senses.
In regard to sound they believed that vibrations spread spherically to
3 4form waves and strike upon the ears. Diogenes of Babylon wrote a work 
on music which considered aua^noLS in a scientific way. Like Plato, he 
considered that music had educative value'’ and might be taught before 
the pupil went on to what were considered as school studies. Diogenes, 
who was himself very sensitive to and appreciative of music, thought 
that the rational person had the capacity for aesthetic awareness; 
therefore musical effect on the senses was consistent with the rational 









sentiment is attributed to Chrysippus who recommended music as lullabies 
for infants.*
Although the Stoics may have provided for certain theories on
music in their system, it was a study which did not really absorb them.
Perhaps a strong interest in music was not compatible with their
principle of otTid^ eua. Their views on music had little impact on
educational thought or on the teaching of music. When it is also noted
that the Romans, Quintilian excepted, questioned the value of music for
2education and did not uphold its teaching," it is a valid conclusion 
that for Roman education there is no really significant comment to make 
on Stoicism and the teaching of music.
ASTRONOMY
Astronomy was a field which very much interested Romans,
although they themselves made no contribution to the development of a
science which was so deeply researched and schematically organised by
the Greeks. And Greek Stoics, although largely drawing on the thought
of other philosophers and scientists,evolved a comprehensive and
coherent system of astronomy. As an integral subject of the quadrivium
of the cymumAlos TtotLÖELot it is necessary at this stage to make some
comment on astronomy and its teaching. However, as emphasised and
3discussed earlier, Roman pupils generally learned their astronomy from 
the grammaticus ' explication of literature and especially through the 
study of Aratus' Phaenomena. Although it was fundamentally and 
scientifically a mathematical discipline, it was studied through the 
teaching of the historice, and it is clear that there was not always 
close attention given to mathematical, scientific precision in such 
teaching. As for the study of geometry, arithmetic and music, Roman 
pupils had little or no association with specialists who as mathematical 





Corn. Nep. Epam. i.2; Cic. de Or. iii.87; Tusc. i.3-5. 
See Chapter 11.
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It is important to note that in contrast to geometry, 
arithmetic and music, Roman authors drew substantially from Greek 
astronomy. Cicero, Seneca, Pliny and Vitruvius included in their 
writings much of Greek astronomy; and they also depend heavily on Stoic 
scientific thought in this regard. In due course there was a situation 
where through reading Latin literature Romans could gain quite an under­
standing of astronomy, and of Stoic astronomy in particular. As 
relevant to the significance of Stoic mathematical sciences and Roman 
interests it is informative to consider several instances (from a very 
much larger number) where in Latin literature prominence is given to 
elements of Stoic astronomy.
The Stoics* upheld the geocentric theory of the universe; in
the centre is the globe of the earth, around which is water and above
which is air. The material of the world fully occupies the space within
the world and leaves no vacant space; motion throughout the space
2occurs through avTCTiepLOTotots. On the circumference of the universe is
3 4the fiery ether which moves in a circular motion. According to Cicero
Cleanthes maintained that the stars are also made of fire. Pliny^
following Stoic teaching maintained that the moon comprised fire and air
taking up particles of vapour from the earth because of its proximity.
The stars took up vapours from the earth and from water as nourishment.^*
Such a theory was in accord with geocentric ideas, for the stars it was
thought moved over the earth as the source of nutriment. In the stars
was embodied a vis vitalis , which was in keeping with the concept that
7they were rational and divine elements in the universe. The earth also
g
embodies an animating soul, which provides nourishment.
* This brief comment on Stoic astronomy might be compared with Aratus' 
concept, Chapter II, p.49 foil.
Sen. N.Q. ii.7
Sen. N.Q. vi . 6•
N.D. ii.U5.40.
N.H. ii.9,.46.
Cic. N.D. iii .14.37; ii. 15.40,46,118. Sen. N.Q. vi.16.
Cic. N.D. i. 14.36 and 50; ii.15.39; 16.43. Acad, ii.37.110
8 Sen. N.Q. vi.16; Cic. N.D. ii.9.
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The Milky Way* was made up of fiery vapours according to
Posidonius who was agreeing with Aristotle. Zeno had originally
believed that comets were formed when several stars united; however,
2the established view supported the theory that they were passing
phenomena. Stoic theories on various natural phenomena were taken up by
Roman writers. The rainbow was explained as the reflection of the sun's
rays from watery clouds, or in Posidonius' opinions was an image of a
3segment of the sun or moon in a cloud suffused with dew. Hail was 
frozen cloud; rain was cloud transformed into water when moisture drawn 
up by the sun had only partly evaporated; snow was moisture from
4congealed cloud. Lightning was caused by the friction of clouds or by 
the wind breaking up clouds; thunder was the result of clouds bursting 
or coming together.'’ Earthquakes occurred when air or wind moved into 
hollow parts of the earth, according to Posidonius.^
The Stoics’ scientific views on astronomy and meteorology were 
also related to precise mathematical calculation; the Stoic 
mathematical scientist could be interested in and relate geometry and 
astronomy, as evidenced by the research of Posidonius and Geminus'7 
especially. As a geometer-astronomer Posidonius pointed out that since 
the earth cast a conical shadow the sphere of the sun was greater than 
the earth's sphere; the sun could be seen from every part of the earth
g
because of its great size. Posidonius calculated that the moon's orbit 
was ten thousand times as great as the earth's circumference and its 
diameter was four million stades.' He estimated the distance of the
Macrobius, Sorrm. Scip. i.15.
Cf. Zeller, op. ait., p.207.
D.L. vii.152; Sen. N.Q. i.3-8.
D.L. vii.152; Sen. N.Q. iv.12.
Sen. N.Q. ii . 12 foil.
D.L. vii.154; Sen. N.Q. vi.18.1-2.
Cf. his introduction to Aratus, eLactytoyr) ict $ tu v o 'y ev a .
D.L. vii.144.
Cf. Cleomedes' statements on Posidonius' calculations; and Zeller, 
op. cit. , p.205.
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moon from the earth as two million stades and the distance of the sun
from the moon as 500 million stades.^ He calculated the diameter of the
2sun as three million stades.
Posidonius’ Stoic order of the planets in relation to the
3earth was adopted by Cicero, who preferred this order to that of Plato. 
The sun was posited fourth from the earth; the moon was closest, then 
Venus and Mercury. Plato, on the other hand, placed Venus and Mercury 
above the sun, which was to be second from the earth. Cicero also took 
up the Stoic theory that Venus and Mercury, although not satellites, 
moved in close proximity to the sun.
The comments in this chapter on the mathematical sciences of 
the quadrivium have related to the traditional subjects, namely geometry, 
arithmetic, music and astronomy. A discussion of associated and 
dependent fields such as optics, surveying and canonics are considered 
as not relevant to the basic theme of this study. Also, the interesting 
and extensive field of astrology is not to be included in a study on 
Roman education, although almost all Stoics, except Panaetius, included 
astrology and divination within the Stoic system; while it is to be 
noted that for the Stoics astrology was virtually synonymous with 
astronomy and that Posidonius through his theories on divination was the 
outstanding proponent of Stoic astrology, the only treatment of such 
beliefs would be through incidental explanation on the part of the 
grammaticus.
The purpose of this chapter has been to look at the cyhumAlos 
7iotu6ecot or liberal arts programme of the secondary curriculum ideal, and 
especially to consider in educational perspective dialectic and the
Pliny, N.H. ii.23.85.
2 Pliny, N.H. ii.85; Cleomedes, mumA decop, ii.146.2.
3 Cf. de Hep. vi.17; de Div. ii.91; N.D. ii.51-53.
4 Marrou, Histoire, p.252. Aueun indice toutefois ne nous permet 
d 'affirmer que l’astrologie avait penetre dans les ecotes et qu'elle 
figurait au programme de Venseignement liberal.
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mathematical sciences together with their marked Stoic significance. It 
is evident that in actual fact the full ideal of the curriculum was not 
implemented and that these disciplines remained the province of 
specialists, who clearly did not teach classes of pupils as did the 
grammatious and rhetor. We must come to the firm conclusion,then, that 
the general education pattern in antiquity was predominantly grammatico- 
literary and rhetorical. Yet whatever may have been the degree of 
importance of various subjects within the eymumAlos Tiaudeua Stoic 
content and influence throughout this curriculum were most substantial.
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CONCLUSION
Although the framework of Roman education throughout the 
period under consideration remained quite static, the introduction and 
establishment of a great number of Stoic elements, as analysed in 
previous chapters, represented within that framework important formative 
and developmental processes. Also, the establishment of these Stoic 
elements is markedly significant for later educational and scholastic 
aspects in the traditions of Western civilisation.
Previously most writers on a Stoic heritage have concentrated 
upon the influence of Stoic ethics, with special reference to Stoicism 
and Christianity.^ But it is also possible to consider Stoic elements 
and their retention in the educational history of Western education.
For instance, the great contribution made by the Stoics to grammar and 
philology, as discussed, was basic to the grammatical system which has 
predominated until the twentieth century. And even if the champions of 
structuralist grammar and transformational grammar were to react against 
traditional grammar, they have still drawn upon an earlier, established 
system; they both use and change the original nomenclature. In any 
case, the contributions made to grammar by the Stoics are still alive 
and are still used in our own time.
While Latin authors are read, either in the original or in 
translation, something of Stoicism will inevitably be imparted. Virgil, 
Horace and Cicero, already mentioned as important school authors in the 
first century A.D., were authors of high standing throughout the history 
of the Western school curriculum. While Cicero especially is a source
Cf. Arnold, op. cit. , pp.408 foil. 'The Stoic Strain in Christianity'. 
Barth, op. cit., pp.232 foil. 'Die Nachwirkung der Stoa'.
Pohlenz, op. cit., I, pp.400 foil.
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of much Stoic thought, Virgil and Horace are also responsible for 
preserving and conveying elements of Stoicism.
Rhetoric, of course, was to become a subject of the mediaeval
trivium, along with grammar (literature) and dialectic. Rhetoric, as
studied in antiquity, was not to survive into the twentieth century.
Throughout history the function of rhetoric was to pass through various
phases: political rhetoric prevailed in the first century B.C.; then
declamation became an exercise in the first century A.D.;
ecclesiastical oratory was later to hold sway; and then during the
Renaissance Cicero and Quintilian were studied again as guides to
oratory. It is hardly within the terms of the present study to trace
the teaching of rhetoric throughout history; yet it is clear that with 
1 2Saint Augustine and Martianus Capella there was an awareness of the 
principles of rhetoric as had been laid down by Hermagoras, Cicero and 
Quintilian. Therefore Stoic elements embodied in oratorical techniques 
were clearly preserved as long as classical rhetoric was taught.
Stoic logic was especially perpetuated in the work of Boethius. 
And when the study of logic became again popular after the Dark Ages, a 
substantial part of Stoic logic was preserved. It is pointed out in
3Kneale that Stoic elements, with some modification through a revival of 
Aristotelian logic, were very much incorporated in traditional logic.
The Stoic contribution to Euclidean geometry was mainly 
effected through Geminus, whose classification of lines into such forms 
as conics and cissoids was included in Proclus' commentary and is of 
particular significance. The predominance of Euclidean geometry 
throughout mathematical history has ensured the preservation of some of 
Geminus' work, and probably something of his teacher Posidonius.
Stoic theories on astronomy were for many centuries of 
importance to scientific thought, although naturally of little relevance 
since the time of Copernicus. Yet Aratus' Stoic poem, the Phaenomena,
* See Chapter VI.
2 W. Stahl, R. Johnson and E. Burge, Martianus Capella and the Seven




was popular until the sixteenth century.* He was well known in the
Middle Ages; and his popularity at the end of the fifteenth century is
attested by three incunabula edited in Latin and one in Greek (circa 
21474-1499). Although Martianus Capella upheld the heliocentric view of
3the universe he at times drew directly from Aratus. There was a long- 
lasting support for Stoic astronomy until the era of modern astronomy.
As well as supporting in theory and practice as propaedeumata 
for philosophy the ideal curriculum of the liberal arts, the Stoics made 
firm contributions to subjects which were to become the trivium and 
quadrivium of the Middle Ages. And they were responsible for 
establishing an interaction between these subjects. With respect to the 
trivium grammar and dialectic were closely interdependent for the Stoics; 
also they closely associated dialectic with Stoic rhetoric. Of the 
subjects of the quadrivium geometry had firm meaning for dialectic; and 
Stoic astronomy was significant for grammatico-literary exegesis. This 
virtually interdisciplinary interaction helped to consolidate and 
perpetuate the eyMuxAuos Tiauöeua as the desirable educational curriculum.
The role of Stoicism in regard to Roman education has proved a 
most rich and fruitful field to research. And it is no exaggeration to 
describe as a unique phenomenon in Western civilisation the way in which 
one philosophical school, Stoicism, contributed so substantially to so 
many components of an educational system. For no other philosophical or 
religious movement has so integrally influenced so many disciplines 
within an educational programme. As these Stoic elements and influences 
were so strong and established, a firm Stoic contribution is embodied in 
the traditions and patterns of education which developed and was 
maintained throughout later centuries. A concluding comment might 
suggest that, just as Stoicism has been examined by many from the point 
of view of its connection with Christian ethics and social values, the
Sarton, op. cit. , p.60.
2 ibid.
3 Stahl, Johnson and Burge, op. cit., pp.180,184. It is suggested that 
lines from Aratus, used by Martianus Capella, are 501-6, 511-524, 
569-732.
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present study has implications for an analysis of Stoic elements 
throughout the centuries of our educational traditions; such a theme 
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